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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. military interv ion In Nicaragua in
1927-1932 sought to brin? political stability to a nation
which was habitually instable. Legitimate transfers of
power simply did not exist. Elections were fraudulent and
coups frequent. The American interest in promoting stable
government in Nicaragua was occasioned by the proximity of
that nation to the P- aama Canax and the existence of a
suitable alternate canal route through Nicaraguan territory.
The decision-makers in v/ashington feared that instability
in Nicaragua might lead to foreign (European) interventi .1
and that such intervention might become permanent, thereby
threatening the trans-isthmian passages which were vital to
U,S. security and commerce. By engendering legitimate and
peaceful transfers of Dower, the U.S. hoped to remove this
threat to its vital interests by creating stable government.
This attempt at institution building was predicated
on ensuring fair and free elections. To guarantee such
elections, the State Department established the Marine com-
manded Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua as a non-partisan national
constabulary to prevent fraudulent elections and thereby
legitimise the change or continuance of those in office.
During the Guard's formative period (the Marines assumed

2command of the Guard on May 12, 1927), the United States
agreed to maintain a military presence in Nicaragua to
assist the Guard in keeping order a.nd in supervising the
1928 presidential election. This assistance expanded beyond
the anticipated commitment when the U.S. supported govern-
ments were opposed by the rebel leader, Augusto C. Sandino.
For nearly two years, tne Marines conducted the uulk
of combat operations against Sandino' s roving insurgents.
Then in the spring and summer of 1929 » the Marine led Guardia
Nacional replaced the Marines in the combat areas and assumed
the burden of suppressing the rebellion for the remainder of
the intervention. In this endeavor, the Guardia was only
moderately successful. The National Guard neither decisively
defeated Sandino nor did it contain his forays to the remote
regions of Nicaragua. Tne Guard, however, did maintain the
duly elected government in power and did prevent Sandino from
severely disrupting normal activity in the populous and
economically important areas of the country.
In engagements witn the Sandinistas, the Marine
officered Guardia performed well. The Marines imparted to
their charges the atrol techniques and small unit tactics
necessary to counter ambushes ana to conduct company t>ize
offensive operations. Tne instruction was, generally, in-
formal. The enlisted Nicaraguan learned the fundamentals of
soldiering tnrough the exoedient of practical experience.
The native junior officer did receive formal training at the

3Marine established military academy, but the Marines of
the Guard did not provide this training until late in the
intervention (more than three-quarters of all academy officers
graduated in 19 32, ti. last year of the intervention). For
field axade officers, there was no training whatsoever
—
neither formal nor informal. There were no native officers
above the rank of first lieutenant until November, 1932,
when the president of Nicaragua appointed captains and field
grade officers from civilian life. However, despite these
deficiencies, wnen the last of the Marines and sailors de-
parted Nicaragua on January 2, 1933 t they left behind a better
trained, better disciplined, and better organized native
militarv establishment tnan Nicaragua had ever possessed.
The Marine tutelage of the i. caraguan constabulary
was successful in endowing that organization, at least at the
enlisted and junior officer level, witn a degree of military
comoetency that considerably exceeded the minimal expertise
of the orevious "national armies." The Marines, however, were
not successful in creating a non-partisan military* Given the
Nicara?uan political context, an apolitical armed force was
probably an imnossibility • The State JeDirtment admitted as
such in 1932 when it agreed to a nrooosal put forth by the
Guard's Marine commander to have the senior officers of the
Guard aopointed equally from anon? tne members of the two
prominent political parties. Implementation of this oroposal
in November and Jecember of 1932 transformed the luardia from

a non-partisan organization to a bipartisan one. Uncer tne
Guard's native commander, General Anastasio Somoza, the
Guard ia Kacional quickly be-ame a p rtisan nody enabling
General Somoza to be "elected" to the presidency in 1936.
The Somoza family has ruled i\iciragua ever since. In the
hands of Somoza, tne Nicaraguan National Guard did brin i
stability to Nicaragua but certainly not in the manner en-
visioi. -d by the State Department. Stability was achieved
not throurh the practice of free elections but through
General Somoza' s control of organized force.
The Nicaraguan intervention is illustrative of the
tenuous nature of foreign imposed "reforms." The reforms f as
in the case of Nic ragua, often do not survive beyond the end
of the intervention--at least for relatively brief inter-
ventions where there is little time for acculturation. The
U.S. attempt in rvicarasrua to institutionalize peaceful trans-
fers of power throu-zh fair an.i free elections failed as did
the attempt to create a non-partisan military. The United
States was successful in achieving the objectives of tne inter-
vention, stability in Nicaragua ana protection of the canal;
however, the United States was not successful in changing
Nicaraguan politics where continuance in the presidency or
accession thereto was accomplished oy force rather than by
vote. The situation in post-intervention Nicaragua, Somoza
and the National Guard, exemplifies the difficulty of imposing






lited States Marine Corps involvement in Nicaragua
began in 1853 when a Marine landing party from the USS Cyane
(22) went ashore at San Juan Del Norte (then Greytown) on
March 11 to protect American lives and property. In fol-
lowing years, similar small contingents landed in l85^ t 1857
(against the filibuster, William walker), 186?, 189^, 1896,
1898, and 1899» with battalion and regimental size forces being
sent ashore in 1910 and 1912, respectively, 2 From 1913 to
192 5, the United States maintained a Legation Guard of ap-
proximately 130 men in Managua. 3 The U.S. withdrew this small
•^William M. Miller an<i John H. Johnstone, A Chronology
of the United States Marine Corps , Vol. Ii 1775 193> (Wash-
ingtoni Historical Division, Headquarters, USMC, 196*5) t p. 77*
2 Ibid ,, dd. 78-101, 111, 113; and Bernard C. Nalty,
The United States Marines in Nicaragua (rev. ed.j Washingtoni
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, I90I),
p. 3» Hereinafter referred to as Marines in Nicaragua .
-'The Legation's military component was composed of
Marine and Navy personnel. From January, 1913 » to January,
1917t its numoers were 105 Marines and 3 Navy; and from 1917
to August, 1925. 129 Marines ana 3 Navy men were attached to
the Legation ("Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations! U.S.
Naval Forces on Shore Juty in Nicaragua, 22 January 1931»"
located in Alphabetical File "N" at Historical Division,
Reference Section* Headquarters, USMC, Washington, D.C.).
Material from Alphabetical File "N" will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as File "N," HQ, USMC.

6force in August, 1925» and for the first time in thirteen
years, there were no U.S. troops in Nicaragua, however,
this condition proved to be transitory, for the Nicaraguan
Civil War of 1926-1927 brought the Marines back in—nearly
3000 of them by May, 1927. The Civil War ended that same May
when peace agreements were concluded between the U.S. envoy
and the rebel commander at the village of Tipitapa.5 The
American military intervention, however, did not end. United
States forces remained in Nicaragua until January 2, 1933*
Why this American involvement with Nicaragua? The
prominent factor, which influenced United States relations
with all Central American Republics, was an accident of
geography—the iothmus. By the twentieth century, the isthmus
was important to botn the security and commerce of the United
States. The construction of the Panama Canal and its opening
in 1914 made the istr.mus even more important. Tne significance
of the isthmus for the vital interests of the United States
resulted in a oolicv towards the Central American countries
4
Ibid .
^Tipitaoa is locked on the river of the same name
which connects Lakes Managua and .icaragua.
Harold Norman Denny, D< liars for h illetsi The Story
of American Rule in Nicara:njia (New Yorkj The Dial Press, 1929)*
pp. 12-15. Hereinafter referred to as Dollar s for Bullets ;
Marvin Gold.vert, The Constabulary in tne Dominican Republic
and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of United States Intervention ,
Latin American Monographs, No. 17 (Gainesville, Fla.t Univer-
sity of Florida Press, 1961), p. v. Hereinafter referred to as
Constabulary ; Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldier s of tne Sea t The
United States Marine Corps , 1775-1962 (Annapolis, Md.i United
States Naval Institute, 19o2) , p. 264. Hereinafter referred to
as Soldiers,

7that some observers have labeled the "Panama or Isthmian
Policy."? That policy v/as relevant to Nicaragua during the
first decades of the twentieth century for two reasonsi (1)
the existence of a suitable canal route through Nicarag' .n
territory, and (2) the proximity of Nicaragua (and the other
Central American states) to the Panama Canal. Briefly stated,
the Panama or Isthmian policy sought to promote political
stability in Central America (and the Caribbean) based on the
following rationalei instability leads to foreign interven-
tion! foreign intervention could result in continuing foreign
control i continuing foreign control would be a threat to the
existent Panama Canal and to the proposed Nicaragua Canal;
such a threat would endanger U.S. security and commerce. 8
Political stability would obviate this chain of events. rlence»
the U.S. interest in the internal affairs of the Caribbean and
Central American states including, of course, Nicaragua.
Was this chain reaction of "instability to security
threat" a realistic possibility in the 1920' s? Probably not,
but aoprehension in Washington that instability in Central
American would threaten U.S. control of vne trans-isthmian
'Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin Americ an Policy of the
United Statesi An Historical Interpretation TNew Yorki
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc7~i 19^3) » P» 185; Henry L.
Stirason, American Policy in Nicaragua (New Yorki Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1927)






8assages resulted in fiscal and -political intervention in
Central America and for Nicaragua, military intervention."
That the can^l routes were of strategic importance to the
security of the United States is true, for as Alfred T.
Mahan succinctly stated i "naive the fleet, and it is infe-
rior in both oceans." 10 An isthmian canal not under the con-
trol of the United States would have done just that-- Mhalve
the fleet! M However, it is doubtful that the isthmus was in
any danger from European or Japanese intervention in the 1920'
s
By the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, Great Britain had sur-
rendered all its rights to an istnmian canal to the United
States. The withdrawal of the British West Indies Squadron
from Jamaica in 1904-1905 made the Caribbean a virtual U.S.
"lake." These two factors combined with the existence of a
^Message if the President of the United States to
Congress, January 10, 192?, printed in U.S. Department of
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States , 1927. Vol. Ill Twa shin.";ton 1 U.S. Government Printing
Office, 19^2), pp. 297-98. This series hereinafter referred
to as Foreign Relations ! and Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes in an address delivered to the American Academy of
Political and Social Sciences, Philadelphia, Pa., November 30,
1923# quoted in Denny, Dollars for Bullets , p. 18.
10 ,-.Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Panama Canal and the
Distribution of the Fleet," North American Review , CC, No. 706
(1914), p. 410.
E.B. Potter ana Chester W. Nimitz, eds., Sea Power 1
A Naval History (Snglewood Cliffs, N.J.i Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
I960), p. 38I1 Gerald S. Graham, The Politics of Naval
Supremacy (Cambridge! Cambridge University Press^ 1965) ,
p. 123.

9"security-community" between the United States and Britain
since 1900, or perhaps as early as 18?1, reinforced oy the
Washington Naval Agreements of 1921-22, made unlikely a
Caribbean clash in the 1920' s between the two principal
12
naval Dowers. As for the other naval power, Japan, her
interests (China and the Western Pacific), trans-oceanic
capabilities, and statistical naval inferiority made a threat
to the western approaches of the isthmus improbable. In other
words, regardless of the varying de-rrees of political stabil-
ity (or perhaps more appropriately, instability) of Central
American regimes, there simply was not, in the 1920' s, any
state, European or Asian, that could hope to successfully
challenge the United States at its doorstep. This "objective
fact" does not discount, of course, what was apparently per-
ceived by American decision-makers at the time—that instabil-
ity in Central America was a threat to national security and
commerce.
What were some of the other factors that caused the
United States to intervene militarily in Nicaragua in the late
1920 * s? William Kamman, in addition to emphasizing the com-
plications arising from the canal routes, suggests the fol-
lowing! (1) U.S. recognition policy, (2) the Monroe Doctrine,
1 oxtKarl W. Deutsch, et al
.
, "Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area," in International Polit i cal Communities i
An Anthology (Garden City, N.Y.t Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1966), p. 11. In this article, Deutsch defines a security-
community to be one in which the members of the community agree
that common social proolems will be resolved only by "insti-
tutionalized procedures without {the] resort to large-scale




(3) Mexico, (4) habit, and (5) economics. J These causal
factors apply to the two ohases of the American intervention--
the initial landing of Marines in late December, 1926, and
early January, 192? » and the period of sustained intervention
resulting from obligations assumed by the United States in che
Tipitapa agreements. To the initial phase primarily belong
the factors of the Monroe Doctrine, Mexico, habit, and econom-
ics; and to the second phase, the recognition policy.
The economic importance of Central America to the
United States was slight and that of Nicaragua even less.
The percent (by value) of U.S. exoorts and imports to and from
Central America (the six republics) during the seven years,
1920-1926, averaged 1.2 percent and 0.9 percent of total U.S.
14
exports and imports, respectively. In Nicaragua, the mon-
etary value of the U.S. economic interest was extremely low.
The Nicaraguan debt to U.S. citizens was estimated at $1.2
million in 1928. ^ American capital investment in Nicaragua
was among the lowest of U.S. business investments anywhere in
13William Kamman, A Search for Stability t United
States Dip!
o
macy Toward Nicaragua , 1925 -1933 (Notre Dame t
University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), pp. 233-34. Herein-
after referred to as Search for Stability .
-^Data calculated frorai "United States Trade with
Latin America," bulletin of the Pan American Union , LI I, LIV,
LVI, LVIII-LXI (1921-1927TT and The Statistical History of
the United S i.ates from Colonial Times to the Present (Stamford,
Conn. 1 Fairfield Publishers, Inc., 19^5), p. 537.
1
^New York Times, March IB, 1928, p. 3, quoted in
Kamman, Search for Stability, p. 142.
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Latin America, -*- and trade, as the following taule indicates,
,i ±s insignif icanx. For the seven years, 1920-192o, the aver-
age percent of U.S. exoorts going to Nicaragua was 0.11 per-
cent of the total U.S. exoorts (this accounted for an average
70 percent of all imDorts into Nicaragua), and the average
oercent of imports coming from Nicaragua was 0.13 percent of
the total U.S. imports (accounting for an average 51 percent
of all Nicaraguan exoorts).
TABLE 1
TRAjS STATISTICS
Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of
Year Total U.S. Total U.S. Total Nic. Total Nic.
Exp. Going Imp. Coming Exo. Going Imp. Coming
to Nic. from Nic. to U.S. from U.S.
1920 0.11 0.14 74 69
1921 .08 .14 58 68
1922 .10 .09 40 80
1923 .12 .13 49 69
1924 .13 .14 42 71
1925 .14 .14 50 72
1926 0.12 0.13 46 61
Nic. = Nicaragua, Exo. = Exports, Imp. = Imports
Sourcesi "United States Trade with Latin America, " Bui
letin of the Pan American Union, LII, LIV, LVI,
L'/III-LXI (1921-1927) 1 The Statistical History of the
United States from the Colonial Time s to the Present
(Stamford, Conn.i Fairfield Publishers, Inc., 1965),
p. 537 1 and U.S. Department of Commerce, bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Nicaragua ! A Com-
mercial and Economi c Survey by Harold Playter and
Andrew J. McConnico, Trade Promotion Series No. 54
(Washingtoni U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927),
o. 90.




Despite this minimal economic significance, the United States
considered that it was a duty of government to provide pro-
tection for the overseas investments of its citizens—a pol-
icy certainly not restricted in its application to Nicaragua
alone. ? The old saw of providing protection for U.S. lives
and property, in the case of Nicaragua, was not a pretext for
some other motive. The initial landings of American Marines
and sailors and the reestablishment of the Legation Guard
took place to a great extent for that very reason.
Closely related to the protection of U.S. lives and
property was the obligation assumed by the United States in
the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to intervene
on behalf of non-American governments to protect their na-
tionals and interests in Latin America. The British, Ital-
ian, and Belgian governments requested such action in early
l?In 1931» this policy as it did apply to Nicaragua
was considerably modified by Secretary of State Stimson when
he announced that the U.S. was limiting the extent of its
protection of American property and lives in Nicaragua
(Kamman, Searcn for Stabili ty
, pp. 202-07; and The Secretary
of State Q5timson]to the Minister in NicaraguajTianna], April 16,
1931. Foreign Relations . 1931. II. p. 808.).
-^Letter from iecretary of State to the Secretary of
the Navy, December 28, 1926, Foreign Relations , 1926, II,
pp. 8l8-19i The Secretary of State (Kellogg) to the Minister
in Nicaragua (Eberhardt), January U, 1927, Foreign Relations ,
1927. III. p. 287, Messa-e of the President of the United
States to Congress, January 10, 1927, Foreign Relations ,
1927. Ill, op. 295. 297-93} Eberhardt to Kellogg, June 30,
1927. Foreign Relations , 1927. III. p. ^0.

13
January, 1927. The State department honored these requests. *
Hence, the landing of American troops on the East Coast of
Nicaragua and the reestablishment of the Legation Guard in
Managua were due in some measure to the self-imposed imper-
ative announced by President Roosevelt in 190^. That imper-
ative was in turn necessitated by the exclusion provisions
of the Monroe Doctrine regarding European interference in
Western Hemisphere affairs.
The use of force in Nicaragua (or for that matter
in other Central American countries and in the Caribbean)
was not a new experience for the United States. Previous
military excursions into Nicaragua had been inexpensive in
terms of men, money, and material, and they had been of
brief duration. For example, the largest earlier inter-
vention (1912) had lasted for only four months, and the one
engagement of any significance (Coyotope) resulted in seven
20American battle deaths. This short intervention ended
the revolution then raging in Nicaragua, maintained the
government in power, and served to protect American lives
21
and property. A show of force--a gunboat here, a platoon
^Eberhardt to Kellogg, January 4, 1927* Foreign
Relations , 1927. HI. p. 286j Kellogg to Eberhardt, January 4,
1927. foreign Relations , 1927, III, p. 287; Kellogg to
Eberhardt, January 6, 1927* j reign Relations , 1927, III,
p. 287 1 Kellogg to Eberhardt," January 7# 1927. Foreign Rela-
tions 1927. III. p. 288; Message of the President of the
United States to Congress, January 10, 1927. Foreign Relations ,
1927. III. PP. 295. 297.






of Marines there--had become a standard United States remedy
for disturbances in Central America and the Caribbean, Prior
to 1926, such action had been successful in restoring order
and in providing protection for Americans and their invest-
ments. "When Coolidge and Kellogg were confronted with the
Nicaraguan situation in 1926, they reluctantly followed a
familiar pattern which they felt would quickly stabilize tue
country." 2 Thus, habit--doing today what one did yesterday
—
was a factor in the decision to intervene in Nicaragua.
In the eyes of the United Stutes, Mexican recognition
of the rebel government did nothing to further peace and sta-
bility in Nicaragua. 2 3 The Mexican involvement in the Nic-
araguan affair raised the three-fold problem of prestige,
influence, and the "sinister menace of international Bolshe-
vism." U.S. ana Mexican counter-recognitions of opposing
factions in the Nicaraguan Civil War resulted in "a test of
24
prestige" between the two governments. The State Depart-
ment perceived the Mexican recognition of the Liberal
22Kamman, Search for Stability , p. 233» This atti-
tude that American intervention would produce peace and sta-
bility is evident in the dispatches from the Legation in
Nicaragua (See, Sberhardt to Kellogg, Decemoer 26, 1926,
Foreign Relations , 1926, II, p. 818; and Eberhardt to Kellogg,
January k, 1927. Foreign Relations , 1927. III. p. 287.).
-'The United States recosmized the Conservative govern-
ment of President Adolfo Dfaz on November 17, 1926. Three
weeks later on December 7. 1926, Mexico recognized the op-
position Liberal government of Juan B. Sacasa,




government as a clear challenge to U.S. influence in Central
2 ^ • .America. J In the past, American recognition or non-recog-
nition had meant the success or failure of new regimes.
Mexico had flung the gauntlet and thereby committed the United
States to an ever more resolute support of the Conservative
government. In the U.S., the "Red scare" of the early 1920'
s
was infectious. There was a Bolshevist behind every lamppost
and fire hydrant. Mexico looked Red. The provisions of the
Mexican Constitution of 191? pertaining to land, labor, min-
erals, and religion comDined with the anticlericalism, the
land expropriation policy, and the threats to American oil
holdings during the Obregon-Calles era made the Mexican
government appear, at least, semi-Communistic to many Amer-
icans. However, the specter of an insidious red hand
reaching out for Central America was either the result of
the State Department's overworked imagination! or, more likely,
it was a State Department fabrication intended to descredit
the Liberals and Mexico. In any event, the acrimonious ex-
changes between A'ashin?;ton and Mexico City ceased shortly
2
^Robert Olds, [Memorandum on the Nicaraguan Situation,
January 2, 1927, Department of State, File No. 817.00/5654],
quoted in Richard Leroy Millett, "The History of the Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of New Mexico, 1966), pd. 116-17. Hereinafter
referred to as "Guardia JJacionalj" Neill Macaulay, The
Sandino Affair (Chicagoi Quadrangle aooks, 1967), pp. 25-2oj
Denny, Dollars for bullets
, p. 258.
26
Karaman, Search for Stabilitv, pp. 73-80, pa jsim i
Denny, Dollars for Bullets, pp. 243-45, 256.
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after they began. The State Department's belief that Mexican
"interference" in Nicaraguan affairs threatened the U.S. he-
gemony in Central America was, thus, another of the causal
factors that sent Marines ashore at such exotic Dlaces as
Pearl Lagoon, Prinzapolca, and Rama in January, 1927.
When the Civil War dragged on through February and
March of 1927t the United States decided to force a settle-
ment between the contending parties. President Coolidge sent
a pei onal emissary, Henry L. Stimson, to Nicaragua to end the
war. The result was the Tipitapa agreements which ended
the Civil War in May. With the conclusion of the fighting,
the first phase of the American intervention came to an end,
and a much longer Dhase began. Under the conditions of the
Tioitapa Settlements, the U.S. agreed toi (1) supervise the
1928 elections, (2) train a non-partisan constabulary to pre-
vent election irregularities, and (3) maintain U.S. forces in
27Nicaragua until after the election. ' The American willingness
to assume such extensive obligations was due to the inter-
relationsnip between its recognition policy and its overall
policy of promoting stability in Central America. U.S. recog-
nition policy toward Central American Republics generally
2
'The Personal Representative of the President of the
United States in Nicaragua (Stimson) to General Moncada, May 11,
1927» Foreign Relations, 192?, Ill, op. 3 i+5- 2+o.
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followed the .guidelines established in the General Treaty of
Peace and Amity of 1907 which were reiterated in a treaty of
the same name in 1923 (neither the U.S. nor Panama signed
28
either treaty). Article II of the 1923 treaty specified
that regimes coming to power by coup d' etat or other uncon-
stitutional means would not be recognized by the governments
of the other Central American Republics. By sponsoring these
treaties, the U.S. hoped to encourage legitimate transfers
of power, and hence political stability, in Central America.
Unfortunately, all elections in Nicaragua were fraudulent.
Those in power stayed in cower. The only recourse to the
ooposition was forceful removal. This of course resulted in
endemic instability which was contrary to the U.S. policy of
promoting stability. Thus, the United States was led to
providing supervised, fair elections in Nicaragua in hopes
of generating legitimate and peaceful transfers of power--
hence, the obligations assumed at Tipitapa and the planned
presence of U.S. forces in Nicaragua through November, 1928.
This tentative date for withdrawal proved to be somewhat
ootimistic as the intervention continued until 1933*
28c Although the U.S. was not a party to either treaty,
they had been drawn up under Amei can aegis t and while United
States adherence to the rec ignition requirements of the 1907
treaty was not perfect, thr United States did abide by the
recognition provisions of tiie 1923 treaty until 1936 (Dana G.
Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Area pBostoni
World Peace Foundation, 193**] # PP« 212-13. hereinafter refer-
red to as U.S. and Caribbeani and Hull to Keena, April 30,




This "Second Nicaraguan Intervention" (the "First"
refers to the intervention of 1912) had its antecedents in
the Nicaraguan election of 1924. President Diego Manuel
Charaorro (an uncle of former President Smiliano Chamorro,
1917-1921) died in office on October 12, 1923. He was
succeeded by the Vice-President, bartolorae Martinez, as
interim president for the remainder of the term. Martinez,
disqualified by the Nicaraguan Constitution from running for
the office of president, and having been warned by the State
Department that if elected he would not be recognized, sup-
ported the Lioeral-Conservative coalition of Carlos Solorzano
(a moderate Conservative) and Dr. Juan B. Sacasa (Liberal). 2 9
The traditional Conservatives supported Emiliano Chamorro,
and a Liberal splinter group, the Liberal Republicans, ran
Luis Corea.
The 1924 presidential elections were held under the
Dodds Electoral Law approved oy the Nicaraguan Congress in
March, 1923.'° Of the 115,000 that registered in March, 1924,
2 9Hughes to Thurston, May 29, 1924, Foreign Relations
,
1924, II, p. 506; Hughes to Thurston, June 5, 1924, Foreign
Relations, 1924, II, p. 508 ; and Thurston to Hughes, June 7,
1924, Foreign Relations , 1924, II, p. 508. For the State
Department's acquiescence on the candidacy of Solo/rzano and
Sacasa, see Grew to Thurston, July 16, 1924, Foreign Relations
1924, II, p. 509.
^ The Nicaraguan government, at the insistence of the
U.S. State Department, had invited Dr. Harold W. jodds to
Nicaragua to reform the electoral laws. In this way, the State
Department had hoped to remove some of the inequities that had
enabled regimes to perpetuate themselves in power.
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84,096 made it to the polls in November (the 1920 Census
31 32 /placed the total population at 633,119 )• The Solorzano-
Sacasa coalition received 48,072 votes, Chamorro, 28,700 j and
the remainder went to Corea.-'-' Not withstanding the Dodds
Electoral Law, "many of the customary abuses seem to have oc-
curred, and the completion of the electoral process was made
possible only by Martinez' arbitrary action in removing the
Conservative majority of the National Electoral Board, which
had refused to certify the result."--5 With some misgivings,
the U.S. recognized President Solorzano's government when it
3^took office on January 1, 1925»
A year before the Solorzano election, the American
government had served notice on November 14, 1923, of its
desire to withdraw the Legation Guard that had been stationed
continuously in Managua since 1913* The inauguration of the
31Pan American Union, Nicaragua , American Nation
Series, No. 14 (Washin?rtoni U.S. Government Printing Office,
1927), p. 2.
32J U.S. Department of State, The United States and Nic-
aragua ! A Survey of Relat ions from 1909 to 1932 , Latin Amer-
ican Series, No. b^Washin^tonj U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1932), o. 52. Hereinafter referred to as Survey of
Relations .
33 Ibid .
34J Munro, U.S. and Cariobean
. p. 245.
-^Although the State Department was aware of irreg-
ularities in tne 1924 election, it felt that the United States
was not in a position to demand new elections (Hughes to




new administration in 1925 was set as the tentative date of
withdrawal. However, on January 7. 1925. Presidenx Solorzano
formally requested that the Legation Guard be retained pending
formation of a non-oartisan constabulary. j) ° The U.S. interest
in the creation of such apolitical military institutions in
Central America had been demonstrated earlier by the inclusion
of a stipulation in Article II of the Convention for the
Limitation of Armaments of 1923 that provided for the estab-
lishment of such forces. ^' Hence, the United Sxates honored
Solorzano* s request, stipulating that the Nicaraguan constab-
ulary be formed in the most expeditious manner. The State
Department set a revised withdrawal date of not later than
September 1, 1925. 38
The Nicaraguan Congress passed the enabling legis-
lation for the formation of the Nicaraguan National Guard on
May 14, 1925. On June 10, 1925. Major Calvin B. Carter, a
former American officer with the Philippine Constabulary, was
^°Thurston to Hughe , January 9. 1925, Foreign /
Relations , 1925. II. pa. 621-22, It is likely that Solorzano,
fearful of a Chamorro led Conservative revolt, wished to main-
tain the stabilizing effect the Legation Guard exerted on
Nicaraguan politics (Millett, "Guardia Nacional," pp. 72-3.).
Vf The Convention for the Limitation of Armaments
(which the U.S. did not si?n) and the General Treaty of Peace
and Amity of 1923 were two of the several formal agreements
resulting from the Conference on Central American Affairs held
in Washington in 1922-1923 under U.S. sponsorship and super-
vision.
-5 Q
Hughes to Thurston, January 14, 1925. Foreign
Relations, 1925, II, no. 622-24.
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hired as the commander of the Guardia Nacic aal de Nicaragua . 39
Carter arrived in Managua on July 16, 1925 i to find 200 raw
40
recruits awaiting him at Campo de Marte. Of this original
41
200, 110 passed the physical examination. In August, the
force numbered 18 officer cadets and 225 enlisted^ "about
equally divided as to political allegiance [between the Liberals
and the Conservative sj •" •* The Nicaraguan regular army, how-
ever, continued in existence much to the consternation of the
United States. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the
Guard ia Nacional , with the arrival of the American commander
and his assistants, and witn the training of the Guard under-
way, the U.S. withdrew its Legation Guard from Managua on
August 1, 1925« The Marines and sailors of the Legation Guard
embarked at Corinto on August 4.
Three weeks later on August 28, 1925» at a testimonial
dinner given in honor of the Minister of Puolic Instruction at
the International Club in Managua, the assembled foreign
guests were introduced, first hand, to Nicaraguan politics.
Gabry Rivas, acting under the orders of the commanding officer
-^Goldwert, Constabulary
, p. 27.
^Millet, "Guardia Nacional," p. 83.
4l Ibid., p. 84.
42 Ibid., p. 85.
-^c.b. Carter, "The Kentucky Feud in Nicaragua,"
World's ^ork, LIV, No. 3 (July, 192?), p. 315. Hereinafter
referred to as "Kentucky Feud."
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of La Loma Fortress, ^ General Alfredo Kivas, arrested several
prominent Liberal politicians including the Minister of Fi-
nance and the Minister of War, General Jose Maria Moncada. 5
Needless to say, the Rivases were Conservatives and were op-
posed to the coalition cabinet formed by President Solorzano/*"
In exchange for the release of the prisoners held at La Loma
and for the return of the fortress to the government, General
Rivas demanded the removal of the Liberals from the cabinet. ^?
Solorzano acquiesced. In addition, Gabry Rivas received a
payment of $2,800, and Alfredo got a house in Managua and
$5,ooo. /+8
To the Americans, Solorzano appeared as a weak, vacil-
lating man. A former businessman, inexperienced in politics,
he was, so the Americans believed, dominated by his wife and
brothers-in-law. ^9 His indecisiveness and precarious hold on
La Loma means "small hill, M and the fortress was
perched, menacingly, on a hill overlooking Managua.
^Eberhardt to KeHogg, August 29, 1925* Foreign
Relations , 1925i II» p. 630; Department of State, Survey of
Relations
, p. 55*
^61 t is interesting to note that Alfredo Rivas was a
brother-in-law of the President. Another brother-in-law,
Colonel Luis Rivas, commanded the Nicaraguan army detachment
stationed at SI Campo de Marte in Managua.
^Eoerhardt to Kellogg, August 29t 1925, Foreign
Relations , 1925# II, p. 636; Denny, Dollars for Bullet s, p.
207.
Carter, "Kentucky Feud," p. 318; and Kamman, Search
for Stability, p. kO.
i+9
Eberhardt to Kellogg, September 3, 1925, Foreign
Relations , 1925. II, p. 637 1 Carter, "Kentucky Feud," p. 317.
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the r°ins of government were all too apparent to another
Conservative, Emiliano Chamorro. In the early morning hours
of October 25. 1925. Chamorro struck. Colonel Padillo, a
Chamorro confederate, opened the rear gate to La Loma For-
tress; and Chamorro' s forces, under the ruse of relieving
the guard, gained control of La Loma without firing a shot.
Chamorro presented his demands to the President the same day:
(1) the coalition was to be dissolved, (2) Conservatives were
to be placed in all offices, (3) full amnesty was to be
granted to all oarticipants in the uprising, ( ;4) payment of
$10,000 was to be made to Chamorro, and (5) Chamorro was to
be appointed as commander of trie armed forces. Solorzano
refused to commit the only force he had, Carter's Guard ia
Nacional , and capitulated on the 26th, meeting all of
Chamorro 's demands,-5
Chamorro lost no time in gaining control of the
government. As commander of the armed forces, he employed
the Guardia Nacional and the army to "calm" the opposition;
^ Carter, "Kentucky Feud," pp. 313-19.
^Eberhardt to Kellogg, October 26, 1925, Foreign
Relations , 1925, II, p. 640.
52Ibid . It is doubtful that the Guard would have
been very effective--it had no machine-guns and only thirty
rounds of rifle ammunition per man. Carter, however, on the
night of October 25> on his own initiative stole four machine
•Tuns from the government arsenal in Managua using the same
trick that Chamorro had used the night before at La Loma
(Carter, "Kentucky Feud," p. 319.).
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he forced Vice-President Sacasa to flee to El Salvador in
November; he removed eighteen Liberal and moderate Conserv-
atives from Congress, charging fraud in the 1924 elections,
and replaced them with his own supporters; a senator from
Managua conveniently resigned, and the reconstituted Congress
elected Chamorro on January 3 to fill the vacancy; it then
impeached Sacasa and delcared the vice-presidency vacant on
January 12, 1926, and elected Chamorro on the same day to be
the first designate; on January 13 i Chamorro became Minister
of V/ar; Congress then granted the President an indefinite
leave of absence, and anointed Chamorro, as the first
54designate, to the presidency on January 16, 1926. He
assumed office on the 17th. ^ Secretary of State Kellogg
notified the Nicaraguan minister to the United States on
JJr2he Congress accepted Solorzano's resignation on
March 14, 1926.
^Article 106 of the Constitution of 1911 provides
for "emergency canctidates"--tne first and second designates
—
for the office of president in the event that both the
president and vice-president are unable to perform the duties
of that office.
-^Eberhardt to Kellogg, December 24, 1925» Foreign
Relations , 1925, II , p. 646; Kellogg to the American Missions
in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador, January 7,
1926, Foreign Relations, 1926, II, o. 780; Eberhardt to
Kellogg, January il, 1926, Foreign Relations , 1926, II, pp.
782-83; Eberhardt to Kellogg, January 13, 1926, Foreign
Relati( .
, 1926, II, p. 784; Stimson, American Policy , p.
23; and Isaac Joslin Cox, Nicaragua and the United States
,
I909, 1Q27 (liostoni ,7orld Peace Foundation, 1927) 1 P. 778.
Hereinafter referred to -is Nicaragua and United States .
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on January 22 that the U.S. did not recognize the Chamorro
regime on the basis that Chamorro* s actions had violated the
treaty of 1923.
On May 2, 1926, the Liberal revolt began with the
landing of an exile army on the East Coast. Soon after, the
Liberals, led by Luis iieltran Sandoval, robbed the national
, , 56
Bank branch at Bluefields of nearly $162 thousand. Chamorro
called up 5000 men (plus 200 of Carter's national Guard) to
put down the revolt. ' By the end of May, Conservative forces
under General Jose Solorzano Diaz had regained control over the
Caribbean areas. " Peace, however, was short. The Liberal
rebellion resumed in August on the West Coast and soon spread
to the Caribbean Coast. While contained in the West, the pro-
Sacasa Liberals managed to sustain the revolt in the East
under the leadership of general Jose Maria Moncada. ' Major
Carter attributed the new found success of the Sacasa forces
to Mexican aidi
We captured members of the Liberal forces who proved
to be Mexican officers. . .[and captured] ammunition con-
tainers were marked 'F.N.C.' the national cartridge
-* Kamman, Search for Stability
, p. 58«
5?Millett, "Guardia nacional," p. 100.
^"Carter gives all the credit to the Guard ia nacional
(Carter, "Kentucky Feud," p. 320; also, Millett, "Guardia
Nacional," p. 102.).
5°Sacasa had not yet returned to Nicaragua. He did
so on December 1, 1926.
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company for the Mexican Government, . . . [^furthermore]]
Mexicans captured by Ch^raorro's forces told me that
leaves of absence had been granted so that they might
come to Nicaragua and make their fortunes by helping
place Sacasa in power; • •
.
[HoweverJ I never saw any
real evidence that the Mexican Government was officially
involved in the support of Sacasa, though Mexican vessels
were landing arms and Liberal troops at various points. ^0
On August 27, 1926, the Secrexary of State again
informed the Chamorro government that it would not be recog-
nized and urged negotiations with the Liberals to end the
Civil War, Tnis warning preceeded the placement on Septem-
ber 15 of an embargo on all arms snipments from the U.S.
to Nicaragua."
The opposing factions declared a fifteen day armi-
stice—through the good offices of Admiral Julian Latimer,
Commanding Officer, Special Service Squadron—beginning
September 23, 1926, to negotiate the problem of the presidency.
The peace conference was held at Corinto on the West Coast.
At U.S. urging, without formal talks having begun, the truce
was extended on October 15 for an additional fifteen days.
After the American Charge d* Affaires agreed to preside over
the conference, representatives of the two political parties
met aboard the cruiser, USS Denver , in Corinto harbor from
the 16th to the 24tn of October in a last attempt to agree
on a provisional president. The Conservatives offered
60Carter, "Kentucky Feud," p. 321.
The arms restrictions were subsequently "relaxed in
December to permit shipments by private firms to the Nicaraguan
Government since it was considered unfair to prevent the recog-
nized authorities [now Dfazjfrom obtaining war supplies when
the revolutionists were receiving them in large quantities





Adolfo Diaz (a Conservative and former president—May, 1911.
to January, 1917) in exchange for the reinstatement of Liberal
congressmen and cabinet officers. The Liberals, however, in-
sisted that Sacasa was the legal president. The conference
ended, and hostilities resumed on October 30«
In accordance with a previously proclaimed intention
made to the American Charge Dennis, Chamorro resigned the
presidency on October 30. 2 The Congress then appointed the
second designate, Senator Sebastian Uriza, as president. ^
Uriza, a personal friend of Chamorro' s quickly re-appointed
64
Chamorro commander of the armed forces.
The United States refused recognition to Uriza on the
same basis that it had refused to recognize Chamorro—election
by an illegal Congress. * in an effort to obtain U.S. recog-
nition for a Conservative government, Uriza reinstated the
eighteen members of Congress dismissed by Chamorro, " and
"2Dennis to Kellogg, September 10, 1926, Foreign
Relations . 1926, II, dp. 791-92.
°^The first designate was absent in the United States.
64Under pressure from the United States, Chamorro sub-
mitted his resignation as commander of the armed forces on
December 8, 1927j on the 11th, he was aopointed Minister to
England, France, Spain, Italy, and the Vatican; turned over
command of the army on the 15th, and departed for Europe on




66The membership of Coneress had been furthered altered
by the removal of the Liberal-Conservative coalition members
that had been declared elected by the National Board of Elec-
tions following Martinez' reorganization of the Board in the
1924 elections. The coalition congressmen were replaced by
those Conservatives declared elected by the Board prior to
Martinez' action (Munro, U.S. and Caribbean, p. 249.).
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on November 11, 1926, Adolfo Diaz was elected as president
with 44 votes for, 2 against (cast for Solorzano) , and 5
Liberal abstentions, ' i)iaz assumed office on the 14th. On
the l?th, the State Department extended recognition.
Diaz* legitimacy was doubtful, but no more so than
any other candidate's. Martinez' arbitrary action of re-
moving Conservative members from the iioard of Elections in
1924 resulted in the coalition victory of Solorzano and
Sacasa, Chamorro, charging fraud in the 1924 election, and
probably quite rightly so, re-made Congress in his own like-
ness. However, his regime could hardly be considered legit
imate nor could Uriza's. The reconstituted Conservative Con-
gress that elected Diaz as interim president probably ac-
curately reflected the political status quo ante bellum in
that "the party that was in power stayed in power." This
/ 68doesn't say a great deal for Diaz' legitimacy.
The State Department, in recognizing Diaz, was neitner
anti-Sacasa nor pro-Diaz; it was merely pragmatic. It would
take force to imoose Sacasa on an already existent Conserv-
ative reerime, a course of action rejected in 1925.°^ The
'Dennis to Kellogg, November 11, 1926, Foreign
Relations , 192 6, II, p. 806; Munro, U.S. and Caribbean , p.
IW.
°°The question of legitimacy is discussed with
varying points of view in the following! Cox, Nicaragua
and United States
, p. 782; Deany, Dollars for Bullets , pp.
238-39; Munro, U.S. and Caribbean , pp. 249-50; and Stimson,
American Policy
, pp. 25-31.
"9Qrew *° Eberhardt, December 14, 1925. Foreign
Relations, 1925, II, p. 643.
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Conservatives were in control of most of the country. The
Liberals held only sections of the East Coast and uninhabited
areas in the interior. To the State Deoartment the Conserv-
atives looked like the winners and tne Lioerals, losers. Diaz
was a known quantity (he had been president during the first
intervention in 1912). He had not been openly involved in
the Chamorro uorising of 1925 and hence, was acceptable to the
Department under the provisions of Article II of tne General
Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923. The State Deoartment felt
that he could control his fellow Conservatives,' He was
favored by Dennis in Managua , and he was willing to make
changes the State Department thought necessary to bring about
stability--amnesty for Liberals, Liberal participation in the
government, reorganization of the 3uardia Nacional
.
' In
short, it appeared to the State Department that support of
Diaz was in the best interest of the United States.
On November 15. 1926, one day after assuming office
and two days before receiving recognition, Diaz notified the
United States that, in face of the Mexican supported Liberal
revolt, his government was unable to protect foreign interests
70Kellogg to Dennis, November 2, 1926, Foreign
Relations , 1926, II, p. 80^.
'




in Nicaragua and requested the U.S. to provide such protec-
tion. Diaz' appeal, in part, saidt
Upon assuming the presidency, I found the Republic in
a very difficult situation because of the attitude»
assumed without motive, by the Government of Mexico in
open hostility to Nicaragua. It must be clear to you
that, given the forces which that Government disposes of,
its elements of attacK are irresistable for tnis feeble
and small nation, • • . [This] emergency. , .places in
peril the interests of North American citizens and other
foreigners residing in our territory and renders it
impossible, for a Government so rudely attacked, to pro-
tect them as is its duty and as it desires. '^
The American reply on December 8 was cool indicating
that Diaz had the moral support of the United States but that
physical support would not be fortncoming. ' 3 However, the
American Legation's warning on the 13th and 15th of December
that the Diaz government was in danger of falling without
active support,'' the imposition of Liberal taxes on American
firms, Mexican involvement, the appeals of American business
firms for protection of their employees and investments, '5
'Dennis to Kellogg, December 8, 1926, Foreign
Relation s, 1926, II, pp. 809-10.
'-'Kellogg to Dennis, December 8, 1926, Foreign
Relat ions, 192o, II, pp. 310-11.
Eberhardt to Kellogg, December 15. 1926, Foreign
Relations, 192o, II, p. 811; Kellogg to Eberhardt, December 18,
1926, Foreign Relation s, 192o, II, p. 812; Eberhardt to
Kellogg, December 19, 1926, Foreign Rel ations , 1926, II, p.
813.
'-'From August, 1926, through December, the State
Department rec -ived twenty some odd requests from American
businesses for protection of their property and employees
(Department of State, A Brief History of the Relations
Between the United States and Nicaragua , 1909-1928 (Washingtoni
U.S. Government Printing Office, 192#J, pp. 05-68.).

31
the appeals of European eovernments for protection of their
citizens, trade, the Monroe Doctrine, and the canal; all
weighed to a greater or lesser amount in the decision to
send in the "colonial infantry"— the Marines!
The Marines declared neutral zones at Puerto Cabezas
and Rio Grande on December 23. 1926 (See APPENDIX III,
Fig. 1). On January 6, 1927, Marines and sailors from the
USS Galveston reestablished the Legation Guard in Managua.
Pearl Lagoon was declared a neutral zone on the 8th. On
the 9th, Marines from the USS Cleveland established a neu-
tral zone at Prinzapolca. On the 10th, the 2nu Battalion,
5th Marine Regiment, went ashore at ^luefields (which had
been a neutral zone since August 26, 1926) . Marine and
naval forces later extended neutral zones to West Coast
towns (in March), the intt- ior (Matagalpa in April), and
the length of the national railway (in February). Trie
2nd Battalion, less the 51st Company, transferred to Managua
where it relieved Conservative forces of the defense of the
Capital on February 1. On February 25, the U.S. Govern-
ment sold Nicaragua 3.000 Krag rifles, 200 Browning machine-
guns, and 3,500,000 rounds of ammunition (for $217,718.) J^
76
' Nalty, Marines in Nicaragua
, p. Ik,
??01ds to Nicaraguan Minister (Cesar), February 18,
1927, Foreign Relations , 1927. III. p. 456.
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The U.S. military build-up had begun. By the beginning of
March, 2,000 Marines were in Nicaragua? by mid-May the num-
78
ber was nearly 3»000.
The Settlement
In early March, 1927, an American encouraged, final
attempt between the Liberals and Conservatives to negotiate
the problem of whom should be interim president (until the
1925 elections) failed. "The failure of the State Department
to formulate a satisfactory local agreement meant the con-
tinuance of the bloody but indeterminate strife. The State
Department now attempted to end the intolerable situation.
Under all circumstances, its prestige demanded bringing
peace—albeit a forced oeace--to the troubled land. "79 on
March 31 » President Coolidge, on the recommendation of the
State Department, requested former Secretary of war, Henry L.
Stimson, to go to Nicaragua to arrange a settlement between
the warring factions.
On April 9, Stimson left New York aboard the Chilean
steamship Aconcagua . Two days before, in a meeting with the
President, Secretary of State Kellogg, and Assistant Secretary
78
Heinl, Soldiers
, pp. 263, 265. It is interest!
to note that the total active Marine Corps in 1927 numbered
19,198 ( The Statistical History of the United States from the
Colonial Times to the Present
, p. 736.). Concomitantly with
tne Nicaraguan Expedition, the Corps in May, 1927, had 4-, 100
troops in China (Clyde H. Metcalf, A Ki story of the United




'Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, p. 797.
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Olds, Stimson had been provided with the following policy
guidelines* (1) Diaz* position was not negotiable, and
(2) if the Liberals resisted, they were to be crushed
—
reluctantly, °° These guidelines didn't require much finesse.
It was to be a power play.
Stimson arrived in Managua on the 17th. After being
briefed by the American minister and the Marine and Navy
commanders, Stimson sought the views of both the Lioerals
and Conservatives. He spoke with President Diaz and travelled
to the Libei al and Conservative strongholds of Leon and
Granada, respectively. Members of both parties visited him
in Managua. From these consultations with the two opposing
groups, Stimson discerned three points of agreementi (1) a
desire for return to orderly government, (2) that this would
be best accomplished by the U.S. supervision of the 1928
presidential election, and (3) that such supervision was to
be backed by sufficient police power to make the election
truly fair. 81 Stimson cabled Washington and received a reply
that the U.S. would be willing to supervise the upcoming
election upon request of the Nicaraguan government.
On the 22nd of April, President Jiaz gave Stimson a
six-Doint peace proposal to be presented to the Lioerals. Its
provisions weret (1) surrender of all arms (Liberal and Con-
servative) to U.S. custody, (2) general amnesty, return of
30Kamman, Search for Stability
, p. 99.
H1Stimson, American Policy , do. 5o~57»
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exiles and confiscated property, (3) Liberal participation in
the Diaz cabinet, (4) the establishment of a nonoartisan con-
stabulary under command of U.S. officers, (5) U.S. super-
vision of the 1928 elections, and (6) a continued presence of
82
Marines to enforce the other provisions. Stimson trans-
mitted these proposals to Sacasa with the stipulation that
they were contingent upon Diaz remaining in power for the
remainder of his term.
Late on the 29th, Sacasa' s Foreign Minister, Minister
of the Interior, and private secretary arrived in Managua from
Q
-J
Puerto Cabezas to discuss the peace proposal. In two days
of talks, a general consensus was reached between Stimson
and the Sacasa reoresentatives on all points save one—Diaz'
continuance in office.
On May 1, the Sacasa delegates requested Stimson to
put them in contact with Moncada so that his opinion could
be obtained on the terms of the Jiaz proposal and on the
matter of Diaz remain! ig in office. Stimson was delighted to
comply since he felt that Moxicada "might be less technical in
aoprovin? a substantially just compromise than the civilian
8?
Ibid , , po. 63-64, On the previous day, April 21,
Stimson and the Nicara^ruan Foreign Minister, Carlos Cuadra
Pasos, had drafted the terms of the peace proposal. The
Diaz plan was virtually identical to that decided upon by
Stimson and Pasos on the 21st (Millett, "Guardia Nacional,"
PD. 123-24.).
Preston.
^Transportation was provided by the destroyer, USS

35
leaders of his party," In his message to Moncada (carried
by three American officers throuarh the lines), Stimson urged
that Moncada come himself to negotiate. Moncada replied on
the afternoon of the 3rd that he would meet with the Sacasa
delegates and Stimson at Tipitapa on the following day.
It was all over in k$ minutes. Moncada agreed to
all the Diaz terms except Diaz' continuance in office, rie
felt that he could not honorably ask his subordinates to
agree to such a condition. Hence, ne requested Stimson to
provide him with a letter indicating that the United States
would not negotiate this point. With the U.S. insistence on
the matter made clear, Moncada could then present the peace
proposal as a U.S. ultimatum against which it was hopeless
to resist and compliance was the only sensible course of
action. Stimson drafted the letter that afternoon (See
APPSNDIX I). 85
On the 5^h, Stimson and Moncada met again, this time
in Managua, to arrange the details of the disarmament. It
was agreed that Moncada' s army would surrender its arms
within eight days, his men were to receive food and clothing,
and each man would receive ten dollars for each rifle or
O '
machine-gun turned in. On the 11th at Tipitapa, at Moncada's
request, Stimson provided Moncada with another letter in
Stimson, American Policy , d. 7b.
85Ibid .. pd. 76-79.
°°Kamman, -Search for Stability , r>. 110.
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which Stimson reassured him of President Coolidge's intent
to meet the obligations incurred by the United States on
May 4 and informed Moncada of the actions taken and planned
by the Diaz government in fulfilling the obligations that
government had assumed on May 4. ' On the 12th, all of
Moncada's lieutenants, but one, agreed to the Tipitapa Set-
tlement. His name was Augusto C. Sandino.
V/hen Stimson left for the United States four days
QQ
later, he thought that the Hicaraguan problem was finished.
The Marines would quickly eliminate Sandino' s small band.
He was wrong. The intervention was just beginning.
"
phe Personal Representative of the President of the
United States (Stimson) to Gen ral Moncada, May 11, 1927,
Foreign Relations , 1927, III, pp. 345-46.
88Eberhardt to Kellogg, May 15, 1927, Foreign
Relations




Sandino' s refusal to surrender his arms and to accept
the conditions of the TiDitapa Settlement was an apparent
reversal of his formerly proclaimed intentions made in a let-
ter to Moncada on May 9. 1927* In that letter, Sandino
statedi
I have decided to go to Jinotega again to assemble my
men, in order to collect all the arms. In this case I
shall remain there awaiting your orders.
I likewise delegate my rights in oraer that you may
arrange the matter jthe surrender of Liberal forces] as
may suit you best, informing me of the results at
Jinotega, which I shall occupy with my troops. 1
Several explanations have been offere i to resolve this
contradic uion between declared intent and subsequent action.
To the Marines, Sandino was a Bolshevist bent on revolution,
and the Tipitapa agreements confirmed at the May 11 meeting
between Stimson and Moncada meant the "prospect of failure of
his socialistic dreams." To keep these dreams alive, ac-
cording to the Marines, he broke with the Liberal Army aud
fled north with a small band of followers to carry on the
General Sandino to General Moncada (translation),





social revolution. The American minister in Nicaragua
considered him to be a bandit and attributed his actions
in the immediate post-Tipitapa period to personal gain.^
Sandino's supporters claim that he never agreed to the peace
settlement and his retirement to Jinotega (in mountainous
North Central Nicaragua) enabled him to evade Moncada and
continue the revolt. Whether the May 9th letter to Moncada
was a bit of subterfuge to mislead Moncada or whether Sandino
did in fact undergo a change of heart is not clear. V/hat is
clear is that Sandino rejected the Tipitaoa Settlement and
decided to continue the effort to unseat the Conservative
regime of President ufaz. This partisan objective, to oust
the Conservatives from government, accounts for Sandino's re-
fusal to lay down his arms and abide by the agreements reached
at Tipitapa. That this was his political goal, the removal of
the Conservative government, is readily apparent from a letter
sent to the Second Brigade Commander, General Logan Feland,
on May 21, 1927
1
2Julian C. Smith, et al. t A Review of the Organization
and Operations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (n.p.,
U-93Z] ) • *>• 63. Hereinafter referred to as Organization and
Operations of the Guardia Nacional .
3Eberhardt to Kello.?£, July 20, 1927, Foreign Re-
lations , 1927, III. pp. 4*+l-i4-2.
Kamman, Search for Stability , p. 121.
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... we propose that the two parties [Liberal and Con-
servative} leave the affairs of the republic in the hands
of the American governor, until absolutely free elections
have been had. If this is done we shall give over our
arms, • • .-^
And on June 14, 192?
i
We do not give up our arms unless the President is sub-
stituted by a Liberal man of honor.
These statements reveal that Sandino's motive was not that
of a bandit, a communist, nor of a super-patriot defending
the sovereignty of tiny Nicaragua, but rather that of a
Liberal who refused to accept the Diaz presidency imposed
on Nicaragua by the United States and acceded to by Moncada.
While Sandino and hid small band (about thirty)' were
trekking north into the Segovia Mountains (eventually arriving
at El Jicaro in Nueva Segovia) , Nicaragua was returning to a
peaceful condition. Sacasa left Nicaragua for Costa Rica on
the 20th of May; by the 26th, the American minister was re-
porting that Sandino was "the only remaining revolutionary
^Letter from Sandino to General Feland (translation),
Yali, May 21, 1927. Located in a notebook entitled "Sandino"
(Card Catalogue No. VS23L .N121991) held at Historical Div-
ision, Reference Section, headquarters, U3MC, Washington D.C.
Hereinafter referred to as "Sandino Notebook."
Letter from Sandino to Jefe Politico , Ocotal (trans-
lation), El Berrugillo, June 14, 1927^ "Sandino Notebook."
The following translation of the same passage is found in
Smith, et al. , Organization and Operations of the Guardia
Nacional
. p. 23^i "We don't give up our rifles even if the
Nicaraguan president is substituted by a Liberal man of
honor." The translation appearing in the "Sandino Notebook"
seems more consistent witn Sandino's political objectives.
'Macaulay, The Sandino Affair
, p. 65«
^On June 18, Sandino established a rebel government
at El Jicaro. He modestly renamed the town, Ciudad Sandino.
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leader of consequence who has refused to lay down his arms";
9
the turn-in of Liberal and Conservative weapons to the U.S.
Arms Commission, began on May 12, was completed on the 6th of
June i and due to the lack of any apparent serious military
threat to the Diaz government and the urgent need for troops
in China, 1000 Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua during
June, 1327. l0
Unfortunately for the United States, Sandino would
not go away. At the end of June he made his first raid. He
attacked the San Albino Gold Mine (about five miles southeast
of El Jicaro) t obtaining 500 pounds of dynamite and taking
over the operation of the mine. On July 2, 1927, Admiral
Latimer ordered General Feland to disarm Sandino. Up to this
time, the Marines and the Legation had considered Sandino to
be only a minor nuisance, characterizing him as an ordinary
outlaw (with which the Northern Departments of Nicaragua had
always been plagued) or as a slightly demented .Bolshevist.
The confiscation of the American owned San AlDino Mine evoked
the response of July the 2nd, but the belief that the
Sandinistas would wither away or would eventually cross the
9Eberhardt to Kellogg, May 26, 1927 i Foreign Relations ,
1927. Ill, oo. 3^9-50.
10Heinl, Soldiers
, p. 266.
-^Eberhardt to Kellosg, June 30, 1927, Foreign Re-
lations
. 1927, III, pp. 439-^0.
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Honduras border with as much plunder as they could carry




Guardia Nacional garrison at Ocotal, Nueva Segovia. ^
From then on, the Marines, the Legation, and the State De-
partment took Sandino seriously.
Three days prior to his attack on Ocotal, Sandino,
in a letter to the Marine commander of that garrison, reit-
erated his conditions for peace— the ouster of Diaz and his
replacement by a Liberal. ^ This stated political objective
was repeated on the 17th and then again on the 26th of
August, Sandino' s belief that he could force the United
States to forgo its support of Jiaz—a policy that the United
States had consistently followed since November 17, 1926, and
was expressly and firmly stated in the Tipitapa Settlement
—
is difficult to explain. One can only assume that he expected
a great deal of partisan support, especially from traditionally
Liberal Nueva Segovia, and that either he was unaware or he
underestimated the U.S. resolve to maintain Jiaz as president
until the 1928 elections. The Liberals, for the most part,
12Millett, "Guardia Nacional," op. 140-41.
1
1
^Lett^r from Sandino to G.u. Hatfiela (translation),
El Chipote, July 13. 1927, "Sandino Notebook."
14Letter from Sandino to the Liberals of Ocotal and
to the Central Americans (translation), Las Sabanas, July 17»
1927, and Letter from Sanaino to the Liberals of Nicaragua
(translation), El Chipote, August 26, 1927t "Sandino Notebook,"

^2
followed the lead of the new head of the party (with Sacasa's
departure), Moncada, in denouncing or, at least in not sup-
porting Sandino. -*
It must have become apparent to Sandino that he had
little influence over the bulk of the Liberal Party t that his
movement, based on the removal of the Conservative president,
was not receiving the support he had hoped for; and that it
would ultimately fail. He had to find a new cause that would
enable him to Dursue his oojective, keep alive his own politi-
cal prospects, and oe more popular. Expulsion of the Marines,
M the assassins and invaders" of Nicaragua, ana "freeing Nic-
aragua from the Yankee imperialism" -*-" would satisfy all three
requirements. Sandino' s new theme, ouster of the Marines
and sovereignty, would remain as his declared political
l^Mc-ncada, in a handbill "distributed tnrous-hout
the provinces surrounding Sandino* s camp," declared
i
"It is a duty of ours not to have anything to do
with the Chief Sandino, and to declare no liberal is
resoonsible for such outrageous things and for this
cause, he is not worthy of consideration for nis last
acts in the constitutional move [?3 because of having
disobeyed the orders to disarm, he aoes not respect
Liberty, nor property nor the lives of persons."
(Handbill fron Moncada to All the Friends of the Republic,
especially to the Seotentrionals [translation], Managua,
July 2, 192?, "Sandino Notebook.").
Proclamation of San iino concerning the 1928




objectives till the end of the intervention. 1? Although
Moncada, a Liberal, was elected to the presidency in 1928,
Sandino considered him to be a traitor who would "only
represent and defend the interest of somebody else, and
not those of the country .
"
XQ Besides, after the break with
Moncada over Tipitapa and the trading of diatribes, it is
unlikely that Sandino would have been welcomed in Managua.
Hence, he opposed Moncada' s presidency as resolutely as he
had Diaz', probably more for his own political gains than
for any other reason. It was not until Sacasa, the former
vice-president and Liberal who Sandino had continued to
19
support after Tipitapa, 7 was elected as president in 1932
and the Marines withdrew in 1933 that Sandino stopped
fighting. There was nothing more to fight about. The
Marines were gone, and a Liberal, satisfactory to Sandino,
occupied the presidential palace.
1
'See, Letter from Sandino to John Nevin Sayre and
Robert C. Jones (translation) El ohipote, January 1, 1928,
"Sandino Notebook"; and Letter from Sandino to Froylan
Turcios, (translation), 81 Chipote, March Ik, 1928, "Marine
Corps Units in Nicaragua, 1927-1933," Box 10, File Folder 2,
located at the Federal Record Center, Suitland, Md. Here-
inafter referred to as FRC . Also, General Sandino to the
Commander of the U.S. Special Service Squadron (Sellers)
(translation), February 3, 1928, Foreign Relations , 1928,
III, p. 5&9; General Sandino to the Manager of the La Luz
and Los Angeles Mines (translation), April 29, 1928, Foreign




Proclamation of Sandino concerning the 1928
elections (translation), El Chipote, October 6, 1927,
"Sandino Notebook."
19See Sandino' s letter of July 17, 1927, and the
October 6 oroclamation previously mentioned.

Although Sandino n ive temporarily groped for a
political cause thic would win him internal and external
support, his military objective, dictated by necessity,
20
was never in question—maintain a force in the field.
Sandino could not hope to defeat decisively the Marines or,
later, the Marine commanded Guard i a .\acional . He had
neither the logistics nor the manpower (See APPEMJIX II,
TABLE I) to do so, and whether he had the ability may be
questioned. The best ne could hope to do was keep the
revolution alive by conducting small unit actions--the ambush
and the hit-and-run- against numerically inferior patrols or
21
against small, isolated outposts. These tactics are not
to be faulted, given the limited capaoilities of Sandino*
s
forces and his political objectives. For while they may not
produce the "annihilation of the enemy," they do permit the
22preservation of oneself." When the former is impossible,
the latter is a suiuaole alternative. By demonstrating that
he could conduct sustained guerrilla activities in the face
of sizeable opoosition, Sandino showed that when and if the
Marines withdrew he would be a political force that would have
to be taken into consideration by any future Nicaraguan govern-
ment. Indeed, he, Sandino, would be in a position to exert
Smith, _et al. , Organization and Operations of the
Guard ia Nacional
, pp. 22, 25.
21 Ibia .. pp. 23, 26-27, 70.
^Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse -tun? i An Anthology of his
Writings
, e<i. 0y Anne Fremantle, Mentor Books (New Yorki




considerable influence in determining the political com-
23
oosition of the government, if net the presidency itself.
This, after all, was his political objective— to install a
Liberal government and president in Managua. Such an
influential status would also serve to satisfy his own
political ambitions.
•what, in summation, can be said about Sandino*
s
actions? His revolt had as its objective the placement of
a Liberal in the presidency. 'When this stated aim failed
to acquire the support of his own party and fellow country-
men, Sandino sought a more popular cause. The Yankees were
both obtrusive and intrusive. They were an easy mark, but
Sandino* s goal remained the same—a Liberal in the pres-
idential pilace. In the beginning, Sandino may have been
dedicated to this partisan cause per se ; later, his motives
were not entirely altruistic. When a Liberal was elected
president (Moncada) , Sandino, realizing that he would have
little or no influence in the government, opposed Moncada
as strongly as he h^d the Conservative Diaz. Sandino did
not cease fighting until there was a Liberal president
(S^casa) from whom he could reasonably expect some political
2 3sandino would later claim, in February, 193^ » that
there were three powers in Nicaraguai himself, the Guardia




rewards and over whom he could possibly exert some influ-
ence. It is somewhat ironic that in view of Sandino's
professed i \m of driving out the Marines, it is likely that
his revolt prolonged the intervention. The U.S., by the
Tipitapa agreements, was committed to maintaining an armed
force in Nicaragua only through the 1928 elections, had
Sandino surrendered his arms along with the other Liberal
chiefs in May of 1927, the Marines would probably have been
scone shortly after the elections, as it was, they did not
depart until four years later in January, 1933* Sandino was
an enigma to the Marines and the State Department. Reports
concerning his objectives and political philosophy were
invariably filled with suppositions. The American minister's
early classification of Sandino as a common outlaw was main-
tained throughout the intervention more so to deny him a
belligerent status than as an accurate assessment of his
motives. Clearly, he was more than a thief. Perhaps, the
best characterization of Sandino is the one offered by
Carleton Beals who interviewed him in 1928i
"He is not a bandit, call him a fool, a fanatic,
an idealist, a patriot—according to your point of
view; but certainly he is not a band, t« "25
24
It is interesting to note that in December, 1932,
the Guard ia Nacional reported only six contacts with the
Sandinistas. In the first six days of November (the election
was held on November 6th), there were twelve contacts! for
the remainder of the month, there were nine ("Official List
of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," printed in
Smith, et al
.
, Organization and Operations of the Guardi a
Nacional
, pp. 302-407, passim .).
^Carleton beals, banana Gold (PhiladelDhiai J. a.




The United States created the Marine commanded
Guard i a Nacional de Nicaragua in hopes that it would provide
that missing element in Nic^raguan politics that would
enable fair and free elections to take place which in turn,
it was hoped, would put an end to the seemingly habitual
national instability. To accomplish the goal of ensuring
fair elections, and thereby stability, the United States
sought to develop a militarily competent, non-partisan
national police organization capable oi maintaining "peace,
law, and order" and of "preventing; any fraud or intimidation
of voters,"-'-
On May 8, 192? » President Diaz formally requested
the United States to designate an American officer "to
The Personal Representative of the President of the
United States in Nicaragua (Stimson) to General Moncada,
May 11, 192?, Foreign Relations , 192?, Ill, pp. 3^5-40; and
General Order No. 1, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua , May 21, 1927, Fi "N," Hw, USMC. The above





pinstruct and command" the National Guard. The U.S.
3
acceded to the request on May 11. On the 12th, Lt. Col.
Robert Y. Rhea, U3MC , became the first Jefe Director of
the new Guardia Nqcional , Allegedly, Jiaz would have
preferred U.S. Army instructors to Marines but Admiral
Latimer is supposed to have persuaded him to accept the
Marines. Rhea's assignment, as an active duty officer, to
the command of the Guardia was legal under a recently passed
U.S. law. Congress had authorized the president on May 19.
1926,
... to detail officers and enlisted men of the United
States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to assist the govern-
ments of th? Republics of North America, Central America,
and South America and of the Republics of Cuba, Haiti,
and Santo Domingo, in military and naval matterst • • .^
When Col. Rhea (3rigadier General in the Guardia ) took
command in May, the remnant of Carter's National Guard (then
under the command of Carter's chief assistant—a Major
Rodriquez) consisted of seven companies plus a headquarters
company totaling 295 enlisted men of whom 65 were absent
2Eberhardt to Kelloe-g, May 8, 1927. Foreign Relations
.
1927, III, p. 433.
^Kellogg to Eberhardt, May 11, 1927. Foreign Re-
lations
, 1927. III. p. 434.
4
Millett, "Guardia Ncicional," p. 133.
^Act of May 19, 192o, ch. 334, 44 U.S. Stat. L.,
pt. 2, 565, quoted in Department of State, Survey of Re-
lations
, p. 54.
General Orders No. 2 and 3, Headquarters, Guardia





without leave. ? Col. Rhea immediately set a.,out to convert
this "old" Guardia into an efficient organization "that
every citizen of Nicaragua may be proud of. • • and all its
personnel glad and satisfied to serve. "° The new Guardia ,
Rhea specified, would be non-partisan, composed of three-
year volunteers, and, of course, trained and commanded by
officers and non-commissioned officers of the Corns. "As
soon as practicable," the Guard would establish a school
for the training of Nicaragua:! officers, and "from time to
time," the Jef e Director would commission enlisted from the
ranks as their merit and ability warranted. On May 24,
1927, the first recruit entered the service. Between tue
18th and the 25th of May, Col. Rhea formed the 1st Company,
Recruit Company, and Headquarters Company. ° The bulk of the
men composing these companies were probably taken from the
old organization. Of the 230 enlisted guardsmen present
when the Marines took over the Guard, Rhea retained 95» The
remainder were discharged on the 26th and 27th of May.
7
' Evans F. Carlson, "The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,"
Marine Corp s Gazette , XXI (August, 1937) » P» 9# quoted in
Millett, "Guardia Nacional," p. 130.
8
General Order No. 1, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional





, Organization and Operations of the
Guardia Na i onal
, p. 9.
General Orders No. 2 and 3t Headquarters, Guardia





Rhea's tour of duty as Jefe Director was short. He was aole
to do little more than initiate its development. Due to
ill health, he was relieved as director on June 29. 1927,
and an interim commander succeeded him pending the appoint-
ment of the new director. On July 11, 1927, Lt. Col. hxias R.
Beadle, US.-1C, assumed the duties of Jefe Director , Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua * with the rank of Brigadier General, GN.
During these early weeks of its development, the
growth of the Guardia was slow. It was coffee picking
season—a time of good wages and available employment. Be-
sides, in the past, Nicaraguan military institutions had
often been negligent in meeting their payrolls. There was
no reason for the Nicaraguan peasant to believe that the
Yankees would be any different. 1- 2 Nevertheless, the Guard
did manage to man, equip, and train one combat unit in a
little over a month. On July 1, 1927, the 1st Company, com-
prised of three American Guardia ;-iacional officers and
fifty enlisted nationals, departed Managua to join the Marines
already stationed at Ocotal. J The 2nd and 3rd Companies
became active in August, manning outposts in the Departments
of Chinandega and Esteli, respectively (See APPENDIX II,











1 3lbid., p. 9.
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During the first two months of its existence, the
Guard ia functioned without any definitive precepts. It
was not until July that the Nicaraguan government established
guidelines for the organization and operation of the Guardia
Nacional . 1^ On the 13th, President Diaz set the force level
of the Guardia Nacional at 600 enlisted and limited the extent
of American participation to 6.5 per cent (39) of the enlisted
strength. The President suDsequently changed this percentage
to 10 per cent (60) in September. J This authorized strength
(660) was about one and one half times that of the old Guard
(415). Diaz issued two more orders concerning the duties
and organization of the Guard during July. On the 29th,
he directed the National Guard to "take over the police
service in the country as soon as possible" beginning with
17
the Department of Chinandeg.*. This edict was follower on
the 30th by Presidential Decree No. 5^ which dealt specifically
A monthly Day scale, however, had been decreed by
executive order on June 18, 1927.
^Letter from President Diaz to Sr. Jefe Director
de la Guardia Hacional, Managua, July 13 . 1927; and Letter
from President Diaz to Sr. Jefe Director de la Guardia
Nacional Managua, September 8, 1927, both printed in Smith,
et al. , Organization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional
,
pp. 205-OoT
ibArticle 2 of the legislation of May 14, 1925,
authorizing the formation of a National Guard, specified that
the Guard would be composed of 23 officers and 392 enlisted
(Thurston to KelloKsr, May 15, 1927. Foreign Relations , 1925,
II, p. 629.).
17 /
'Letter from President Jiaz to General Beadle,
Managua, July 29. 1927. printed in Smith, et al
.
, Organization




with duties of the Guard and its relationship with the
president. It is probable that this decree was heavily
influenced uy the proposed treaty between the United States
and Nicaragua regarding the Guardia Nacional which was sub-
/ l ft
mitted to President Diaz by General Feland in July.
Many of the provisions of Decree No. 5^ and the proposed
treaty were similar (some were virtually verbatim trans-
criptions) . It is apparent that the decree was intended
as an interim directive pending approval of the Marine
drafted treaty by the Nicaraguan government. The July 30th
order assigned the following missions to the Guard ia Nacional i
(1) the policing of the Repuolic, (2) the control of all arms,
ammunitions, and military supplies, (3) the control of all
government property formerly held ^y the army, navy, and
police forces, and (4) the training of native officers. The
decree also established that "the Guardia Nacional would
be subject only to the direction of the President of Nic-
aragua, M There would be no intervening officials between the
president and the .jefe director , U.S. military personnel on
duty with the Guard were exempt. d uy the order from Nicaraguan
law and were subject only to the courts-martial laws of the
19United States,
Millett, "Guardia Nacional," p. 14?.
^Presidential Decree No. 5^» printed in Smith, et





Although Decree No. 5^ specified the chain of command
between the president of Nicaragua and the commanding general
of the Guard, the relationship between the Marine Second
Brigade and the Gu ardia Nacional was aooarently not clarified
until late in 192?. on November 16, 1927, the Director of
Operations and Training, USMC, sent a memorandum to the Major
General Commandant stating that he considered all Navy and
Marine Corps personnel assigned to the Guardia Nacional to
be members of the Second 3rigade."" This meant that Beadle
who was directly responsible to the Nicara^uan president was
simultaneously subordinate to the Second Brigade Command ei
.
The Secretary of the Navy changed this situation the fol-
lowing month when he issued a directive entitled "Instructions
for forces in Nicaragua." Addressed to the Commander Special
Service Squadron, the order established two separate chains
of command
i
BASIC PRINCIPLES. The Second Brigade constitutes the
force of the United States, resoonsible to the President
of the United States. The National Guard constitutes the
force of Nicaragua, responsible to the President of
Nicaragua. These two forces should operate independently
of each other, except in an emergency requiring joint
action.
COMMAND. The command of the Second Brigade will rest
in the Brigade Commander, responsiole to tne Commander,
Special Service Squadron, to the Navy Department and to
the Major General Commandant. The command of the National
Guard will rest in the commanding officer thereof, respon-
sible to the President of Nicaragua. ...
DISCIPLINE. The discipline of the Second Brigade
will be administered by the Brigade Commander, in accord-
ance with the law and regulations. The discipline of the
20




National Guard will oe administered by the commanding
officer thereof solely in so far as the native person-
nel is concerned. In the case of members of the naval
service attached to the Nicaraguan National Guard
Detachment, discipline will be administered by the com-
manding officer thereol within the limits of his legal
powers, i.e., in ordering summary courts-martial, deck
courts, and the awarding of punishments. In- cases
where such naval service personnel require trial by
general courts-martial, the individuals will be trans-
ferred to the Second brigade. • •
ORGANIZATION, SUPPLY, ADMINISTRATION, AND TRAINING.
These activities will be conducted independently by
the commanders of the Second Brigade and the National
Guard* ...
CORRESPONDENCE. Correspondence will be conducted
direct by each commander through the oroper channels
without reference to each other. Matters pertaining
to combined operations, however, will be conducted
through the senior officer present. • • •
SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT. The senior officer present
will be the officer of the naval service present in tne
line of command, according to United States commission
MILITARY OPERATIONS. Combined operations will be
under the direction of the commanding officer of the
brigade subject to the command of the senior officer
present, tfhen forces of the Second Brigade and of the
National Guard are acting together, the senior officer
in line of command, according to United States commission,
whether of the brigade or of the guard, will command the
combined force. ^1
It is interesting to speculate on the source of the
concept of independent commands stated in the Secretary's
directive. Given the military's penchant for pyramidal
organizations with one, final decision-maker at the top, it
seems unlikely that a suggestion for two serrate institutions
pi
Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the
Commander, Special Service Souadron, Washington, December 9»
1927, printed in Smith, et al., Organization and Operations




would have originated with the Admirals and Generals. It
is possible that the idea came irom the civilian side of
the Navy Department, but it seems more probable that the
State Department devised the arrangement in order to make
the Guard somewhat more responsive to the local conditions
and to the president of Nicaragua. This was admirable, if
true, or it may have been just a politically convenient sop
to Nicaraguan pride i but whatever the reason, the scheme
certainly placed the Guard commander in an uncomfortable
position. The officer corps of the Marines in 1927 was
22
small. Its members numbered only 1198« It was very pos-
sible that the Marine officer assigned as the Jefe Director
de la Guardia Nacional would, at some time later in his
career, find himself as a subordinate to the former Second
Brigade Commander, later himself, serving in a different
capacity. Even if he did not, an influential, discrediting
word drooped here and there could seriously m^r his career.
This situation must have, in some way, affected the Guardia
commander in the performance of his duties. Obligated by his
position as .jefe director to carry out the orders of the
president of Nicaragua and to do all in his power to further
the interests of the Guardia Nacional , the Guard commander
must have been constantly aware of the effects his actions
would have on his future as a Marine officer, particularly
22
The Statistical H . tory of the United States from
the Colonial Times to the Present , p. 736.
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when the interests of the United States or of the Second
Brigade were contrary to those of Nicaragua or the National
Guard. So, although the Brigade and Guard were formally
seoarated in principle, in practice, the division was
probably less than complete; and in a confrontation between
the two, the best the .jefe director could hope for would be
a draw and then only with the support of a third party— such
as the Legation.
The Dotential dichotomy of U.S.—Nicaragua or Second
Brigade
—
Guardia Nacional did not occur during 1927-28, and
consequently the subordination of the American commander
of the Guard to the president of Nicaragua (vice to a U.S.
official) worked well during the remainder of the Diaz term.
Diaz was under no illusions as to the political autonomy of
21Nicaragua. J His government had only narrowly escaped being
overthrown by the Liberals and owed its existence to the U.S.
Consequently, the interests of Nicaragua were identical to
those of the United States. President Diaz followed the
American lead dutifully, and when the Nicaraguan Congress
talked, he issued decrees on cue. Neither did Diaz attempt
to use the Guard ia Nacional for political purposes. His suc-
cessor, Moncada, was not so scrupulous, employing the Guard
ok
to arrest his political opponents. But in 1927-28 there
21 /
^Stimson intended Diaz to be only a "figurehead"
executive and believed Dfaz had accepted this reduced status
(Eberhardt to Kellogg, May 2, 1927, Foreign Relations . 1927,
III, pp. 33k -35.).
2*4-
Millett, "Guardia Nacional," pp. 2^3-46.
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were few such problems, and no serious disagreement appears
to have emerged between the Guard and the Brigade until the
early months of 1929.
One problem, however, was the legal status of the
Guard. Until late December, 1927, the legal bases for the
existence, organization, and operations of the Guard were
presidential decrees. This situation was nearly remedied
on December 22 with the signing of an agreement between the
United States and Nicaragua formally establishing the Guardia
Nacional . The agreement was signed in Managua by the American
charge d'ali'aires ad interim and the Nicaraguan foreign
minister. The twelve articles of the treaty set forth
the pay, strength (93 officers, 1136 enlisted), annual budget
($689il32.), chain of command, and missions of the Guard.
In addition, it provided for the assignment of U.S. officers
and enlisted men "to assist the Government of Nicaragua in
the organizing and training" of a National Guard and for their
exemption from Nicaraguan lav/. The items of mission, chain
of command, and American exemption from Nicaraguan law were
no different than those of Presidential Decree No. 5^ issued
in July. Two provisos, however, were significant. The
specifications of Article I which established the pay,
strength, and budget were to be "regarded as the minimum re-
quirements [emphasis added] for the Guardia Nacional de Nic-
aragua," and Article II specified that the Guard would be "the
sole [emphasis added] military and police force of the Republic:"^
^"Agreement between the United States and the Re-
public of Nicaragua, "printed in Smith, e_t al. , Organization




The agreement almost immediately ran into dif-
ficulties. Although the Nicaraguan oenate passed the treaty
on January 10, 1928, the Chamber of Deputies, for reasons
2h
not yet clear, refused to do so. The rejection of the
treaty by the deputies, however, did not hamper the operations
of the Guard. It continued to function under decree-law.
Both houses of Congress finally passed an amended agreement
on February 19» 1929. and President Moncada signed it into
law two days later on the 21st. 2 ' The State Department
considered the revised agreement unacceptable. It was never
aoproved by the Department. The U.S. objections centered
around the change in Article I that altered the "minimum
requirements* to the "only require:!. ents, " the possible
subordination of the Guardia commander to officials other
than the president (Articles II and VIII), the apparent
reduction in the director's control over the internal affairs
of the Guard (Article III), trie possible exposure, without
adequate safeguards, of native guardsmen to civil jurisdiction
(Article V), and the requirement that all American officers
2<DMillett suggests that the power struggle within
the Conservative Party between Foreign Minister Carlos Cuadra
Pasos and General Chamorro caused Chamorro to have his
suDOorters in the Chamber of Deputies block the passage of
the treaty (Millett, "Guardia Nacional," pp. 223-23.).
27Eberhardt to Kellogg, February 20 and 21, 1929.
Foreign Relations
, 1929. III. pv» 619 and 620.
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assigned to the Guard be able to speak Spanish (Article
XII). 2 ® Although Moncada considered that the amended
agreement as passed by the Nicaraguan Congress and signed
by him was technically law, * he apparently expressed to the
American minister that he felt "disposed to continue the
operation of the Guardia under the [then] present arrange-
ment*' of decree-laws, while this was not entirely satisfactory




first seven months were a modicum of
success. From the small core of 95 men retained by Col. Rhea
from the "old" Guard, the New Guard had grown to 438 enlisted
and 46 officers on October 1st and had further expanded to
576 enlisted ana 82 officers by the end of the year (De-
cember 31» 1927). While desertions for the last three months
of 1927 numbered 14, there were 1?4 enlistments.-^ The Guard,
2 ®Stimson to Hanna, May 29. 1929, Foreign Relations ,
1929, III, po. 630-35; and Hanna to Stimson, May 23. 1930,
Foreign Relations , 1930, III, op. 659-o8. The entire amended
agreement as passed by the Nicaraguan Congress is printed in
Eberhardt to Kellogsr, March 30, 1929. Foreign Relations , 1929.
Ill, pd. 625-30.
29Eberhardt to Kellogg, March 7. 1929. Foreign
Relations , 1929. III. p. 621.
3°Stimson to Hanna, May 29. 1929t Foreign Relatioi ; ,
1929. Ill, op. 632-33.
-^ "Annual Personnel Report Covering the Period of
1 October 192? to 1 October 1923 inclusive," r5ox 10, File
Folder 14, FRG, This writer was unable to locate any




during the seven months, was involved in 20 contacts with the
Sandinistas suffering 15 casualties (Killed in Action, Died
of Wounds, and Wounded in Action) including 1 Marine killed
and 1 wounded. The enemy sustained 248 casualties as a result
of the 20 engagements.-' Since the establishment of the 1st
Company in May, four additional field comDanies were formed
and subsequently deployed to outposts in the Western and
Northern sections of the country and to the National Peni-
tentiary in Managua. On January 1, 1928, the Organizational
Chart of the Guard ia Nacional appeared as on page 61.
The Guard continued to expand in 1928 under the
tutelage of its Jefe Director , Brig, Gen. Beadle. General
Beadle had definite convictions as to the purpose of the
Guard i a Nacional and quite naturally the organization re-
flected its commander's beliefs. Unfortunately, and perhaps
necessarily, Beadle's concept of the duties of the Guard were
in marked contrast to what the Second Brigade Commander,
General Feland, came to think they should be. In 1928 there
was no open clash between the two commanders—1929 would not
be nearly so harmonious.
?2J
"Official List of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua," printed in Smith, et al
.
, Organization and Opera-
tions of the Guardia Nacional
, pp. 302-407, passim ; and "Marine
Corps Casualties in Nicaraguai January 1, 1927# to January 2,
1933 (corrected copy)," File "N," HQ, USMC . Of the 20 contacts,
1? involved combined Marine
-
Guardia patrols, only 1 involved a
Marine-led Guardia patrol, and the 2 remaining contacts in-
volved patrols whose comoosition could not be determined. The
Marines (exclusive of those serving with the Guard) suffered
31 casualties in the 20 contacts. Enemy casualties do not
include those designated as "estimated" in the "Official List
of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua." In 192?,
there were an additional fifty estimated "bandit" casualties,



















Fig. 1.—Organizational Chart, January, 1928
Noteai a. A Military Division territorially corresponded
to a Political Department. The term Military
Division was subsequently changed to Military
Department.
b. The Divisions of Nueva Segovia and Esteli were
combined on December 31 t 192?, into the Division
of Nueva Segovia.
Source i General Order No. 2, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional





Under Genera Beadle the Guard was primarily a
police force rather than a combat force. 1 Beadle was not
only leery of using his few relatively untrained and inex-
perienced guardsmen asrainst the Sandinistas, but he firmly
believed that the principal duty of the Guardia was to carry
out the functions of a rural and urban police—not fight
the "bandits." 2 Tnat was the Marines' business. This concept
of the separate missions of the two forces was clearly stated
in a memorandum written at Guardia Headquarters at the end
of 1928i
The Brigade forces [the Marine Second Brigade] have
yet to accomplish one of the most important parts of
their mission that is to clear the territory of Nicaragua
of bandit troops [emphasis added] , which bandit troops
are at this time still operating ana are of such strength
that they are more than an ordinary police force can
handle (emphasis added] . At such time as the situation
in Nicaragua becomes only a police problem or the Guardia
comes up to a strength of 2500 men with a Mobile Operating
Battalion [described in a preceeding paragraph as 15
^Beadle served as the Jef e Jirector from July 11,
1927, to March 10, 1929.
d. ^33.





officers and 400 men to be operational by the end of
1929] • it is apparent that the Marine forces are still
necessary. • .3
As the following tables show, the Guardia Nacional
conducted its operations during Beadle's tenure as .jefe
director in accordance with his perception of its mission.
TABLE 2
GN and USMC FORCES in the NORTHERN and CENTRAL AREAS







































NA * Northern Area CA = Central Area Bde = Brigade
3
-"'Brief on Guardia Nacional," unsigned. Headquarters,
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua , December 10, 1928, Box 10
File Folder 14, FRC. Altnou^h the author of this memorandum
is not indicated, it is reasonable to assume that it reflects
Beadle's thoughts on the matter—a command tends, inevitably,
to adopt the philosophy of its commander, particularly the
headquarters staff. It is interesting to speculate on whom
the "brief" was intended for--presumaoly someone outside the
Guard organization. The Mobile Operating Battalion never did
become a reality. Tne best the Guard managed was a mobile
company—Company "M"--with an average strength of two officers
and thirty enlisted. The offic . most closely associated with
Company "M" was 1st. Lt., later General, "Chesty" Puller
(Smith, et al. , Organization and Operations of the Guardia











































NA = Northern Area CA Central Area
Notes for Tables 2 and 3«
a. The Northern Area is composed of the Departments
of Nueva Segovia and Esteli. The Central Area
is composed of the Departments of Jinotega and
Matagalpa (See APPENDIX III, Fig. 2).
b. The 2nd Brigade total strength includes all USMC
and USN units attached to the 2nd Brigade, but
does not include Marines nor Navy serving in the
Guardia Nacional.
c. USMC contacts are contacts with the enemy involving
patrols composed of Marines only; USMC-GN contacts
involved mixed composition patrols; GN contacts
involved Marine or Nicaraguan led patrols composed
of nationals only.
d. For 1927* two additional contacts occurred in the
Northern Area whose patrol composition is either
composite or GN, and the location of the single GN
contact is unknown. For 1928 t zhe location of one
USMC contact is unknown; the location of two of the
USMC-GN contacts is unknown; the location of three
of the GN contacts is unknown; two additional con-
tacts occurred in the Nonhern Area whose patrol
composition is either composite or GN, and two
more contacts occurred whose patrol composition is
either composite or GN and whose location is un-
known.
e. Probable location error for USMC-GN and GN. con-
tacts is t 10 percent.
Sourcesi The data was compiled fromi "Principal Engage-
ments the Marine Detachments have had with Bandits in
Nicaragua since May 15, 1927 {" "Casualties in
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Nicaragua from December 23. 1926, to Feoruary 8,
1928 j" "Bandit contacts in Nicaragua! from April 1,
1928, to April 30, 1931. M all located in File "N,"
HQ, USMCi from the 1928 and 1929 Guardia Nacional
Annual Reports, box 10, File Folder 14, FRC; from
the "Official List of Contacts of the Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua," printed in Smith, ejt al.
,
Organization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional ,
PD. 302-407, passim 1 and from Nicaragua Microfilm
Reels Nos. 11 and 14, held at Historical Division,
Reference Section, Headquarters, USMC, Washington,
D.C. Hereinafter referred to as Nicaragua Microfilm
Reels, HQ, USMC.
As is indicated by TABLE 3. the Sandinistas' area
of activity in 1927-1929 was mainly located in the Northern
4
and Central Areas of Nicaragua. Beadle, believing that the
"bandits" were the Marines' concern and not the Guard's,
stationed at most a little over one-quarter of his available
manpower there and at times as few as one-tenth of his force
in those regions. The forces he did deploy to the Northern
and Central Areas were not as heavily engaged as the Marines
assigned to the same areas, leading one to conclude that they
were employed more in a police than a combat role. From
July 11, 1927 # through March 10, 1929. patrols involving
Marines (USMC and USMC-GN) encountered the enemy eighty-four
times (known locations and known patrol compositions) in the
Northern and Central Areas. For the same period of time in
4 . .The Sandinistas' base of operations was located in
the Northern and Central Areas, particularly in the Eastern
sections of the Departments of Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, and
Matagalpa, throughout the intervention. Until January, 1928,
Sandino's headquarters and main arsenal was ac the mountain
redoubt of El Chipote, located aoout ten miles north of
Quilali' in the Department of Nueva Segovia. A Marine -Gjuardia
offensive, intended to remove the "bandit" threat for once and
for all, forced Sandino to abandon El Chipote in January, 1928.
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the same region, members of the Guardia Nacional (GN and USMC-
GN patrols) were involved in only thirty-eight contacts with
the Sandinistas (known locations and known patrol composi-
tions). In other words. Marines were involved in more than
twice as many engagements as were guardsmen. Casualties
also reflect the extent to which the forces were engaged.
The Marines, throughout Nicaragua, suffered 70 casualties
(KIA, DO.V, and WIA) during the time period, and the Guard
sustained 26 casualties (inclusive of Marine personnel
serving with the Guardia Nacional ) • Although estimates of
enemy casualties are always unreliable, tneir general trend,
in this case, illustrates that the Marines and not the
Guardia were doing most of the fighting. Of the 59 "Marine
only" contacts occurring during the period, 55 are known
to have taken place in the Northern and Central Areas.
These 55 contacts resulted in 113 "oandit" casualties. Fig-
ures for "Guard only" contacts are 9 known contacts in the
Northern and Central Areas causing 12 enemy casualties.
^Data compiled fromi "Principal Engagements the Marine
Detachments have had with Bandits in Nicaragua since May 15t
1927i" "Casualties in Nicaragua from December 23, 1926, to
Februarv 8, 1928|" "Bandit Contacts in Nicaraguai from April 1,
1928, to April 30, 1931|" "Marine Corps Casualties in Nic-
aragua! January 1, 1927, to January 2, 1933 (corrected copy)|V
all located in File "N," HQ, USMC; and the "Official List of
Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," printed in
Smith, et al
.
, Organization and Operations of the Guardia
Nacional
, pp. 302-407* passim . The 70 Marine casualties and
the 26 Guard casualties account for all Marine and Guard
casualties that occurred during the period except for 3
Marine aviators of the Second Brigade. "Guard only" inflicted
enemy casualties do not include those designated as "estimated"
(none so listed for this period) in the "Official List of
Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua." Casualties





The foregoing compilation of contact and distribution data
illustrates that the Marines were not only deployed to tne
"bandit" infested area but were also actively engaged in
seeking them out. The Guard, in accordance witn its com-
mander's policy, was not so utilized.
During 1927-1928, this separation of duties,
apparently, was an agreeable arrangement that satisfied the
State Department, the Gu-rd, and tne Second Brigade, The
State Department ' s prevailing concern was the holding of a
"free, fair, and impartial election" in 1928.' To make such
a desire a reality, tne Legation believed that one of the
essential steps was tne removal of the nation's police
forces from political control. The Legation tnought this
could best be accomplished by having the American commanded
National Guard assume the police duties throughout the
Another interpretation can be gleaned from the data.
One can draw the conclusion that the Marines instead of oeing
"more heavily" engaged were just "more sloppily" engaged than
was the Guard. After all, they had more contacts (ambusned?)
and had more casualties. However, given the relative level of
exoerience and training of the two forces, even though at
times the Corps was using recruits witn only six weeks of
training (Macaulay, The Sandino Affair , p. 109), this con-
clusion would be tenuous. It seems much more likely that
the Marines were out "beating the bush" looking for the
Sandinistas; ana when they found them, they sought to main-
tain contact, not break it,
'The Personal Representative of the President of the
United Stages in Nicaragua (Stimson) to General Moncada,
May 11, 1927. Foreign Relations , 1927, III, p. 3^5.
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country. Beadle evidently agreed that this was a proper
mission for the Guard as that organization began to take
over the police service in August, 1927, A year later, it
had replaced all other police forces in tne Republic.
The Marines, on the other hand, committed by the Tipitapa
Settlement to disarming all the combatants that had par-
ticipated in the Civil War, directed their attention towards
Sandino's band. Since the settlement also required the
Marines to remain in Nicaragua until at least the 1928
elections, the division of labor between tne Guardia
Nacional and the Second Brigade was acceptable to Generals
Feland and Beadle.
Following the 1928 elections, relations between the
two commanders began to deteriorate. It seems probable that
the conflict between the two officers began as a result of
Congressional pressure in the United States to have the
Marines withdrawn. With the successful completion of the
supervision of the elections, one of the committments the
United States had assummed at Tipitapa had been met and
opposition to the continued presence of American troops
3Millett, "Guardia Nacional," pp. 164-65.

o9
in Nicaragua increased. ° both the commander of the Special
Service Squadron (now Rear Admiral D.F. Sellers) and General
Feland favored a reduction in force to approximately that
of the pre-election levels of early 1928. ° The willing-
ness of the senior American commanders to reduce the number
of Marines in Nicaragua reflected the Congressional op-
position to the intervention as well as Seller's conviction
that San lino's movement had been severely damaged by his
inability to disrupt the 1923 elections.
Q7The Senate in FeDruary, 1929, nearly succeeded in
attaching a "rider" to the 1929 Naval Appropriations Bill
that would have Drevented the allocation of funds for the
suoport of the Marines in Nicaragua (Macaulay, The Sand ino
Affair
, p. 135* )• The Senate had made a similar attempt
in 1928, but the proposed admendments to the appropriations
bill had been defeated with the helo of Senator William E.
Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
who believed that the Marines were needed to meet the U.S.
obligation to supervise the 1928 elections (Kamman, Search
for Stability , p. 135.).
10Kamman, Search for Stabilixy , p. 172.
Ibid , Sandino was unable to make a concentrated
effort to prevent tne 1928 elections. Tnis is evident from
the number and location of contacts that occurred during
the period September 23 to Novemoer 4, 1928 (regisxration
of voters took place from September 23 to October 7 and the
election was held on November 4). There was a total of
five contacts during this period (all the result of Marine
patrols). All occurred in October in the remote Department
of Nueva Segovia ("Bandit contacts in Nicaragua from April 1,
192 R» to April 30, 1931." File "N," HQ, U3MC.)'. Although
contacts indicate more where the Marines and Guardia were
rather than where the Sandinistas were, with 432 oolling
places scattered throughout the Republic, it would seem
that a serious attemot to disrupt the elections would have
resulted in many more and more widely distributed clashes
with the security forces than the five that occurred in
Nueva Segovia. Also the five contacts did not represent
an abnormally high incidence rate. The total number of
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On January 3, 1929 , Rear Admiral Sell srs recommended
12
that the Marine lorce be reduced to 3500 meii." It is obvious
that this proposed decrease in the operational strength of
the Second brigade could only have one result for the Guardia --
more combat. Beadle, as indicated by the Jecember memorandum,
ODuosed the troop withdrawa 1 and its consequence—an increased
combat role for the Guard. He could argue, and probably did,
that the Second Brigade had not fulfilled the obligation
incurred at Tipitapa to disarm Sandino, that his organization
did not have the requisite strengtn to taKe over combat
operations as well as to continue to perform police duties,
and that the Guard, having been utilized as a police force
for a year and a half, had neither the training nor the
experience necessary for a combat force. The December memo-
randum suggests thst jeadlu would have preferred a moratorium
of one year on Marine withdrawals, he didn' t get it. As
the following table shows, the strength of the Marine 2nd
Brigade was reduced by two-thirds during 1929.
contacts in September was 2; in November, 4; and Jecember, 3
("Bandit Contacts in Nicaragua from Aoril 1, 1928, to
Aoril 30, 1931." Kile "N," HQ, USMCi and the "Official List
of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," printed
in Smith, et al. , Organiza m and Operations of the Guardia
Nac ional
, pp. 302-^07, passim .).
12Eoerh=irdt to Kellogg, January 3. 1929, Foreign




2nd BRIGADE STRENGTH, 1929
Date -orce Levela
Jan. 5. 1929 4873
Feb. 2, 192 40 34
Mar. 2, 1929 3916
April 6, 1^29 3735
May 4, 1929 3359
Jun. 1, 1929 2900
Jul. 6, 1929 2882
Aug. 3. 1929 2811
Seot. 1, 1929 2003
Oct. 5. 1929 1724
Nov. 2, 1929 1709
Dec. 7, 1929 1682
Notes i a. Force Level includes all Marine and Navy per-
sonnel attach -d to the 2nd brigade. It does
not include personnel attached to the Nic-
arasuan National Guard.
Sourcesi "2nd Brigade Consolidated Distribution Reports,"
and "2nd Brigade R< -ord ol Events," Nicaragua
Microfilm Reels Nos. 11 and 18, respectively,
HQ, USMC.
Feland's views regarding xhe withdrawal of Marines
and its consequences were contrary to Beadle's. Feland had
11
agreed with Sellers in Novemoer on a trooo reduction, J and
he felt that the Guard ia should je out in the field fighting
the "bandits" rather tnan just performing police functions.
This difference of opinion concerning the "proper mission" of
the Guard ia in the post-election oeriod was abetted by other
conflicting convictions which combined to increase the discord
between the two officers.
Corps , o. 438.
13
•^Kamman, Search for Stability
, p. 172.
Sfletcalf , A History of the United States Marine
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In early 19- J. disagre ne .r ~ose between the
Brigade commander and the Guard commander over three other
matters. One concerned the proposed Nicaraguan amendments
to the December 22, 1927. Guard i: agreement between the
United States and Nicaragua. Feland and Sellers believed
that the amendments would not inhibit the director's control
over the Guard nor endanger its non-partisan nature (see
suora
, pp. 53-59). On the other hand, both beadle and the
American minister, Eberhardt, wanted the agreement passed in
its original form to insure a strong and independent National
Guard. Secondly, Feland, with Sellers* support, wanted the
Guard to be a subordinate unit of trie Second brigade rather
than an autonomous organization responsible (at least
nominally) to the president of Nicaragua. beadle preferred
his independent status. ^ The third item of contention
involved President Moncada's formation of his own Liberal
army separate from the Guard ia. M one ad a had proposed to
Admiral Sellers in January the creation of a force of "500
carefully selected volunteers" to assist tne Marines in
"bandit" suppression in the Northern departments. General
Feland, anxious to have Nicaraguans engaged in field
operations and contending that the native led volunteers
had the anility to detect Sandino sympathisers, supoorted
^Kamman, S earcn for Stab \ I i ty, pp. 174-77.
'-^Eberhardt to Kellogg, January 3. 1929. Foreign
Relations. 1929. Ill, p. 5^9.
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President Moncada in his desire to raise the force. Beadle
and Sberhardt opposed the creation of such an armed force
outside the control of the national Guard as a violation
of the December 22na agreement that had established the
Guard ia as the sole military and police force in the Re-
public, Moncada, supported by Feland, won out, and one
column of about ninety men was ready for operations on
January 2?. A second column of approximately the same size
began operations on the 19th of Feoruary. Although the
volunteers eventually expanded to a force of aoout 300 men,
they failed to be any better at catching "bandits" than xhe
Guard or the Marines. They were disbanded in August, 1929,
17
without any notable success.
As a result of this inter-organizational squabbling
and Feland' s opposition to the American minister's views
(which represented State Jeoartment objectives), Sberhardt
recommended that both officers be relieved, 1 Beadle
^Millett, "Guardi* Macional," no. 190-9^. 235i and
Sberhardt to Kellogg, Marcn 16, 1929. Foreign Relations ,
1929. III. oo. 552-5^ • Moncada' s volunteers were a hybrid
unit. They were under the administrative control of the
Guard ia (funds, equioraenx, and training) and under the
ODerational control of trie commander of the Second Brigade
(see Eberhardt to Kellogg, March 16, 1929. above.).
18Millett, "Guardia IMacional," x)p. 236-38.
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was replaced on March 10th ind F« nd was relieved on
March 26, 1929. 19
The new commander of the vational Tuard, Colonel
Douglas C. McDougal, USMC , had been a former commander of
the Haitian constabulary, the Garde d' Haiti . He quickly
began to make operational and organizational changes in
the Guardia Nacional . With the Marine reduction in force
inevitable, McDougal (Major General, GN) accepted the Guard's
dual role as both a police and a military force. He sent
the Guard out into the field to engage the Sandinistas. He
decreased the number of personnel assigned to the guerrilla-
free departments along the West Coast and in Southern Nic-
aragua and used them to reinforce the Northern, Central,
and Eastern Areas as the Marines began to withdraw from
those regions. By the end of July, 1929» McDougal had
established thirty-four Guardia Nacional outposts in the
area of the heaviest "bandit" activity—the Northern and
^Sberhardt attributed the source of the friction
between beadle and Feland to the actions of General Frank R.
McCoy, U.S. Army (Kamman, Search for Staoility
, p, 1??, n.
18.). McCoy was the American member and Chairman of the
National Electoral Commission that oversaw the 1928 elections.
The State Department had, in !v;arch, 1923, persuaded Diaz to
relinquish the president's position as commander-in-chief of
the Guardia to the chairman of the electoral commission
during election periods (Millett, "Guardia Nacional," p.
223.). While McCoy had prai ,e for his temporary subordinate,
Beadle, for the performance of the National Guard during the
election, he was extremely cr i .ical of Feland' s continuing





Central Departments of Nuev Gegovia, Estell, Jinotega, and
Matagalpa (See APPENDIX III, Fig.. 2^ . 20 Th« new Second
Brigade Commander, Brigadier General uion Williams, was pleased
with the Guard's new found enthusiasm for combat and with the
actions of its .jefe director . In a report to Sberhardt, he
wrote t
The Guardia Nacional shows continued and what is
believed to be lastinr improvement.
The energetic measures taken by General McDougal,
and his appreciation of what the true role [emphasis
added] of the Guardia should be, has [sic] contributed
great]/ to our recent successes,^-'-
The extent to which McDougal accepted the task of "bandit" sup-
pression as a mission of the Guardia is indicated by the change





December 31, 1927, to December 31, 1929
GN Percent Percent Percent Total
Date Total in in in Percent*3
Strength hlA-CAa WA-SAa SAa
Dec. 31, 1927 658 23 33 56
Jun.30, 1928 13^7 11 25 5 41
Feb. 28, 1929 2050 26 31 57
Aug., 1929d 2] 50 48 25 12 85
Dec. 31, 1929 2219 ^5 26 10 81
NA = Northern Area, CA = Central Area, EA = Eastern Area,
WA = Western Area, SA = Soutnern Area
20Metcalf , A history f the United States Marine
Corps , p. 439.
2
-*-The Commander of the Second brigade, U.3.M.C.
(Williams), to the Minister in Nicaragua (Sbernardt), May 6,
1929, Foreign Relations, 1^29, III, p. 565.
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Notes i a. Northern Areat J- oar ^merits of Nueva Segovia and
Esteli
Central Areai Departments of Matagalpa and
Jinotega
Eastern Areai The departments and districts on
the East Coast and Eastern interior
Western and Southern Areasi The departments along
the West Coast. Chontales, and the
District of ;jan Juan del Norte
b. Total Dcrcent represents the tots 1 percentage of
GN strength deployed outside the Department and
City of Managua. Stationed in Managua would be
Department of Managua personnel, headquarters
personnel, the Presidential Guard Detachment,
the rsand, Casuals, Replacement Company, Recruit
Company, the National Penitentiary Detachment,
etc. It is obvious from tnese figures that
McDougal was successful in getting the Guard out
of Managua and into the field.
c. McDougal relieved beadle on March 10, 1929.
d. The percentages for the Aug., 1929t date are
slightly in error du to the fact that the GN
total strength is an estimate based on the
Feb. 28, 1929. strength of 2050 and a strength
on Oct. 1, 1929, of 2198.
Sourcest Guard ia Nacional Annual Reoort, 1928; box 10,
File Folder 1^7 FRC ; "Activities and Achievements of
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua from the time of
its reorganization to February 28, 1929," Box 10,
File Folaer 14, FRC; Hanna to Stimson, Ausxist 22,
1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, III. p. 579; and
Smith, e_t al., Organization and Operations of the
Guardia Nacional
, p. 15.
In early summer 1929, General McDougal reorganized
the Guard. The Republic was divided into five operational
areas of responsibility each with an area comia^nder (under
Beadle there had been four areas but only the Eastern Area
had been established as a semi-inaeoendent command with its
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own commander). The mirDose of the area coMmander conceot
was twofold i (1) it w^uld permi"-. a more ra:;id marshalling
of the available area-wide resources to counter guerrilla
activity than had been possible under the previous arrange-
ment when no area commander had been assigned, and (2) by
placing high ranking Guardia Nacional officers (all American)
in the various areas, it was ho this would make the Guard
more visible and more responsi a to the local inhabitants
22
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Reoort of GN-3 Section, 3 December 1929,"
r 14, FdC. The following is an. excerpt
Derations and Training) report!
ation decentralized the organization in
aced senior and experienced officers at
uarters. • • Having an Area Commander
enables quicker decisions pertaining to
be made and it also olaces a senior officer
tive of the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional,
ere the officials and puulic can easily







The Department of Managua, the v.f :agua City Police Company,
the Presidential Gu-ird, and the rational Penitentiary Guard
were under the operational control of General Headquarters
in Managua. The Southern Area was never established as an
area command, and the Western Area ceased operating as an
area command on May 3t 1930* The departments and districts
assigned to these two areas functioned independently of
each other, reporting directly tc General headquarters.
McDougal completed the reorganization of the Guard by
August, 1929. The new organization remained in effect
until U.S. forces withdrew from Ni ;ragua in 1933*
During its first two years, the Guard had undergone,
essentially, a single change in command and one reorganization.
It had grown from under 100 men to over 2000. Its primary
mission had been police work leaving tne suopression of
"banditry" to the Marines. When tne Marine forces began
to be reduced following the 1928 elections, the Guard was
forced to assume more of a combat role. McDougal, taking
command in March* 1929t accepted this mission as a proper one
for the Guard and began deploying his forces into the "bandit"
areas. Thereafter, military operations against the
Sandinistas became more and more a Guardia re: ^onsibility
as the Marines continued to withdraw from the guerrilla areas.
^Smith, ejt ajL . , Organization and Operations of the




The conduct of military operations prior to the sum-
mer of 1929 had been, for the most part, a function of the
Marine forces in Nicaragua (See TABLES 2 and 3, CHAPTER IV).
During this period, the Marines had launched three major
offensives against the Sandinistas--one aimed at El Chipote
and two along the Coco River (See APPENDIX III, Fig. I). 1
The El Chipote offensive in December-January of 1927-1928
was meant to capture or destroy the Sandinistas and thus rid
Nicaragua of Sandino and his followers. It failed. Sandino
abandoned El Chipote before his lines of retreat could be
blocked and fled south to San Rafael del Norte (about ten
miles northwest of Jinotega) . In April, 1928, the Marines*
hoping to force Sandino into Honduras and keeo him there to
A "major offensive" must be understood within the
context of the Nicaragwun "war." The campaign against Sandino
was one of incessant patrols ana intermittent contacts. It
was a Dlatoon war of small unit actions. An assemblage of
troops greater than a company in strength constituted a large
concentration for a "major" offensive. For El Chipote, the
combined Marine and uuardia forces numbered about 300
(Macaulay, The Sandino Affair
, p. 103.). The two patrols
down the Coco River consisted of about 100 men each (Nalty,




prevent disruption of the 192c elections, organized an
expedition up the Coco River intc "bandit" country. From
April through May, the Marines sought to make contact with
the poierrillas—up the Coco River to the huasouc, up the
Huaspuc and then overland to Jocay--largely without success.
Arriving at Bocay on May 31 # the patrol could claim only
four "bandits" wounded for all its efforts. Not only had
Sandino not been forced into Honduras, but he had succeeded,
in Aoril, in raiding the gold mines in the San Pedro Pis Pis
region. Following these forays into Northeastern Nicaraatia,
Sandino moved into the remote, dense jungle region between
the Bocay and Coco Rivers establishing a base area near
Poteca (twenty-five miles east of SI Jicaro, on the Coco River),
The Sandinista concentration at Poteca was the objective of
the second Coco River offensive. On July 26, in the middle
of the rainy season, tne Marines deoarted ziocay by boat via
the already flooded river. Snroute to Poteca, the patrol
encountered the "bandits" twice, inflictin? seventeen casualties
and losing one killed and three wounded. The Marines occuoied
Poteca on the 17th of August. The offensive had succeeded in
its £oal of dispersing the "bandits" and denying them a
3
oermanent, secure base of operations. Junng the remainder
2The rainy season in Nicarasrua is from the end of
Aoril through Octooer.
^This account of the Marine offensives of 1923 is




of the year, the Marines engager, the Sandinistas fourteen
times, but these contacts were the result of daily patrols
rather than of any new "major offensive." This was to be
the pattern of operations for the Marines for the rest of
their period of active participation in the campaign against
Sandino—vigorous, aggressive, and continuous patrolling.
Major offensives from the end of 1923 on would be the re-
sponsibility of the Guardia Nacional .
The Guardia Nacional considered four plans to combat
the Sandinista movement. 5 One involved closing the border
with Honduras. The "bandits" main infiltration routes of
arms and supplies began along the Patuca River in Eastern ana
Central Honduras, at jJanli in Central Honduras, and at
Choluteca in Western Honduras. The Honduras government was
both unwilling and unable to effectively patrol its side of
the frontier desoite considerable U.S. pressure that it do so.
Clearly, the Guardia Nacional , witn a force level of about
2000, did not have the requisite manpower to seal the long,
uninhabited, jungle border with Honduras, w'nile the closing
4
"Bandit Contacts in Nicaraguai from April 1, 1928,
to April 30, 1931." File "1M," HQ, USMC. Tnese fourteen con-
tacts were the result of "Marine only" patrols. After May,
1928, no composite patrol had any more contacts in 1928
(Smith, e_t al. , Organiz ation and Operations of the Guardia
Nacional
, pp. 302-407, passim. )
.
^The following discussion of tne Guard ia'
s
overall
plan for opposing Sandino is taken from Smith, et al.
,





of the frontier was most desirable, it was also impossiole
and the olan was rejected. A second alternative was the
concentration of forces to be directed against the "bandits"
in a series of what today would be called "search-and-destroy
missions" to ferret out and eliminate the Sandinistas. This
strategy had the unhappy effect of uncovering the rear areas
due to the Guard's lack of sufficient personnel to both
provide security and undertake a full scale offensive against
th guerrillas. Also, as the Marine attempts of 1928 had
shown, jandino was hard to catch. As a consequence, this
alternative was also discarded. A third consideration was
the garrisoning of as many towns and villages as the Guard's
limited forces would permit, thereby olacing the guard on the
defensive and leaving the initiative with Sandino. This was
an unsatisfactory situation, and the scheme was dropped. The
plan that was finally adopted was a fusion of the seconu and
third alternatives— "combining an active defense with offensive
operations. " The "active defence" consisted of stationing
the largest Dortion of the Guard in the "bandit" areas of
North and Central Nicaragua (See TA LS 5, CHAPTER IV) to pro-
vide physical security for the inhabitants by conducting daily
patrols in the vicinity of the outpost. Thus, any move by
the Sandinistas to raid a town or village would, hopefully, be
detected by the local garrison's patrol activities. Offensive
operations would be mounted as the guerrilla situation and
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manpower permitted. Personnel for these search-ana-aestroy
missions would be obtained by reducing defensive forces to
the absolute minimum commensurate with the "oandit" threat
in any oarticular area or department. The goal of each area
commander was to free as much of his force as Dossible for
offensive operations. The Guard was not entirely satisfied
with this compromise plan for the overall conduct of the
campaign against Sandinoj but given the limited force that the
Nicaraffuan government was willing and able to support, the
Guard felt it was the best olan that could be implemented.
According to one of the Guardia Nacional '
s
chiefs of staff,
Major Julian C. Smith, USMC , the best solution would have
been a plan embodying Beadle's concept for a Mobile Operating
Battalion. The success of Lt. Puller's roving patrol
(Company "M") indicated that a larger, mobile force whose
only mission would be to seek contact with the Sandinistas
combined with the "active defense" operations of the scattered
outoosts would have been the most effective procedure for
combating Sandino. The mobile force would have consisted of
"From the force level of 93 officers and H36 enlisted
established by the December 22, 1927, agreement, the authorized
strength of the Guardia was i oreased in June, 1928, to 246
officers and 2000 enlisted (Letter from President Diaz to Sr.
Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional, Managua, June 10, 1928,
printed in Smith, e_t al
•
, Orranization and Operations of t
Guardia IMaci >nal
, p. .'16.). In February, 1931* the authorized
strength was again increased to 204 officers and 21$0 enlisted
after havinpr been reduced to loO officers and I650 enlisted in
December, 1930 (Hanna to Stimson, December 13, 1930, Foreign
Relations , 1930, III, pp. 091-92; Stimson to Hanna, February l*fc
1931 # Foreign Relations , 19 31, II, o. 844} and hanna to
Stimson, March 12, 1931# Foreign delations , 1931t II » P« 846.).
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of 14 officers and 210 men, divided amon'7 8 roving patrols
(2 each to the Northern, Central, and Eastern Areas, and 1
each to the Departments of Leon and Chinandega), and a re-
placement company of 3 officers ana 30 men. This force was
never organized because the funds (estimated at $8900 per
month) for its operation were never appropriated by the
Nicara?"uan government,?
It is the opinion of this writer that the strategy
the Guard ia Nacional accepted as the only one possible under
the constrictions imoosed by a limited oudget and manpower
could not have resulted in the defeat of Sandino and that
it was not intended I > do so. Tne inhibiting factor was
money. To the Marines in the Juard, there wasn't enough of
it, and without more funds tne Guard was unable to increase
its personnel strength to a level its American commanders
deemed necessary to dissolve the Sandinista movement. Hence,
the Guardia Nacional adopted an essentially defensive strategy,
'It is interesting to note that in a book on
guerrilla warfare published nearly thirty-five years after
the Marine experience in Nicaragua, the problem of con-
centrating against the <ruerrilla or dispersing to protect
one's own vical areas is resolved with much the same sol u tion
the Guard devised in its plan for active defense combined
with the mobile operating force. In that book, the author's
solution to concentration versus dispersion was a strategy
that would enable the anti-guerrilla forces to secure their
own base ar^.o while preventing or delaying the guerrilla
from formine his own (See Jonn J. i^cCuen, The Art of Counter-
Revolut ionary War [Harris burg, Ia.t StacKoole iiooks, I960J ,
pp. 78-80. ) . The Guard's active defense and mobile operating
force would have done just that.
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and, as Clausewitz has said, the object of defense is to
oreserve. The Guard sought to preserve the areas it did
control by containing, not defeating, Sandino in the remote,
backlands of North-Central Nicaragua. The establishment of
outposts throughout the Northern and Central Areas, the
active defense, and trie conduct of limited offensives when
conditions oermitted, all were meant to keep Sandino in
the wilderness and prevent him from extending his control
to the towns and villages. It is this writer's belief that
such a strategy did not have as its ouroose the defeat of
Sandino."
a
Estimates of the force level required to defeat
Sandino were in considerable excess of those available to the
Guard. General Feland in June, 1928, estimated that 4000
Marines would be required Dut that 10,000 to 12,000 would do
it quicker and provide better security (John J. Tierney, Jr.,
"U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, ] i>27-1933« Lessons for
Today," Orbis , XIV, No. 4 [1971J , p. 1018.). An officer who
served with the Second brigade estimated the force required
at 20,000 (Vernon Edgar Megee, "United States Military Inter-
vention in Nicaragua, 1909-1932" [unpublished M.A. dissertation,
University of Texas, 196J] , p. 2l8.). President Moncada
believed that 5000 Guardia would be needed to decisively
defeat Sandino (The President of Nicaragua [[Moncada] to the
Secretary of State, November 7, 1930, Foreign Relations , 1930,
III, p. 680. )• Forces in excesj of 10,000 may have been re-
quired to eliminate the Sandinistas to the last man, but it
seems to this writer that a larger Mobile Operating Force
than the one contemplated by the Guard would have so harassed
and harried the Sandinistas that they would have been pushed
back deep into the wilderness or across tne Honduras border.
Sporadic raids would not have been stopped, but the Sandino
movement would have been effectively destroyed. General
Feland' s and President Moncada' s estimates of a total force
of 4000-5000 seems reasonable.
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The Guard commenced its campaign against Sandino in
the spring of 1929 when it began relieving the Marines of
patrol duties. The Marines, as the table below indicates,
withdrew almost entirely from the Eastern Area (from 694
officers and men in January, 1929, to 220 in June to 117 in
December). A similar reduction took place in the western
Area and more gradually so in the Northern and Central Areas.
By the end of the year, the greater part of the 2nd Brigade
was concentrated in the Southern Area.
TABLE 6
2nd BRIGADE FORCE DISTRIBUTION, 1929







Jan. 12, 1929 48?8 36 50 14 100
Feb. 2, 1929 4084 <*3 40 17 100
Mar. 2, 1929 3916 44 39 17 100
Apr. 6, 1929 3735 46 36 13 100
May 4, 1929 3359 ^7 40 13 100
Jun. 1, 1929 2900 44 43 8 100
Jul. 13, 1929 2886 50 42 8 100
Aug . 3
,
1929 2811 47 46 7 100
Sep. 7. 1929 2006 38 56 6 100
Oct. 5. 1929 1724 39 5^ 7 100
Nov. 2, 1929 1709 39 5^ 7 100
Dec. 7, 1929 1682 41 52 7 100
Bde = Brigade, NA = Northern Area, CA = Central Area,
SA = Southern Area, WA = Western Area, EA = Eastern Area
Notes i a. The 2nd Brigade total strength includes all Marine
and Navy personnel attached to the 2nd Brigade.
It does not include American personnel serving
with the Guardia Nacional.
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b. The area designations are those used oy the
Guardia Nacional
. The 2nd brigade's Southern
Area actually included tne GN ' s Southern,
Central, and western Areas, i'he force dis-
tribution ( igures have been calculated to con-
form to the Guard's area designations.
Sourcei "2nd Brigade Consolidated Distrioution Reports,?
Nicaragua Microfilm Reel No. 14, HQ, USMC.
The extent to which the Guardia replaced the Marines in con-
ducting combat patrols is indicated by the following table
of contacts for 1929t
TABLE ?
MONTHLY PATROL CONTACTS FOR 1929
Patrol





112111 102 2 2 6 5 5
Notesi a. No comoosite (UJMC-GN) oatrol had any contact in
1929.
b. Two additional contacts were made by Moncada's
volunteer force--one in April and one in June.
c. 100 percent of the USMC contacts occurred in
the Nortnern and Central Areas as did 88 percent
of the GN contacts. The two volunteer contacts
occurred in the Central Area.
Sourcest "Bandit Contacts in Nicara^uai from April 1,
ly28, to April 30, 1931," File "N," rtQ, USMC;
and the "Official List of Contacts of the Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua, " printed in Smith, et al
.
,





The total number of contacts for the year wasi U3MC— 7 and
GN--25. All of the Marine contacts occurred in first five
months of the year during the initial ohases of the reduction
in force and withdrawal from tne "bandit" areas. The Guard,
on the other hand, had seventeen of its twenty-five contacts
in the last six months of 1929 corresponding to the period
in which the Marine force was sharoly reduced. It is clear
from this data that the Guard ia hiacional was performing the
bulk of the active patrol operations directed against the
Sandinistas by the summer of 1929.
It was a oroDitious time for the Guard to assume
such duties, for on June lb, 1929, Sandino had crossed over
the border into Honuuras on his way to Mexico to personally
seek the aid of the oresident of Mexico in providing material
support for his revolution. ° In the preceedine January,
Sandino had written Mexico's President, Emilio Portes Gil,
requesting permission to visit Mexico. Portes Gil discussed
the matter witn the American Ambassador, Morrow, to determine
the American attitude. 10 The State Department considered that
a Sandino in Mexico was better tnan a Sandino in Central
America provided that the Mexican government would prevent
Sandino from using Mexico as a refuge from which to abet the
^"Intelligence Memorandum, Third battalion, Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua, 23 July 1929t" printed in Smixh, et al.,
Organization and Operations of the Guardia i\acional
, p. 2^6.
10Millett, "Guardia i\acional," po. 200-01.
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revolution in Nicaragua. Hence, when Mexico requested the
government of Honduras to permit Sanaino to pass through
Honduras, the State Department ii xormed its minister in
Tegucigalpa that "the United States will interpose no objection
12
to the transit of Sandmo from Nicaragua to Mexico." Not
only did the State Department raise no objections to Sandino 's
triD to Mexico, but it also directed trie Marines and the Guard
not to interfere. * Sandino arrived in Mexico at Tapachula,
Chiapas, on the 26th of June. The Mexican government, as
was the U.S. desire, kept him out of Mexico City. From
Chiapas, the Mexican government sent Sandino to Vera Cruz,
by-passing the capital, and from Vera Cruz to Merida in the
Yucatan peninsula--a long, long way from Mexico City. It was
not until seven months after his arrival in Mexico that
Sandino was granted an interview with President Portes Gil
and former President Calles (the real power in Mexico) in
Mexico City in January, 1930. ^
^Kellogg to Morrow, February 25i 1929# Foreign
Relations , 1929, III, PD. 533-84.
12Kellogg to Summerlin, April 11, 1929, Foreign
Relations , 1929, III. p. 585.
^Stimson to Morrow, May 8, 1929, Foreign Relations ,
1929, III, u . 586; and Memorandum by the Under Secretary of
State (Clark) of a Conversation with the Mexican Amoassador
(Tellez), May 17, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, III, p. 58?.
Morrow to Stimson, June 28, 1929, Foreign Relations ,
1929, III, o. 583.
^Macaulay, The Sandino Affai r, pp. 1^9, 158.
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Prior to departing Nicaragua, Sandino had directed
one of his lieutenants, Francisco Estrada, to carry on the
revolution in his absence. However, Estrada and other leaders
believed it would be more prudent to retire with the bulk of
the guerrilla forces into Honduras to await Sandino' s return.
As a result, the Sandinista chiefs elected one Pedron
Altamirano to remain in Nicaragua with about 100 of the best
armed men to continue the fight. Another band under Miguel
Angel Ortez also stayed. The rest made their way across the
border.
Ibid
. , p. 150. The Marines in the Guard had admir-
ation for Ortez, but they wasted no such love on Altamirano.
The following characterization of the two "bandit" leaders is




"Miguel Angel Ortez y Guillen. . . operated constantly,
always seeking contact with Marine and Guardia patrols, and
was one of the few leaders of bandits who continued a fight
after the first burst of fire, who ambushed patrols suc-
cessfully, arid who made v tliant attacks on garrisons. • • •
Pedro (Pedron) Altamirano. • • was one of the most
savage, cruel, and sanguinary of Sandino' s leaders. • . •
He avoided contact with patrols unless he had a large and
certain advantage over them, and occupied himself to a
large extent in looting, burning, and killing. ... He
disDersed his grouo widely for the purpose of suosisting
it on the country, but seemed always able to concentrate
it for a raid or for a light. • • • His one great weakness
as a guerrilla leader, common among the bandit chiefs, was
that he failed to oersonally lead his men in action and
to oush home his attacks. He had the arts of ambush,
subsisting on the country, subterfuge, surorise, rapidity
and secrecy of movement, down to a fine point and his use
of interior lines was masterly."
These descriptions are interesting because they indicate that
the Marines did not fully understand the nature of the war they
were fighting. Ortez appears as a brave leader who is praised
for standing his ground and for attacking strongpoints whereas
Altamirano, who seems to be the eDitome of a guerrilla leader
and who appears to have understood the basics of guerrilla war,
is the object of disoaragin£ remarks and the intimation that
his method of fighting was somehow cowardly.
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Sandino's meeting with Portes Gil and Calles re-
sulted in no positive benefits for the revolution, and
Sandino, dismayed from ever obtaining any tangible support
from the Mexican government, evaded the Mexican authorities
and left Merida in late April, 1930. He arrived back in
17Nicaragua about mid-May. His year long absence seems to
have had little effect on the tempo of activity in Nicaragua.
The total number of contacts with the •'bandits" decreased
slightly from sixty-five in 1928 to fifty-six for the period
June, 1929* through May, 1930 (the approximate duration of
Sandino's stay in Mexico). 9 However, Sandino's return
brought an immediate increase in "bandit" operations and
consequently, an increase in Guard activity also.
By summer, 1930, the Guard ia Nacional had assumed
all patrol duties in the Republic. 9 The Marines had been
relegated to the role of a ready reserve to suDport the
Guard if needed. The stepped up campaign of the guerrillas
17
'"Annual Reoort of the Secretary of the Navy,"
printed in Annual Reports of the Navy Jep.^rtment . 1930
(Washingtoni U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931) » P»
101. This series hereinafter referred to as Annual Reports .
1 ft
"Bandit Contacts in Nicaraguai from April 1,
1928, to April 30, 1931," File "N," HQ, USMC j and the
"Official List of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua," printed in Smith, et al
.
, Organization and
Operations of the Guardia Nacional
, poT 302-407, passim .
197Smith, et al
.




^"Metcalf , A History of the United States Marine
Corps
, p. 445. On June 7. 1930, the strengtn of the 2nd
Brigade was 1027 ("2nd Brigade Record of Events," Nicaragua
Microfilm Reel No. 13, HQ, USMC.).
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following Sandino's arrival in Nicaragua was the first
challenge the Guard i a Nacional faced on its own. Under the
21
guidance of its Marine officers, it Derformed well.
Prom June through December, 1930, the National Guard engaged
the Sandinistas 85 times (as compared to the 35 encounters
in the five months prior to Sandino's return) inflicting
215 casualties on the "bandits" while suffering 20 (KIA,
2?
DOW, and WIA). Although the majority of these contacts
occurred in the Northern and Central Areas, the following
2
^0n June 30, 1930, out of a total officer corps
(Marine and Navy) of 200 there were 17 native officers in
the Guard ("Annual Report of the Commanding Officer,
Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, to the Major General
Commandant, October 1, 1930," box 10, File Folder 14, FRC).
U.S. Navy personnel assigned to the Guard were pharmacist
mates, Navy doctors, and Navy civil engineers.
22
"Official List of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional
de Nicaragua," printed in Smith, et al . . Organization and
Operations of the Guardia Nacional , pp. 302-^-07* passim .
Marine patrols had only five contacts in 1930 with four out
of the five occurring in the last six months of the year.
The last Marine contact of the intervention took place in
January, 1931 (Monthly reports on "Bandit Contacts in Nic-
aragua," from April, 1928, through November, 1932, File "N,"
HQ ( USMC). Although the last report was filed in November,
1932, it seems safe to assume that there were no Marine con-
tacts with the "bandits" in December, 1932. Composite
patrols (USMC-GN) had their last "bandit" contacts in 1930.
There were four and all occurred in the last six months of
the year and are included in the eignty-five contacts listed
above. It is, perhaps, a misnomer to label these patrols
composite t-ince in these four contacts the patrol force
numbered fifteen to twenty men of which only one to three
were Marines, excluding the officers (See "Official List
of Contacts of the Guardia Kacional de Nicaragua," above.).
Metcalf states that enlisted Marines accompanying Guardia
patrols in 1930 did so in the capacity of automatic weapons





table shows that in 1930 the Sancinistas were beginning to
expand their area of operations
i
TAi ...E 8
CONTACTS by AREA, 19?7-1930
Year Number of Contacts by Areaa Total






















NA=Northern Area, CA=Central Area, SA=Southern and western




Contacts include those involving USMC, composite,
GN, and the volunteer patrols.
This writer has used the designation "Southern
Area" for both the Western and Southern Areas.
Tnis corresponds to the designation used on
distribution reports after the Western Area
was dissolved as an area command in May, 1930.
Prior to McDougal's reorganization in 1929,
the label "Western Area" was applied to the
districts and departments that McJougal divided
into the Western and Southern Areas.
The year 1927 begins with the first contact in
July at Ocotal on the lbth.
As indicated in an earlie
error for contacts involv
patrols is t 10 oercent.
in which this writer dete
Many were already identif
be identified by the name
near which the contact to
information was not suffi
were used by reconstructi
This was done by using pi
(town, village, etc.) dIu
of a contact near that lo
possibility of error--the
village but not in it, bu
r table, the location
ing Gin and composite
This is due to the way
rmined contact locations,
ied by areaj others could
of the town or village
ok place. When this
cient, grid locations
ng the grid coordinates,
aces of known location
s the grid coordinates
cation. Hence the
contact was "near" the
t the coordinates were
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used for reconstruction as if the contact had
taken place in the village. Using tnis method,
some contacts occurred in the Pacific Ocean.
USlvlC ana volunteer contacts were identified by
department; therefore, there was no location
error for tnese contacts.
Sourcesi "Principal ^.n^a cements the Marine detachments
have had with Jandi us in Nicaragua since May 15 1 1927;"
•'Casualties in Nicaragua from Jecember 23» 1926, to
February 8, 1928;" "bandit Contacts in Nicaragua
i
from April 1, 1928, to April 30, 1931 t " all located
in File "M," HQ, USMC i and the "Official List of
Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,"
printed in Smith, ejb al. , Organization and Operations
of the Guard ia Nacional , pp. 302-407t passim .
Of the sixteen contacts that took place in the Southern Area,
twelve occurred in the last six months of 1930. The location,
oy department, of -he sixteen engagements was as follows:
four in the Department of Chinandega, six in tne Northern half
of Leon, one in Southwestern Managua and one in Eastern
Managua, two in western Masaya, one in Chontales, and one as
far south as the D partment of Rivas. J Although ten of the
sixteen encounters hapoened in what might be considered the
rather remote departments of Leon and Chinandega, it is
evident that the Guard was having difficulty restricting
Sandino to the mountainous backlands of Northern Nicaragua
as early as 1930. The Guard woula not be any more successful
in 1931 nor in 1932.
The increased "bandit" activity in the summer montns
of 1930 engendered a Guard i reaction in the form of a counter-
offensive in August. A large searcri-and-destroy mission
23
"Official List of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional
cte Nicaragua," printed in Smith, et al. , Organization and Oper-
ations of the Guardia nacional
, pp. 302-407 t passim .
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consisting of nine combat patrols (stretched along an east-
west line) began a sweep from the region around Ocotal in a
southeasterly direction cowards Jinotega. The sweep did
2k . •
more searching than it aid destroying. The Sandinistas
were caught in a number of contacts, but for tne most part,
they avoided the patrols. As Major Smith summarized in his
history of the Guard
i
• • ., the most successful offensives only served to dis-
perse the bandit grouDS. • ., and, • .the bandits would
after a time return to their old haunts and renew tneir
careers of loot and pillage. ->
The Guardia '
s
pursuit of the guerrillas during the
fall of 1930 was temporarily interruoted by the Nicaraguan
Congressional election held in November . Offensive oper-
ations were curtailed while the Marines and Guard pro-
vided security for the voters. Following the elections, the
Guardia attempted to cut the Sandino supply lines originating
in Danli, Honduras. Patrols operated in area bounded by
Ocotal in the west, Cifuentes on the Honduras border in the
north (about twenty miles nortn of El Jicaro), Poteca in the
east (twenty-five miles east of El Jicaro), and by Quilali
in the south. The expedition failed to stop the flow of
supplies. While the :-uard was on the Honduras border
c iMacaulay, The Sandino Affair
, pp. 170-71.






conducting supply interdiction Derations, Altamirano slipped
south into the, now relatively undefended Department of
Matagaloa. After raiding the deoartment, he returned north
to the Pena Blanca region of Jinotega (about twenty miles
northeast of the city of Jinotega). The patrols along the
border moved south in hopes of entrapping the guerrilla
leader, but this effort failed. On this note, 1930 came to
an end.
Operations during 1931 and 1932 continued at the
quickened pace set in 1930. There were more contacts, more
•'bandits," more Guardsmen, and fewer Marines in 1931 and 1932
then there had been in 1930. The practice begun in 1929 of
stationing the greatest portion of the Guard ia in the guer-
rilla infested Northern and Central Areas was continued, as
the following table illustrates, by McDougal's successor.
TABLE 9
GN FORCE DISTRIBUTION, 1931-1932
Percent Percent Percent Total
Date Total in in in Percent
Strength NA-CA SAa EA
Feb. 28, 1931 20 51 54 16 9 79
Sep. 30, 1931 2463 6o 14 12 86
Dec. 26, 1931 2437 59 14 13 86
Aor. 30. 1932 2550 54 18 13 85
Auff. 27, 1932 2567 54 18 13 85
Dec. 24, 1932 2645 47 18 12 77
NA=Northern Area, CA=Central Area, SA=Southern Area,
EA=Eastern Area
Notes t a. The Southern Area includes all the departments and
districts of the former Southern and Western Areas.
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b. Total oercent represents the total percentage
of GN strength let. \yed outside the Department
and City of Managua (See TABLE 5, note b).
Sources i "Consolidated reoort showing distribution of
all troops, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, as of
28 Feoruary 1931." Box 10, File Folder 7, FRC
;
"Annual Report of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua
for the Period Commencing October 1, 1930, and
Ending September 30, 1931." Box 10, File Folder 14,
FRC i and "Distribution of Troops of the Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua, 21 December 1931 to Date
[24 December 1932]," Kile "N," HQ, USMC
.
During 1931 » not only were there more contacts than
in any previous year, but tney were also more widely dis-
tributed. The Guard was less and less able to restrict
Sandino* s activities to the remote areas of Nicaragua. In
April, 1931* the Sandinistas terrorized the East Coast to
such an extent tnat ships of the Special Service Squadron
were sent to Cabo Gracias a jios, Puerto Cabezas, and
Bluefields. Marines and sailors from the USS Asheville
landed at Puerto Caoezas and at .bluefields from the USS
Sacramento . Prior to ths arrival of the naval forces at
Cabo Gracias a Jios, the "bandits" had been successful in
sacking the village, curing the summer, Sandino kept eight
columns in the field raiding the Northern departments. In
the following November, "the supreme effort of organized
27banditry was made." Reinforced groups of Sandinistas con-
centrated in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega to sever
the railroad line between Man; -;ua and the major West Coast
26Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, p. 204.






port of Corinto. On November 22nd, the "bandits" began the
campaign by seizing the town of Chichigalpa (on the railroad)
located about eight miles southeast of Chinandega. The
arrival of a Guard ia patrol from Chinandega forced the
"bandits" to flee. During the emergency in the two depart-
ments, the State DeDartment authorized the use of the Marines
in Managua as train guards, and President Moncada raised a
force of 150 auxiliaries to operate, under the Guard's con-
trol, in Leon and Chinandega for three months. ° The Guardia
also increased its strength in the two deoartments by sending
reinforcements from the Northern and Central Area garrisons.
As a result of these efforts, the Guard was able to keep the
line of communications open between Managua and the sea, and
the "bandit" Dlan failed.
In 1932, Guard contacts with Sandinistas exceeded the
orevious high set in 1931. The Guard averaged nearly fifteen
contacts Der month. They occurred all over the country from
Brown's Camp near Puerto Cabezas on the East Coast to San
Antonio in the Department of Chinandega in the West, and from
* Ibid
. , d. 18. Since June, 193Ii the Marines, reduced
to an "instruction battalion" and the aviation detachment, had
been concentrated in Managua. On September 1, 1931 t there
were, exclusive of Marines serving witn the National Guard,
75^ Marines in Nicaragua (The Secretary of the :<avy [Adams] to
the Secretary of State, FeDruary 24, 19J1| and The Chief of
the Division of Latin American Affairs [Thurston] to Assistant
Secretary of State [white] , September 12, 1931. both in
Foreign Relations
, 1931. II. po. 845, 858.).
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Jalapa on the Honduras border in iMueva Seguvia to Santo
Domingo in central Chontales in the South. 7 In the soring,
the "bandits" tried again to cut the rail lines between
Managua and Corinto and failed. The weeks preceeding the
November presidential elections were an exceptionally active
period. In the last week of October and in the first six days
of November (the election was held on November 6th), the
Guardia engaged the Sandinistas nineteen times. The elections
were held successfully with a minimum of Marine assistance,
and by December a definite lull in "bandit" activity occurred
with the Guard encountering Sanaino's forces only six times
during that month.
*
An overview of the 1931-1932 campaign asainst Sandino
is provided in the following xable^i
TABLE 10
CONTACTS by AREA, 1931-1932
Year Contacts by Areaa Total















NA=Northern Area, CA^Central Area, SA=Southern Area
EA=Eastern Area, Unkn=Location Unknown
29
"0fficial List of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional
de Nicaragua," printed in Smith, et aj_. , Organization and















Notes, TABLES 10 AND lit
a. All contacts in 1931 and 1932 were by Marine or
native led Guard patrols consisting of nationals
only, except for one contact in the Northern Area
in 1931 that was the result of a Marine patrol.
b. The Southern Area includes all the departments and
districts of the former Southern and Western Areas.
c. Casualties include killed in action, died of
wounds, and wounded in action.
d.
f.
USMC casualties are exclusive of Marine personnel
serving with the Guard.
GN casualties include Marines serving with the
Guard but do not include auxiliary forces and
civilian guides serving with the Guard (three
such casualties in 1931 and nine in 1932).
All Sandinista casualties were inflicted by Marine
or native led Guard patrols consisting of nationals
only.
As Sandinista casualties for GN contacts Nos. 317
and 334 (1931) were listed in the "Official List
of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua"
as "not verified" and "estimated" (as printed in
Smith, et al
. ) , the 1932 Guardia Nacional Annual
Report was used as a source for the "bandit"
casualties for these two contacts.
h. For total casualty s, 1927-1932, s
TABLE 3.
APPENDIX II.
Sourcesi Monthly report on "Bandit Contacts in Nicaragua,
from April, 1928, to November, 1932;" "Marine Corps
Casualties in Nicarasuat January 1, 192?, to
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January 2, 1933 (corrected coDy)," both located in
File HN," HQ, USMCi "Annual Report of the Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua for the Period Commencing
October 1, 1931* and ending September 30, 1932,"
Box 10, File Folder 14, FRO; and the "Official
List of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nic-
aragua," printed in Smith, et al. , Organization and
Operations of the Guardia Nacional, pp. 302-407,
passim .
As the information above indicates, the Sandinistas
expanded their operations to the whole of Nicaragua in 1931
and 1932. The Guard was unable to contain the bandit activ-
ities to just the Northern and Central Areas. With a total
force level of about 2500, responsible for the defense of the
entire country, such a task was probably impossible. Jue to
its limited manpower and extensive responsibilities, the Guard
found itself reacting to Sandino's forays rather than acting
to prevent them. However, when the Guard and the "bandits"
did clash, as the casualty figures show, the native guardsmen,
under Marine leadership, performed well. The Marines were
successful in providing the Guard witn a competent enlisted
soldiery; but as the following chapter illustrates, they were
considerably less successful in developing a trained and




The goal of the officers and noncommissioned officers
of the Marine Corps assigned to the Nicaraguan National Guard
Detachment was to develop a Nicaraguan led and manned con-
stabulary that would be both professionally competent and,
hopefully, apolitical. The Marines believed that a period
of ten years would be required to train the Guard. However,
following the change in administration in the United States
(Coolidge to Hoover) in 1929» it became aoparent to the
members of the National Guard detachment that withdrawal
of all American forces from Nicaragua would occur much sooner
than in ten years. *• The Marines relinquished command of the
Guard to native officers, on January 1, 1933 » just one day
before the United States withdrew all its remaining forces
from Nicaragua. On the 2nd of January, 1933 » the Nicaraguan
National Guard Detachment, organized five and one half years
before, ceased to exist.
Smith, e_t a_l
.







Personnel for this detachment were originally selected
from volunteers amon? Marine forces already stationed in
Nicaragua . At some later date, the Marine Corps changed tnis
nolicy and chose "volunteers" from the entire body of the
2Corns. The Marine Corns seems not to have established any
rigid qualifications for oersonnel being assigned to the Guard
nor have developed any training program for the c;e future
3Guard ia officers nrior to their denloyment to Nicaragua.
In light of the fact that for much of the intervention up to
two-thirds of the Marine Corps was stationed outside the
United States (China, Guam, Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, Philippines,
and the Canal Zone), this was not surprising. The Corps was
stretched thin just meeting its committments. Training was
p , ...Me gee i "United States Military Intervention in Nic-
aragua, 1909-1932," n. 167. Millett reports from an inter-
view with Lt. General Julian C. Smith (a former chief of staff
of the Guard ia ) that Marine Corps officers were expected to
"volunteer" when their turn came due to be rotated to Nicaragua
(Millett, "Guardia lvicional, " p. 171.).
'M, Dean Haivron, et al. , Constabulary Capabilities for
Low Level Conflict (McLean, Va.i human Sciences Research,
Inc
.
, 1969), p. 68.
"Report of tue Major General Commandant of the United
States Marine Corns," printed in Annual Renorts [1927-19321 .
vihen the Marine Corp. was reduced in 1932 by 2700 enlisted
men, the commandant reported that the Corps could no longer do
its jobt
u
T!r\e reduction of the enlisted strenrrt of the Marine
Corps from 18,000 to 15 t 3^3 has made it impossible for the
corns to carry out its primary mission of supporting the
United States ^leet by maintaining a force in readiness to
operate with the fleet. . . .
tfith the present enlisted strength, tne Marine Corps
is not nrepared to oerfor.'n its allotted task in the event
of a national emergency."
("Renort of the Major General Commandant of tne United States




to be acquired by doin?. Some ability in the Spanish language
as well as previous constabulary experience were desirable
traits but not requirements. It is quite possible, given
the small size of the Corps during the 1920' s that many of
the officers and noncommissioned officers that served in the
Guardia may have had the latter characteristic by default
rather than by plan, having either had tours with the Garde d'
Haiti or with the Guardia nacional Dominica . In October,
1930, General McDougal suggested to the Major General Com-
mandant the following qualifications for noncommissioned
officers requesting duty with the Guardia i (1) completion of
a satisfactory personal interview with the man's commanding
officer, (2) completion of one full enlistment in the Corps,
(3) possess the equivalent of a hi~h scnool educaxion, (4)
have some knowledge of Spanish, (5) oe temperate in habits,
(6) be capaole of w king independently without supervision,
and (7) have an excellent leadership record. To what extent
%illett, "Guardia Nacional," p. 171. Unfortunately,
the Haitians sooke French or Creole. A Guardia officer
speaking French was no better off in Spanish speaking Nicaragua
than a Marine who only knew "Brooklynese. " The Marines com-
manded the Garde d* Haiti for nineteen years (1915-193^) and
the Guardia Nacional Jominic > for even (1917-1924).
"Annual Report of the Commanding Officer, Nicaraguan
National Guard Jetachment, to the Major Genera Commandant ,
"
October 1, 1930 , box 10, File Folder 14, FRC . There was con-
siderable incentive ( oeyono. any "unofficial" pressure that
might have been Drought to bear on "volunteers") for both
officers and noncommissioned officers to apply for dutywith
the Guard. Marine Coros personnel serving in the Guard re-
ceived both their Marine pay and Guardia pay. Also, all Marine
(and Navy) noncommissioned personnel served as officers in the
Guardia , usually with the ^uarctia nacional rank of 2nd or 1st
lieutenant. Marine and Navy officers were also "frocked,"--
majors and lieutenant commanders served as Guard colonels and
colonels as major generals, etc.
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the commandant was able or willing to impl :nent these sug-
gestions is not known to this writer.
The bulk of the officer corps of the Guardia nacional
was composed of Marine and Navy noncommissioned officers.'
These men, as well as the officers, not only did not receive
any training peculiar to their assignment as a Guardia officer
(language, traditions, and history of Nicaragua) orior to their
transfer to the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, but also
when they arrived in Managua the Guardia Nacional was unable
to provide them with any, at least as of late 1929. The Guard
considered this situation to be both regrettable and un-
avoidable—as is indicated in the following memorandum written
at Guardia headquarters in December, 1929*
Junior officers (enlisted Marines and Navy men)
entering the Guardia Nacional report for duty at Head-
quarters, ianagua, where they are held for a few days
and are indoctrinated in Guardia worK. They are then
assigned to companies where they receive practical training
under experienced officers. At the oresent time there is
'For example, the officer (U.S.) breakdown on July 1,
1929, was i follows i 37 USiviC officers, 8 USN officers, 133
US !C noncommissioned officers and 20 USN petty officers. A
year later on June 30, the composition was much the samei 5^
USIVIC officers, 9 USN officers, 117 USMC and 20 USi\ noncommis-
sioned officers ( Ibid . ) . This arrangement was maintained
throughout the intervention- The firures for June 30, 1932»
weret 59 Marine and 6 navy officers, 122 U3i«iC noncommissioned
officers and 1*4 Navy petty officers ("Annual Report of the
Secretary of tne Navy," November 15» 1932, printed in Annual
Re ports [j.932], p. 31.).
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no school for the special training of officers. A
school for training and indoctrinating officers is highly
desirable, but due to the shortage of officers in the
field, it has been impossible to spare the time for this
training."
It would seem unlikely with the increased "bandit" activity of
1930-32 that the Guard corrected this training deficiency.
This lack of specialized training had its effects.
Although headquarters judged the overall performance of its
American officer personnel (commissioned and noncommissioned)
to be excellent, many of the noncommissioned officers serving
9
as lieutenants had to be replaced. More serious were the
mutinies. It is difficult to estimate to what extent a formal
indoctrination program for the American Guardia officer in the
social, cultural, and value system of tne native i>.icaraguan
might have prevented at least some of the eight mutinies that
occurred in the Guard during its Marine tutelage (a ninth
incident involved the apparently accidental killing of a
commissioned Marine officer of tne Guard by a native sentry
and a tenth, the justifiable shoot in^ of a marine sergeant
who was an officer in the Guard). rive of the eight mutinies
o
Memorandum, unsigned, headquarters, Guardia i>.acional
de Nicaragua, 3 December 1929, Box 10, File Folder 14, FRC . 1he
Guard, early in its organization, adopted the procedure of first
appointing enlisted Marim s and j^avy men as cadets for a pro-
bationary period prior to commissioning them as officers in
the Guardia Nacional . How long this procedure was in effect
remains to be determined ("Rep rt of the Major General Com-
mandant of the United States Marine Corps," October 3i 1928,
printed in Annual Repo. is [1925] , p. 1242.).
^Memorandum, unsigned, Headquarters, Guardia ^acional
de Nicaragua, 3 December 1929, oox 10, File r older 14, FRC.
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were directed against North American ^uardi:i officers, two
against Nicaraguan commissioned and noncommissioned officers,
and one against all senior personnel (U.S. and Nicaraguan) of
the garrison. In four of the eight cases, a perceived insult
to the sensitivities of the nicaraguan (ranging from exclusion
from a dance to pending transfers and reductions in rank) was
either the only cause or at least a contributory factor in
generating the revolts. An awareness, orovided by a formal
training program, of the sooio-cultur al facets of Nicaraguan
life may have averted affronts to nicaraguan oride and adaoted
standard American disciDlinary measure (such as reduction in
rank) to the Nicaraguan life- style. This education Tiight
have reduced the numoer of mutinies by 50 oercent. In only
three of the mutinies was there collusion with the Sandinistas.
As a result of these eignt revolts, five Marine Corps per-
sonnel (including one officer) were killed and two faithful
guardsmen wounded. ° Despite these eight occurrences, "The
enlisted guardia were on the whole very loyal to their
officers, both American and Nicaraguan." 1 ^
Smitn, et al. , Organization ana Operations of the
Guardia Nacional
, pp. 109-122, passim, . The first mutiny
occurred on January B, 1928, and the last, the only revolt
in which a commissioned Nicaraguan officer participated, on
June 30, 1932.
11
Ibid. , p. 39.
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This fealty was engendered by a tradition of
caudillismo , by mutual exnosure to the rigors of combat,
and perhaps most by assured nay, Doard, and medical care.
The army that wasn't paid in Nicaragua soon ceased to exist. -^
An illiterate raso (private) in the Guardia was considerably
better off than his counterpart in civilian life. The ordi-
nary laborer's wage averaged about 50 cents a day with many
13
mozos earniner only 5 to 6 dollars per month. A Guard
private earned a monthly wage of 12 dollars, received a daily
ration valued at 30 cents, ana was provided with free medical
Iktreatment. This rate of oay, xhe steady employment, and
the benefits of food, lodging, and medical care were certainly
inducements that persuaded the Nicaraguan soldier to remain
loyal to his American and idcara-uan officers. One has to
eat.
The comparative advantages offered by the Guard in
the way of wages and personal care undoubtedly helped re-
cruiting. Cnce the Nicaraguan peasant learned that members
of the Guard actually received their oay and on a regular
12
r.1illett, "Guardia Kacional," o. 251.




, Organization and Operations of the
Guardia Nacional , pp. 79* 84. The value of the daily ration
was subsequently reduced to 25 cents in 1929 ana to 20 cenxs
in 1930 (Smith, et al,, p. 79.).
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basis, he sought to enlist. The following taole snows that





Period Enlistments Force Enlisted
Level a Strength 3-
Oct. 1,1927-Seot. 30,1928 1405 1633 2000°
Oct. 1,1928-Sept. 30,1929 1056 1939 2000
0ct.l,1929-3ept.30,1930 109^ 2241 2000
0ct.l,1930-3ept.30,1931 1285° 2210 2150
0ct.l,1931-Sept.30,1932 799 c 227^ 2150
Notesi a. The "Enlisted F01 ce Level"
Unlisted Strengtn" were as
for each row.
and "a.uxhorized
of the later date
b. The authorized enlisted strength of 2000 for
Seotemuer 30, 19^8, had only been established
in June, 1928. Prior to June, the authorized
enlisted strength was 1136.
c. The enlistments for the reporting period 1930-31
and 19;L-32 include 424 and 434 re-enlistments,
respectively. These re-enlistments would be men
who originally enlisted in 1927-28 and 1928-29
for the mandatory three years.
d. The enlisted force levels include those enlisted
Guardia hired by private firms to protect their
property. These men were paid by the companies
that hired them. They were not carried on
Guardia payrolls and hence could be in excess
of the authorized strength. For example, in
1932, cne Standard Fruit Company supported 50
men (officers and enlisted); tne Pacific Rail-
road Company, 20; and the 3an .-mtonio Sugar
Estates, 20 (Smith, e_t al., Or i zation and




Sources t "Annual Reoorts of xhe
aragua," 1928-1932, ^>ox 10,
Guardia K'acional de Nic-
File Folder 14, FRC
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(pertinent sections of the Annual Report for 1929
are located in box 10, File bolder 14, and dox 11,
File Folder 13) ; for authorized strengths, see
suura, n. 6, p. 33.
Originally, the Guard transferred the new recruit
from his olace of enlistment, when it coincided with his home,
to another military department in order to assist the indi-
vidual in maintaining a non-partisan attitude. * Headquarters
changed this policy sometime during 1929 due to the costly
and inadequate transportation facilities between deoartments
and as an attempt to decrease the desertion rate by having men
serve in their home departments. The number of desertions,
as TABLE 13 illustrates, did decrease during 1930 Out remained




























Total 1348 495 2389
•^General Ord
de Nicaragua , October
-^Memorandum,
de Nicaragua, 3 Decern
General Order No. 73
ary 27, 1930 (General
Nacional de Nicaragua
18, FRC.). However,
General Order No. 73-
lation.
er No. 73 » headquarters, Guard i a Nacional
31, .927, Box 10, File Folder 17. FRC.
unsigned, Headquarters, Guardia nacional
oer 1929. Box 10, File Folder 14, FRC.
of 1927 was not rescinded until Febru-
Order No. 15, Headquarters, Guardia
, 27 Feoruary 1930, Box 10, File Folder
as the above indicates, in practice,
1927 was violated prior to its cancel-

Ill
Notes i a. The higher discharge rates of 1930-31 and
1931-32 were due to expiration of the three-
year enlistments begun in 1927-28 and 1928-29.
b. In addition, five enlisted marines (officers in
the Guard) deserted while serving witn tne Gu .rdia
(File M M, " HQ, USftiC
.
) .
Sources 1 "Annual Reports of trie Guardia nacional de
Nicaragua," 1928-1932, Box 10, File Folder 14, FHC
(for the 1929 Annual Report, oertinent facts are
located in Box 11, rile Folder 13).
The high number of discharges and desertions were due to a
number of factor s--disenchantment with the service, inadequate
recruit screening, unfitness, and the lack of any tradition of
a disciplined armed force and allegiance to tnat force. The
Guard did manage to recover 37 percent of all those who did
desert. Many of these men probably "deserted" when they felt
the urge or necessity and returned of their own free will never
having been aware of having committed a "crime" or believing
that they had committed one. Tne inculcation of discipline
and fealty took time, but as the low number of desertions in
1932 indicates, oersistent training in these areas was finally
successful.
The overall enlisted training program of the Guardia
Nacional is adequately described by the abbreviation OJT
—
on-the-job training. There was little formal training in the
basics of soldiery. If the recruit lived long enough, and
the casualty figures for the Guard indicate he did, he be-
came a competent soldier by practice. Upon his enlistment,
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the recruit went through one montn of basic training and
17
then, evidently, he was sent straight to the field. ' Small
arms training, during particularly hectic times, was only a
week long. In April, 1929. headquarters issued a General
Order that made general military training the responsibility
of the local commands. The General Order prescribed the
training; to be conducted which included insxruction in reading,
writing, and simple arithmetic for zhe illiteraxe members of
iq ...
the Guardia. 7 Headquarters, at various other times, directed
that monetary awards and ounishments be utilized to enhance
the training procedures. It authorized the payment of 25
cents to the guardsman having the cleanest clothing, rifle,
and equioment at the weeKly Saturday inspections held at
all "costs co imanded by an officer and 25 cents to the man
displaying the greatest proficiency in the manual of arms
during the insoection. Conversely, a fine of 50 cents was
imposed on a guardsman found to have a dirty rifle (this
17
'"Annual Report of the GN-3 Section," 3 December
1929, Box 10, File -older 14, FRC
.
-^"Activities and Achievements of the Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua from the time of its reorganization
to February 23, 1929," Box 10, File bolder 14, FRC.
^••Annual Report of tne G1m-3 Section," 3 December
1929; Memorandum, unsigned, Headquarters, Guardia nacional
de Nicaragua, 3 December 1929| and "Annual Report of tne
Guardia nacional de Nicaragua for the Period Commencing
October 1, 1931, and Znainz September 30, 1932," all located
in Box 10, File Folder 14, FRC.
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practice was rescinded by General Order 15 of Lveoruary 27
»
1930). The policy of local training, heavily interlaced
with practice in the field, was continued throughout the
intervention as is evident from the following statement in
the 1932 Annual Report
»
During the period covered by this report (October 1,
1931, to September 30, 1932), military training has been
continuous at all posts. Due to the increase in bandit
activity and the accompanying need of all available men
for field duty, the majority of recruits received their
training in actual service in the field. However, when-
ever opoortunity availed itself, schools i.ere held at all
posts for the enlisted personnel in which the duties of
the soldier were taught, particular stress being laid on
the use, care, and functioning of the rifle and auxomatic
weapons.
I>io regular training centers for the enlisted oersonnel
were operated during the year due to the "paramount need of
all available men for field duty.
This lack of formal training, if "bandit" casualties are to be
believed, apparently did not impair tne performance of the
Guard in combat. The enlisted guardia learned how to fight
by fighting.
Training for noncommissioned officers was no more
formal than it was for recruits. Again, headquarters divorced
itself from trainin? operations and gave the responsibility
of preparing enlisted men for advancement to the rank: of
corporal and above to the field commands--the organizations
20General Order No. 95» Headquarters, Guardia Nacional
de Nicaragua , December 2, 192?; and General Order No. 30 , Head-
quarters, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Way 12, 1930, located
in Box 10, File Folder 17 and Box 10, File Folder 18, FRC
,
respectively.
21"Annual Report of xhe Guardia nacional de Nicaragua
for the Period Commencing October 1, 1931* and Ending
September 30, 1932," Box 10, File Folder 14, FRC.
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with the least amount of tine to conduct an orderly training
program. General Order No. 13-1930 direcxed the local units
to train their own noncommissioned officers:
School v/ill habitually be held in each organization
for the proper training of Guardia recommended for pro-
motion. The course shall be such as to fix the man to
oualify for the next higher rank. 22
One exception to this policy of local training of noncom-
missioned officers occurred in 1930* Five Nicaraguan first
sergeants attended a course in company administration at the
military Academy in Managua for one month during the summer
of 1930. Four satisfactorily completed the course. D Other
than this one instance, this writer is not familiar with any
other attempts to provide noncommissioned officers with
formalized training.
The lack of time, resources, facilities, or whatever
the reason for the Marines' failure to provide adequate formal
training for enlisted of all ranks was corrected by the
expedient of combat. A greater shortcoming, because it
was not rectified, was the combined inability and failure of
the Guard leadership to commission a sufficient number of
native officers at all levels early enough in the inter-
vention to enable a smooth and successful transition of the
Guard to Nicaraguan control when the Marines withdrew in 1933°
22General Order No. 13» headquarters, Guardia Nacional
de Nicaragua , February 28, 1930, Box 10, File Folder 13, FRC.
2 3 f, Annual Report of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua
for the Period Commencing October 1, 1929 » and Ending
September 30, 1930," Box 10, File Folder 14, FRC.
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Of the 178 Wicaraguan line officers with the rank of captain
and below (in other words, those officers most likely to con-
duct patrols) not holding staff positions (i.e., personnel
officer, instructor at the Military Academy, etc.) on the day
of the turnover, only 87 had been officers for longer tnan a
month and one half. furthermore, of tnose same 178 officers,
only 28 had led patrols which had made contact witn the
"bandits." All native line officers above the rank of captain
(of which there were 17) were appointed from civilian life by
President Moncada in November and December of 1932. Twenty-
two of the thirty-three captains were likewise appointed from
24
civilian life. These 39 officers, of course, had no prior
experience in the Guard (some had gained experience in Nic-
aragua's various revolutions).
This lack of experienced junior officers and trained
senior officers was in marked contrast to Colonel Rhea's
intention of providing the nascent Guardia with native
leaders as soon as practicable (See supra
, p. 49). It is
not entirely clear why Rhea's successors did not meet this
goal. vor senior officers, the difficulty seems to have been
due to political restrictions. In the case of junior officers,
?4Data collected from the "Official List of Contacts
of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," printed in Smith, et
al
.
, Organization and Operations of the Guardia nacional , op.
302-407 » pa ssim i and Letter from the Commanding Officer,
Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, to the Major General
Commandant, USMC , Managua, 15 December 1932, dox 13 * File
Folder 4, F3C. The figure given (23; for the numoer of
officers having led patrols in contact with the "bandits"
maybe low by, say, 10 due to the difficulty of identifying
officers with the same last name and due to the fact that
not all oatrol leaders are named.
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the problem was mostly one of money. Altnough the budget
established in the December 22, 1927, agreement provided
for an annual salary of 600 dollars each for 20 officer
students, there was no orovision in the budget specifically
funding officer training. ^ Evidently, monies for this
ouroose were not available until 1930. The .iefe director
recommended to President Moncada in 1929 the establishment
of a military school for the training of Nicaraguan officers.
Moncada approved the proposal but stated that the financing
of the institution would have to wait till the first half of
1930. 2 ? On April 1, 1930, the Military Academy was open for
instruction with a staff of two Marine officers and one
gunnery-sergeant, U3MC. The first class, composed of nine
Nicaraguan senior noncommissioned officers, graduated on
June 22, 1930--nine months ahead of schedule due to increased
"bandit" activities in the Northern and Central areas (See
supra
, pp. 91-93)* This brought the total number 01 native
^"Agreement between the United States and the Repuolic
of Nicaragua, "printed in Smith, et al. , Organization and
Operations of the Guard i a Nacional , d. 209.
2o"Annual Report of the GN-3 Section," 3 December
1929. Box 10, File Folder 14, FRC
.
^Memorandum, unsigned, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional
de Nicaragua, 3 December 1929. Box 10, File Folaer 14, FRC.
28Smith, et al. , Organization and Operations of tne
Guard ia Kacional de Hicara^ua , o. 102.
"
ibid
. , p. 103 1 and "Annual Report of tne Guardia
Nacional de Nicarap-ua for the Period Commencing October 1,




officers serving in the Guard to seventeen. The first
Nicaraguan officer had been appointed from civilian life on
July 30, 1929. He was followed by seven otners appointed
from civilian life on November 21, 1929.^ Three more
classes attended the Military Academy prior to the U.S.
withdrawal producing a total of I06 new officers for the
four classes.
The length of the academic year at the Academy
fluctuated considerably, the amounx of variation bein?: de-
pendent on the exigency for officers in the field. Originally,
the course of instruction was to be for eleven months—nine
months class work and two months field work.-^ 2 By the time
the second class of cadets entered the Academy on November 19»
1930, the allotted time had been reduced to nine months--
^Letter from Commanding Officer (u.C. McDougal) to
the Major General Commandant, August 20, 1930, Box 12, File
Folder 23, FRC . Two of the seven officers appointed in
November, 1929» were subsequently discharged for unsatisfactory
oerformance on July 1, 1930 ( Ibid . )
.
?1 .J Smith, et al
.
, Organization and Operations of the
Guardia Nacional , pp. 104-0b. The graduation dates were
June 1, 1931 ; April 7, 1932; and December 1, 1932. Three of
the twenty-eight graduates of the second class were officers
attending the Military Academy and hence are not included in
166 total above ("Annual Report of the Guardia Nacional de
Nicaragua for tne Period Commencing October 1, 1930, and
Ending September 30, 1931i" Box 10, File Folder 14, FRC).
-^"Annual Report of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua
for the Period Commencing October 1, 1929, and Ending September
30, 1930," box 10, File Folder 1<+, FRC.
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eight in the classroom followed by one in The field,-^ How-
ever, only one class, the third, ever s:ot the benefit of a
full nine months of instruction. Of The others, the first
had two and one half j the second, six and one half; and the
fourth, seven months.
The curriculum at the Military Academy varied in
detail from class to class as the staff translated more
Marine Corns training manuals into Spanish, and as they made
adjustments in the course of study to make it more applicable
to the Nicaraguan situation. However, all classes, with
possible exceotion of the first due to its brevity, received
basically the same training. There were six areas of study
i
Military Science (drill, oatrolling, leadership, etc.),
Administration (pay, company administration, duties of depart-
ment, district, and sub-district commanders, etc.), Infantry
Weapons (use, care, and operation of small anas), Law
(Constitution of Nicaragua, Articles for the Government of
the Guerdia nacional
,
police regulations, etc.), Engineering
(roads, fortifications, map maKing and reading, etc.), ana
Academic Subjects (Math, English, ana xne History, Customs,
Traditions, and Geography of Nicaragua, etc.). The greatest
34
-* Smith, et al
•
, Organization and Operati ns of the
Guard ia Nacional, pp. 103-0o.
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number of hours of instruction were devoted to Military
Science. J
In addition to the scheduled instruction, two of the
classes (the second and third) participated in combat patrols
against th Sandinistas. The members of the Corps of Cadets
and the staff of the Academy constituted a reserve force for
the Guard ia and were subject to active duty operations any
time after the third week of training. The second class was
in the field for one month and had one contact with the
"bandits." The third class conducted patrols for two months
and made four contacts.^
From the foregoinsr discussion, it is clear that
the Marines did train Nicaraguan junior officers, but they
trained many of them too late thus preventing native officers
from acquiring needed combat experience. A total of 166
officers were commissioned from the Academy. Of these lo6
officers, 132 graduated in 1932 \ and of these, 73 were com-
missioned on December 1, 1932, only one month prior to the
-^"Annual Report of xhe Guardia ^acional de Nicaragua
for the Period Commencing Octooer 1, 1930* and Ending
September 30, 1931 t" and "Annual Report of the Guard ia Nacional
de Nicaragua for the Period Commencing Octooer 1, 1931 » and
Ending September 30, 1932, "both in Box 10, Pile Folder 14, FRC.
The scheduled hours of instruction for the second class were
as followsi Military Science— 291t Engineering—199» Law— 189,
Infantry Weapons--l84, Academic Subjects—112, and Admin-
istration—84 (See 1931 Annual Report).
^ Smith, et al
.
, Organization and Operations of the
Guardia Nac i >nal, on. 103tl05»
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37U.S. withdrawal. This delay in training; was prooably due
to both insufficient funds and an error in judgement in not
expediting officer training once the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Nicaragua became definite in early 1931* with 80
percent of all Academy officers graduating in 1932, and oy far
the bulk of the junior line officers came from tnis source
(very few were commissioned from the ranks or appointed from
civilian life), Lt is not surprising that Marine led patrols
had the majority of the contacts with the Sandinistas.
Nicaraguan commanded patrols, as is indicated oy the following
table, never constituted more than one-third of tne patrols
having contact with "bandits" in any one givaiyear.
TAr3LE 14
GN PATROL CONTACTS, 1927-1932
Number of Nicaraguan Marine
Year Nic. Led Led Unkn Total
Line Officers Contacts Contacts
Beginning -Snda
1927° 18 2 20
1928 1 25 2 28
1929 8 5 20 25
1930 8 15 19 101 120
1931 15 35 23 118 141
1932 35 203 59 114 3 17b
Total 107 396 7 510
Nic. = Nicaraguan, Unlm = Patrol leader unknown
37 Ibid
.
, -on. 103-0o. The numoer of graduates Der
class was as followsi 1st class--9, 2nd class--25 (does not
include the 3 officers that also graduated with tnis class),
3rd class— 59, and 4th class- -73.
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Notes: a. "Beginning" refers to the numoer of Nicaraguan
line officers as of January 1 of each year and
"End" to the number as of Jecember 31 • All
native officers in the Guard were line officers
exceut those in the Medical Corps.
b. The year 1927 begins with the first contact
in July at Ocotal on the 16th.
c. "Nicaraguan Led Contacts" include those patrols
commanded by native enlisted and officer oersonnel
that had contact witn the Sandinistas.
d. The contacts listed are only those contacts in
whicn members of trie Guardia Ivacional participated.
That is, the patrols were mixed composition (USMC-
GN) or Marine/Nicaraguan led patrols comDosed of
nationals only.
Sourcest "The Official List of Contacts of the Guardia
Nacional de Nicaragua," printed in Smith, et al.
,
Organization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional
,
pp. 302-407, passim ; "Annual Reports of the Guardia
Nacional," 1928-1932, oox 10, File Folder 14, FRC;
"Roster of Officers Performing Duty in the Guardia
Nacional," box 9. File Folder 14, FRC ; Letter from
Commanding Officer (j.C. McJougal) to Major General
Commandant, Managua, August 20, 1930, Box 12, File
Folder 28, FRC; Letter from Commanding Officer,
Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment, to Major
General Commandant, USMC, Managua, December 15 » 1932,
Box 13, File Folder 4, FRC; and The Jefe Director of
the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (Matthews) to the
American Charge (rseaulac), April 4, 1932, Foreign
Relations, 1932, V, p. 857.
While the junior officers lacked combat experience,
the senior officers appointed from civilian life in late 1932
had neither training nor experience as Guard officers. The
Marines were unable during their tutelage of the Guardia
Nacional to provide the Guard with a corps of trained and
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experienced field grade (major and aoove) officers.-' The
deficiency of competent native officers in the junior grades
is exolicable in terms of misjudgement and lack of funas. as
for the senior officers, it was a matter of political con-
straints that were not overcome until a few months before
the withdrawal.
38The problem of procuring higher grade officers is




The first definitive statement on the United States
withdrawal from Nicaragua a-ooeared in a letter from Secretary
of State Stimson to President Moncada in Novemoer, 1930*
Stimson wrote
i
At this ooint, I feel bound to remind you that the
time is rabidly approaching when it will be necessary
for the United States Government to withdraw its Marine
forces and officers from Nicaragua. The presence of
those forces have always necessarily created an aunormal
situation and one which can nox be permanent, ... I
can not see how they can remain later than to assist
you in carrying; out the elections of November, 1932.
This country will then have helped Nicaragua for five
years to police its territory and to keep banditry in
check. Public opinion in this country will hardly sup-
Dort a further continuance of that situation,
^
Public opinion, however, was only one of tne factors
urging the United States to withdraw its armed forces from
Nicaragua, There was also the persistent opposition of
Congress (culminating in the Senate's refusal to appropriate
funds for the supervision of the 1932 Nicaraguan elections),
the antagonism of many of tne Laxin American countries, the
The Secretary of State to the President of Nicaragua





considerable exoense of maintaining an overseas force
during a depression, and perhaps the possible ill effects
of a continued intervention on the Reouolican chances in the
2
accroaching presidential election of 1932.
Two months after the letter to Moncada, Stimson
notified the Secretary of the Navy of the State Department's
desire for withdrawal after the 1932 Nicaraguan electionsi
I feel that we snould be in a position, after the
Presidential elections in Nicaragua in 1932, to withdraw
all our Marines from the country should this Government
at that time decide that that is the wise thing to
do. • • ., I want to ask you to issue instructions to the
Commander of trie Guardia Nacional to devote special
attention to the training up of nicaraguan officers so
that we may be in a position, should that then be the
decision of this Government, to turn over the whole
Guardia force to Nicaragua upon the installation of the
new Government on January 1, 1933 •-'
To ascertain the opinion on the proposed withdrawal
of those most closely associated with the Nicaraguan situation,
Stimson requested the American Minister, Hanna, and General
..".cJougal to come to Washington to discuss the withdrawal wixh
him. General McCoy, the former Chairman of the 1^28 electoral
Commission, was also invited. The discussions with the
Secretary of State Degan at the end of January, 1931 • ^y
2
Kamman, Search for Stability
,
po. Ib9, 193; and
Millett, "Guardia Nacional,"" dp. 2 64-71*.
^The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the navy
(Adams), January 22, 1931. I'oreirn ^^litions , 1931i II» pt> •
839-40.




February 5th, the grouD had developed a policy to govern
U.S. military action for the remainder of the intervention.
A Marine force would be retained till the withdrawal, but
it would only be stationed in Managua. Marines deployed to
the Nortnern and Central Areas were to oe concentrated in
Managua by June 1, 1931, ani were to be replaced by the
500 n^w guardsmen recruited for this Durpose (See supra ,
n. 6» 0.83) • On February 13t Secretary Stimson made public
his intention to withdraw all Marines, including those with
the Guard, from Nicaragua after the 1932 election. Also, he
described the policy adopted on Februarv 5 and stated that
the Marine forces (inclusive of the Marines in the Guard)
woulo be reduced to anproximately 500 men by the June 1st
deadline. By these public statements, the U.S. committed
^Memorandum by the Secretary of State, February 5i
1931, 1'0 reign Relations , 1931, II, po. 841-44.
bPress statement contained in Giimson to hanna,
Foreign Relations , 1931. Hi PP. 844-45. The total U.S.
force level in Nicaragua n'-'V'C did decline to the 500 mark.
On June 6, 1931. 2nd Brigade strength was 803. Tnis included
about 50 Navy personnel attached to the urigade ("Record of
Events, 31 May 3I--0 June 31." Nicaragua Microfilm Reel No.
19. HQ, U3MC). In addition to the 803, there was about 200
Marines and Navy mon in the Guard. On Jecember 24, 1932,
the 2nd brigade numoered 80o ("Record of Events, 18 December
32— ^4 Jecember 32,*' Nicaragua Microfilm Reel No. 19» HQ,
USMC




itself to a SDBcific withdrawal date as well as a finite
oeriod in which to replace American officers of the Guard
with Nicaraguans.
During the Stimson meetings with McCoy, lianna, ana
McJougal, the commandant of the Marine Corps had appraised
McDpugal's chief of staff (soon to oe aopointed Jefe jjirector
on February 6, 1931) t Lieutenant Colonel C.B. Matthews, USMC
,
on the necessity of exoeditin?; the training of native officers
in view of the proposed withdrawal date of January 1, 1^33.
Matthews' plan for doing this, as reported by rianna, consisted
of increasing the number of Academy graduates so as to provide
for the requisite number of junior line officers, appointing
doctors from civilian life to staff the Medical Corps, and
^Letter from the Major General Commandant to the
Commanding Officer, Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment,
Washington, January 31 » 1931 t Box 11, File Kolaer 11, FRC.
Matthews had been in Nicaragua since July, 1930, first serving
as the Central Area Commander and then assuming the chief of
staff post on October 28, 1930 (3mitn, e_t al. , Organization
and Operations of tne Guard ia nacional , op. 227, 229,). He had
remained in Man i?ua while Mcuougal went to talk to Stimson in
Washington. The letter above, althougn addressed to tne Com-
manding Officer of the Nicaraguan national Guard Detachment,
was evidently meant for Matthews since i-'cuougal was in washing-
ton. The letter bears Matthews initials indicating he had seen
tne letter. This raises an interesting point oi conjecture.
To what extent did Mcuougal, who was soon to be relieved and
who was in Washington committing the Guard to a course of
actions that he did not have to imulement (replacement of the
Marines in the northern and Central Areas and turnover of the
Guard to native officers by 1933) » and Matthews agree on the
future of the Guard? One can only assume that the two officers




promoting experienced Nicaraguan non-commissioned officers
to fill the officer billets in the Quartermaster and other
staff departments. In nanna's report there was relayed an
admission by Matthews that he had not developed any program
to provide for field grade officers and apparently, he was
o
not planning to do so. This concession should have triggered
an alarm at the Latin American desk in the State department.
Here was the ranking American officer in the Guard reporting
to the American minister that the nicaraguan Hacional Guard
Detachment was preparing to oroviae the Guard with native
junior officers, but it had no concept as how to proceed to
acquire senior officers for that organization.
The State Department, evidently, did not awaken to
this omission in the withdrawal scheme until late February,
q
1932. On March 11, State sent an urgent inquiry to the
Q
Manna to Stimson, "'arch 12, 1931, Foreign delations ,
1.931 1 II. P« 846. Of the 13 native officers in the medical
Corps (including 11 half-pay contract surgeons and dentists)
at the time of the turnover, 12 had i,een appointed from
civilian life in November and Decemoer, 1932 (Letter from the
Commanding Officer, iNicaraguan kati mal Guard uetachment, to
the Major General Commandant, USMC , Managua, 15 December 1932,
Box 13, File Folder 4, FRC). The proposal to commission men
from the ranks was apparently not implemented. To this writer's
knowledge, only four men were promoted directly from the ranks
(The Jefe Director of the Guard ia nacional de Nicaragua
{Matthews] to the American Charge JbeaulaoJ, April 4, 1932,
Foreign Relations
, 1932, V, p. 857.). Perhaps, this was
sufficient. The number of Academy graduates was increased
as has been previously discussed (See, supra
, p. 119).
9Millett, "Guardia kacional," pp. 283-84.
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Legation request ing information on the Guard commander's
plans for executing the transfer of the Guardia ivacional to
Nicaraguan officers. 1 The Legation replied on April 2
stating that the junior officer and Medical Coros comple-
ments would be filled by the date of the withdrawal, xiowever,
the aopointment of field grade officers was to be left to the
newly elected president following his assumption of office on
January 1, 1933* This proposal would have destroyed any
hope of maintaining the Guard as a non-partisan organization.
Obviously, the new president would appoint only men of his
party loyal to himself to high positions in the Guard. Para-
doxically, in light of subsequent events (Somoza's dictator-
ship), it probably would have provided Nicaragua with stability—
not through democratic elections out by means of force. The
party elected to office in November, 1932, assuming some sort
of accomodation with Sandino, would have had the means to
perpetuate itself in oower and dissuade any future revolution
—
an organized, disciplined, militarily competent armed force,
the Guardia ;<acional . That waj something Nicaragua never had
before.
On April 5th, the American Charge, beaulac, sent a
letter supplement to his April 2nd telegram containing a new
Stimson xo beaulac, March 11, 1932, Foreign Relations ,
1932, V, p. 852.
-''beaulac to Stimson, Aoril 2, 1932, Foreign ftel itions ,
1932. V, p. 853.
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oroposal from Matthews for obtaining senior officers.
Matthews now suggested that native high ranking officers
be anpointed, aoparently by Moncada but chosen oy the winner
of the presidential election, about two months before the
turnover so as to enable the Nicaraguans to receive some
practical training in the duties they woula assume upon the
12departure of the American officers. This was followed by
another revision sent to the negation in June. In a letter
to Hanna, dated June 15th, Matthews explained nis latest
proposition:
It will in all probability not be practicable to
secure the appointment of suitable native officers for
the higher commands during the current administration.
The President who will le elected on 6 November, 1932,
and inaugurated on 1 January, 1933 » will have to be
depended upon to make these appointments [a modification
of Matthews' April k position but consistent witn
Legation's April 2nd telegramj .... It would be most
heloful if these officers could be selected in equal
numbers from the two political parties, and I recommend
that our Government use its good offices with the new
President to bring about this result.^-3
Matth.-ws went on to state that following the new president • s
appointment of officers after his inauguration, fifty Marines
should stay on witn the Guard for two months to proviue at
least a modicum of trainin? for the new senior officers.
12The Jefe director of uie Guardia nacional de Nic-
aragua (Matthews) to the American Charge' ( beaulac ) , April 4,
1932, Foreign Relations , 1932, \f , p. 358.
^Letter from G.d. Matthews to tne Honorable Matthew
E. Hanna, Managua, June 15# 1932, printed in Smith, £t al.
,




Matthews believed that these two months would be wholly-
inadequate to train the officers but would be sufficient
time to enable the mechanics of the turnover to proceed
smoothly. Hanna concurred with Matthews' suggestions ana
forwarded them approved to the State Jeparxment on June 21. ^
Matthews' proposal for a bioartisan Guard ia is the
first indication that the Guard commander was aware of the
political implications for the United States attendant to the
aDOointnent of officers to the directing oositions in the
Guard. His previous proposals would have left the Guardia
Nacional a Very partisan organization, and clearly this would
have been an objectionable result, after five years of inter-
vention, to the State Department. Of Matthews' June 15
suggestions, the Department considered only his bipartisan
proposition acceptaole. Otherwise, the reply was negative and
unrealistic. The withdrawal would proceed as planned, no
Marines would remain in Nicaragua beyond the inauguration of
the Nicaragua^ president, and as for the matter of providing
the Guard with field grade officers, that was simole; Matthews
should just select those best qualified, divided equally as
14.,.,Ibid
.
^Hanna to Stimson, June 21, 1932, Foreign delations ,
1932, V, pn. 865-60. In this dispatch rianna quotes virtually
the entire contents of Mattnews' June 15th letter.
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to number and rank oetween Liberals and Conservatives, and
have President Moncada appoint thern immediately.
Matthews * answer, sent to the Legation on August 8,
stated, as diplomatically as possible, that only someone
entirely unfamiliar with the internal politics of Nicaragua
could have proffered the solution to the senior officer
problem as set forth in the Department's July 19 telegrami
,
... it is inconceivable to me that any president will
accept or continue in office Nicaraguan officers, of high
rank in key positions in the Guardia, of whose personal
loyalty to himself and to his party there is the slightest
doubt, . • •
In view of these conditions, the existence of which I
believe everyone familiar with the situation here will
admit, it is obviously impossible to select for the higher
commands of the Guardia, Nicaraguans who will be acceptable
to the new president until it is known who the new presi-
dent will be. . . .
I have considered and rejected as impracticable the plan
of requesting the President to appoint Nicaraguans whom I
believe to be qualified for the higher ranks before the
candidates of the leading parties are known; both because
I am certain that the present Chief Executive will refuse
to make the necessary appointments because of the expense
involved, and because no one would accept an appointment
without assurance that it would be made permanent by the
new president, an assurance which it is of course impos-
sible to give at the present time. 7
His plan for the turnover disapproved oy the State
Department and having rejected the Department's recommendation
Stimson to hanna, July 19 $ 1932, Foreign Relations ,
1932, V, pp. 866-67.
1
^The Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional de Nic-
aragua (Matthews) to the American Minister (nanna), August 8,
1932, Po.-eign Relations , 1932, V, po. 808-09. Also in Smith,
et al
.





for acquiring senior grade officers, Matthews offered an
alternative olan. As soon as tne two parties selected their
nominees for president, Mattnews would request these two
gentlement to orovide him with a list of men, equally divided
as to party affiliation, each candidate desired to have fill
the higher offices of the Guard ia . The Guard commander then
would present this list to President Moncada who would appoint
the men on the winning candidate's list to the high positions
18in the Guard immediately af t ?r the elections. The Depart-
ment approved this plan on August 30th.
Tne Jepartment considers that the plan now proposed is
satisfactory from both the military and political stand-
point. It will permit those Hicaraguan officers who are
to fill the higher ana most responsible positions to gain
instruction and experience by working alongside the Ameri-
can personnel. It also will allow the incoming President,
whoever he may be, to select the officers who will command
the Guardia during his term. Finally it will assure the
continuance of the non-partisan basis of tne Guardia since
its officers will oe drawn equally from the two historic
political parties [This is a neat oit of self-deception.
Obviously, the Guard, as envisioned by Matthews, would be
a bipartisan not a non-partisan organization following the
U.S. withdrawal.J .9
Minister hanna presented the Matthews' olan to
President Moncada on September 8. Mone ad a approved it and sug-
gested that in order to ensure tne scheme would be implemented
l ft
The Jefe Jirector of the Guardia nacional de Nic-
aragua (Matthews) to the American Minister (hanna), August 8,
1932* Foreign Relations , 1932, V, p. 869. The exoense of the
appointments would be reduced by paying the senior officers the
salary of a captain in the Guard until the turnover.
1
^Castle to Hanna, August 30, 1932, Foreign Relations ,
1932, V, pp. 871-72,
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by the winning candidate, both nominees should sign an agree-
ment in the presence of a representative of the State Depart-
20
ment pledging themselves to execute the plan. Tne State
21Department agreed to this. The presidential and vice-
presidential candidates of both parties signed the agreement
on November 5i the day before the election. In its final form,
the accord provided that "the non-partisan [actually bipartisan]
character of the Guardia r^acional shall be strictly maintained
in the enlisted personnel, the cadets of the military Academy,
and in each graae of commissioned officers, except [empnasis
addedjthe grade of Jefe Director."^ 2 In other words, the com-
manding officer of the Guard woula be a political appointee,
presumaoly, of the same party as the president.
Immediately following the election, Sacasa, the Lioeral
president-elect, submitted a revised list of selectees, with
the approval of Minister hanna and President Moncada, to
Matthews. The new list provided for thirty-six appointments
as compared to the original list of thirty. -* In actuality,
20Hanna to Stimson, Septemuer lb, 1932, Foreign
Relations , 1932, V, p. 873.
0-1
xStimson to hanna, September 19» 1932, Foreign Re-
lations , 1932, V, pd. 873-74.
22copy of Agreement signed on Uovemoer 5» 1932, Pro-
viding for the Maintenance of the Non-Partisan Character of the
Guardia Nacional de Nicaraeua, Foreign Relations , 1932, V,
p. 887.
23 / /
-'Letter from C.j. Matthews to 3r. iion Jose Maria
Moncada, Managua, November 17, 1932, printed in Smith, et al .
,
Organization and Opera ti ns of the Gu.-i.rdi a Nacional
, p. loO.
In this letter Matthews states that the position of cni< f of
staff, in accordance with the November 5 agreement, was to be
filled by a member of tne winning political nrty. apparently
then, even though the November 5th accord does not so state,
both the .jefe director and the chief of staff were political
appointees of the victorious party.
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President Moncada appointed thirty-nine officers from civilian
life to high positions in the Guard, the last being appointed
on December 12. 2^ Excluding the .jefe director , the rank and
party distribution were as followsi
TAtlLS 15
NICARAGUA^ SENIOR LINE OFFICERS







Total 19 19 33
Sources Letter from C.B, Matthews to the rionoraDle Matthew E.
Hanna, Managua, undated, box 11, File Folder 11, FRC
.
Also contained in Smith, e_t al., Organization and
Operations of the Guardia Nacional
, p. lol.
^Letter from Commanding Officer, Nicaraguan National
Guard Detachment, to the Major General Commandant, USMC
,
Managua, 15 December 1932, box 13, File Folder k, FRC. The
thirty-nine appointees do not include the officers appointed
from civilian life to the Medical Corps (See supra , n. 8,
p. 127), nor the one 2nd lieutenant (permanent) appointed on
December 8 (See Matthews' letter of Jecember 15i 1932, above).
The announcement that civilians would be appointed their
seniors was not received favoraDly by the Nicaraguan officers
already serving in the Guard. To quiet, or at least ease, this
discontent, General Matthews issued a special order on Octo-
ber 21, 1932, stating that it was his intent, upon graduation
of the present class of the Military Academy, to promote those
qualified by examination to the next higher rank (The ni?hest
rank held at that time by a native officer was 1st Lt. ; there-
fore 1st. Lts. would be promoted to captain, etc.)except for
2nd lieutenants (temporary) who would be appointed permanent
2nd lieutenants (Special Order No. 33-1932, neadquarters,
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, October 21, 1932, printed in
Smith, et al., Organization and Operations of the Guardia
Nacional
, p . 1 59. ).
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Sacasa selected, perhaps under pressure from Moncada,
Hanna, and Matthews, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Liberal, Anastasio Somoza, as ,iefe director . * President
Moncada subsequently aopointed Somoza a brigadier General in
the Guard, and Somoza assumed the interim position of Assistant
J.;fe Director on November 14, 1932, orior to accepting the
office of director in January. ° The apprenticeship of the
other senior officers was not as long as General Somoza' s.
However, the Marines did provide tnese officers with a two
week course in administration and in the basics of command
and combat following their aopointments from civilian life
in November and December, 1932, '
The Americans turned over command of the Northern and
Central Areas and the department of Chontales on December 15.
In the remaining Areas, the .'.arines of the Guard concentrated
in the principal towns—on the ./est Coast, along the rail line
in order to protect the route of evacuation to the embarkation
port of Corinto, and on the East Coast at Puerto Cabezas and
2 %\ Llett, "Guardia Nacional," pp. 295-97.
2t>Letter from the Commanding Officer, Nicaraguan
National Guard Detachment, to the Major General Commandant,
USMC, Managua, 15 December 1932, riox 13, File Folder 4, FRC.
2 ?Millett, "Guardia nacional," p. 298.
2
"Hanna to Stimson,
Relations, 1932, V. p. 908.
December lo, 1932, Foreign
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Bluefields. ^ on January 1, 1933 » following the inauguration
of President Sacasa, General Matthews relinquished command of
the Guardia Nacional to General Somc^a.-* The next day, the
last of the Marines and Navy personnel boarded the troop ships
at Corinto and sailed from Nicaragua. The State Department
released the following statementi
Today the United Staxes marines leave Nicaragua. No
American armed forces will remain in that country, either
as instructors in the constaoulary, as a Legation Guard,
or in any oth^r capacity whatsoever, • • •
The withdrawal of the American forces,. . • marks the
termination of the SDecial relationship which has existed
between the United States and Nicaragua.-' 1
The six year intervention was over. The Guard and Nicaragua
were left to stand or fall on their own. As Assistant Secretary
of State Francis White had predicted a few months earlier, the
United States got out "bag ana baggage."^ 2
2Q^Memorandum from Commanding General, Second Brigade
USMC, to General Matthews, Managua, 29 October 1932; and
Directive from the Commanding Officer, iNicaraguan National
Guard Detachment, to All Area and Department Commanders,
Managua, 3 December 1932, both located in box 12, File Folder
26, FRC.
3°Hanna to Stimson, January 2, 1933 » Foreign Relations ,
1932. V, p. 924.
31press Release Issued by the Department of State,
January 2, 1933 # Foreim Relations , 1933. V, pp. 848-^9.
•^Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ('white)




Peace spared or denied, deoendin?": on one's ooint of
view, the native led Guardia Kacional de Nicaragua from a
final confrontation with the Sandinistas. On Feoruary 2,
1933, as a result of negotiations begun in late December,
1932, Sandino signed, in Managua, a peace treaty with the
Nicara~uan government of President Sacasa. Sandinistas
oe^an turning themselves and their arms in at San Rafael
del Norte, Department of Jinotega, on February 22. 2 Upon
completion of the disarmament in early March, aooroximately
1800 to 3000 men claiming allegiance to Sandino had surren-
dered alons; witn at least part of their arms and ammunition.-^
Whether or not the Guard, under native officers,
could have been successful in oermanenxly disrupting the
Sandinista movement is open to snecul ition. The Guardia was
^lillett, "Guardia Nacional," pp. 308-09. 312-16.
The text of the peace agreement is printed in Smith, e_t al.
,
Organization and Operations of tne Guardia i\acional
, pp.
285-87.
2Macaulay, The Sandino Affair
, p. 2^7.




rift by dissension (Academy graduates versus the political
aoDointees) , wixhout air support, and was low on ammunition
and arms. On the other hand, the Guard officers apparently
were willing to engage Sand ino and had been busy increasing
the force level of the Guard until it numbered about 4000
men, including auxiliaries, by early February, 1933. This
size of a force, properly led and armed, may have been suf-
ficient to reduce Sandino to a nuisance. It is improbable
that it could have eliminated him altogether.
The lack of a "crucible test of major combat," as
one author has commented, makes it difficult to form an
evaluation of the Marine Corps effort to develop a militarily
competent National Guard. * The basic premise of the training
effort was correct. Execution was faulty for a variety of
reasons, some of which .vere beyond the control of the Corps.
The concept of placing professional officers and noncommissioned
officers in command of an indigenous force lacking any prior
formal training and traditions is the quickest and most
efficient method to develop such a force into a competent
organization.
4
Ibid ., pd. 300, 310-14, 317. 320, 323.
^Megee, "United States Military Intervention in
Nicaragua, 1909-1932," p. 207.
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There are only two ways that the military of one
state can train the military of anotner—either the "in-
structors" are in a command position or they are not. One
commands, or he does not command. There is no intervening
position. In other words, the training of an indigenous force
by a foreign military can eitner be by advice or by command.
Both can work equally well. The former takes longer and is
politically more oalataole to the host state; the latter is
quicker but harder for tne host to swallow. The advisor has
no authority (and fortunately, from the advisor's point of
view, no responsibility) • He can not issue a direct order
to those he is supervising. ;ie can cajole, he can plead, he
can urge, he can beg. He can quit or tnreaten to cut off
suoplies and suoport, but he can not direct. Some tangential
authority may accrue to him if he has control over the al-
location of money and material, but this method of exercising
authority is not responsive to immediate decisions necessitated
by crises. It is too slow, for the desired results often
occur after the fact; and there is no guarantee that such
action on the part of tne advisor v/ill orevent repetition of
mistakes in the future. An advisory effort is clearly more
suitable to peacetime instruction than it is to training in a
combat environment. In wartime, tnere is no adequate sub-
stitute for an order. Unfortunately, from tne perspective
of the military conducting tne traininr, advice may have to
suDolant commands even in war.
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A nation that skives command of its armed forces to the
military of another state is forgoing its sovereignty. To be
sovereign is to have the suoreme lawgiving and law-enforcing
authority within a certain Territory." Without a doubt, the
surrender of the control of one's army, an executive agency,
is concomitantly the surrender of one's sovereignty. In
Nicaragua, the Jiaz government was willing to relinquish its
sovereignty to the United States because it was in danger of
losing that sovereignty to the Liberals. In return for U.S.
suooort (until the 1928 elections), the Conservative govern-
ment acceded to tne American demands for making peace with the
Liberals. Stimson virtually dictated the terms of the peace
proDOsal to the Nicaraguan government. One of those terms was
the creation of an apolitical national constabulary under the
command of American officers--an organization that would be
only nominally responsible to the Nicaraguan president. Only
a government exDeriencing a situation of extreme emergency will
be willing to relinquish th<? command of its armed forces to a
foreign oower. When the possible gains from such an action
exceed he possible costs of not so acting, one can expect a
government to request or at least accept a foreign military
mission with the autnoritv to command.
°Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations i The
Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed.; New Yorki Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 1967) , p. 305.
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The situation in Nicaragua in the 1920 *s was ideal
for a military mission of this type. Aa American commanded
National Guard was ^ceptable to the Jiaz regime, and Nic-
aragua had no standing army nor national police organization
with their own history and traditions. In addition, the
forces that did exist were devoid of any prior military
training (with the possible exception of Carter's National
Guard). These conditions made possible the establishment of
a military organization under the control of American officers.
The government accepted the Marine tutelage, and the Marines
did not have to overcome an indigenous, professional military
with its own doctrine and organization. The Americans created
the first national military and police in Nicaragua—the
Guard ia Nacional . There were no predecessors.
It is unlikely that the favorable conditions the
Marines found in Nicaragua in the 1920* s will be duplicated
anywhere in the world today. Generally, the most under-
developed of states has at least a small standing army or a
national police organization. These armed forces or oolice
are likely to have oeen tin; recipient of British, French,
American, or Russian trainin sometime in the past. They will
have set attitudes, concepts, and self-interests. The officers
and men would likely oe hostile and resistant to assuming a
subordinate status to foreign troops. .Vhile these factors
would not preclude the establisnment of a foreign tutelage over
the native force, if invited or accepted by the host country,
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it certainly would make the execution of training more dif-
ficult than if they did not exist. However, in this era of
ardent nationalism, the states that might need such a training
mi sion are much more likely, when faced with a military crisis,
to request assistance from a friendly cower in the form of
combat personnel and advisors. The host country would probably
desire the foreign troops to assume tiie bulk of combat oper-
ations while it regroups and retrains its own forces witn the
help of the foreign advisors.
This formula for assistance might also be more
politically suitable to the donor state than one involving
direct command over indigenous forces. By posixng as an ally
and benefactor, tne foreign power could perhaps evade the
acrimonious accusations that would likely result from a policy
that was suggestive of occupation and "imoerialism. " whether
the assisting state, with the consent of the recipient govern-
ment, elects to train the native forces by command or advice,
it seems certain that if the military situation in the host
country has deteriorated to the extent that foreign combat
troops are needed to redress the oreaicament; both states
involved will want to use these troops in active operations to
relieve the oressure on the native military in order tnat it
may be trained, equipped, ana organized as soon as possible.
This is assuming, of course, that both states are interested
in terminating this combat assistance quickly. Sucn a
termination can be brought about by defeating the enemy or by
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reolacing the foreign troops with native forces, which is
the puroose of a training program. In Nicaragua, the Marine
Second Brigade performed the majority of the offensive activ-
ities during the first two years of the campaign against
Sandino while marine tutors groomed the Guard.
If the training mission is to be of the nature of an
advisory effort, tnen the foreign state must be willing to
exoend the additional time, men, money, and material that
this method will require as compared to that of command. The
results of the two methods are the same—military competence.
The advisory technique takes longer; and because it does so,
the assisting military can exoect to carry the burden of com-
bat operations for a greater o~riod of time than would be re-
quired if it had command. Hence, more casualties and an
increased expenditure of money and material. The advisory
method requires more time because there will be an inherent
tendency on the part of the force being trained to learn by
mistake rather than by advice. Even if the individual advisor
can establish the best of relationsnips with his counterpart,
the native officer or enlisted man may oe reluctant to try a
new approach, or concept, or way of doing something due, per-
haps, to pride i or because the suggested action violates the
norm or contradicts previous training. If the advisor is
fortunate, his counterpart will insist upon oerforming tne
task "his own way" only once. If not, it may take several
repetitions of the same mistake before the native soldier is
convinced that the advisor was right all along. Unfortunately,

this all takes time, and it may cost lives. In peace, time
is not such a orecious commodity. In war, it is. Lives
always are. The advisor is not always going to oe correct.
When his advice is refused, there maybe a very good reason
why it was not accepted. Experience may nave taught the
native something that the foreign Drofessional does not Know.
However, tne tendency should not be one of tne advisor "going
native," but rather one of oersistently urging the indigenous
military to adoot the standards, concents, oractices, and
procedures, suitably adaoted to the local situation, of tne
advisor's own military. Unfortunately, one can not ensure
the imolementation of advice; one can only offer it and hope.
The advisory method of training indigenous forces
does not produce a more proficient military than does the
command technique. In the former, the learning process takes
place through the realization that the foreign professional
is proffering good advice. This realization is the result
of acting on the advice and discovering that it is a satisfac-
tory way of performing the tasK, or oy trying other methods,
finding that they fail, and finally accepting the advisor's
suggestion. There are oossible flaws in this process. One
is that while the native military is trying out its own ideas,
it may find one that works. It may be wasteful of men, equip-
ment, or time and may be less effective than the advisor's plan,
but it works. At this Doint, "satisficing" may occur.

1^5
Satisficin^; is accepting xhe first alternative that achieves
the desired results.' In other words, the native military
having found a workable method may reject any further advice
on the matter. The other possible failing in the advisory
technique is that the advisor's counxerparx may just ignore
his advice altogether. In which case, training ceases.
A foreign military mission with the authority to
command overcomes many of the problems involved in training
by advising. However, it also creates problems of its own.
There is bound to be some degree of hostility and resentment
on the part of the indigenous forces. The intensity of which
increases in prooortion to the length of time tne native
military has existed, the extent of success it nas enjoyed in
past operations, and the amount of training it has had. The
greater the animosity and indignation, the greater is the
possibility of resistance to change which would in turn
adversely affect the training: effort. Tne advantage of command,
however, does enable the foreign military to conduct training
by demonstrating tne orop ?r method or procedure, having the
trainees try it, and Xnen having them repeat and refine the
execution until oerformance is satisfactory. This enforced
'Herbert A. Simon, Administrative behavior (2nd ed
.
j
New Yorki Free Press, 195771 quoted in William J. Coolin,
Introduction to InXernaxional Politics ! A Theoretical Overview
(Chicago » /'iarkham Publishing Company, 197171 pp. 43-4^.
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inculcation, while having; the benefit of requiring less time
than the trial-and-error attempts that are orone to occur in
an advisorv situation, is only effective to the extent that
the native officers and men are convinced of the validity of
the instruction. Conviction often comes by the simple ex-
oedient of doin? and zhen ooserving that what was taught
actually works. Howev-r, even if thenative military rec-
ognizes that a particular technique is a correct one, if such
a procedure is too alien, for whatever reason, it will not
survive beyond the termination of the foreign tutelage. The
native forces will modify it or abandon it.
Permanency of training, and hence competence, is the
goal of any military training mission whetner it is accom-
plished by exerting: authority or by persuasion. In an
advisory effort, the inuigenous military achieves competency
by benefiting from the greater exoertise of the advisor and
by learning from its own mistakes. In the case of foreign
officers actually exercising command, these officers implant
standard operating procedures in the native force. Once
learned and accepted, these procedures tend to become permanent
and enable the native military to develop into a competent
organization.
In Nicaragua, the Marines dia have command of the Guard,
and they did provide Nicaragua with a more proficient military
than it had ;ver had t ;fore. Unfortunately, insofar as an
evaluation is concerned, Sanaino never tested tne Guard's
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comDetency under native leadership, however, the Quardia .
in General Somoza's hands, was a stron? enough organization
to successfully assasinate Sandino in February, 193^, without
suffering; any major repercussions, and then force the resig-
nation of President Sacasa in June, 1936, replacing him with a
Somoza supporter. General Sornoza, in firm control of the
country due to the Guard, was elected president in Jecember,
1936." The Guard thus evolved into an entirely different
organization than the one the State Department intended it to
be--trained, for the most part, it wasj but it was certainly
not non-oartisan nor even biDartisan.
The State Department, tnrough its agent, the Marine
CorDS, could have not but failed in its attempt to transform
a traditionally political organization in Nicaragua— the armed
forces--into a non-partisan body. The end of the non-partisan
Guard came with the State Department's acceptance of Mattnews'
recommendation that the Nicaraguan government appoint its
senior Guard officers equally irom each of the two principal
oarties (See supra
, p.. 130) . From this point on, non-partisan-
ship was a dead issue. The State Department continued to refer
8Millett, "Guardia Nacional," op. 3^0-57, 372-99,
passim . Since General Somoza's ascendency to the presidency
in 1936, the Somoza family has ruled Nicaragua. President
Anastasio Somoza was assasinated in September, 1956. He was
succeeded by his son Luis. At the present time, another son,




to the Guardia Nacional as "non-partisan, " out clearly it
was supporting the i reation of a Dipartisan Guard. Tnis policy
was certainly more in accord with the realities of Nicaraguan
politics than one pursuing the establishment of an apolitical
armed force. Even more so would have been the policy proposed
in Matthews' original plan to permit the new president to
aoDoint whomever he wished to the senior grades upon his
assumDtion of office (See supra , o,128 ). Assuming Sandino
could have somehow been neutralized, this plan probably would
have achieved half of the State Department's oojective. It
would have provided Nicaragua with political stability, not
throueh democracy as the State Department desired, but by the
control of a better armed, oetter trained, and more competent
military than Nicaragua had ever nad before.
It is easy in retrospect to realize that the estaolish-
ment of a non-political constabulary in Nicaragua was an
impossibility. However, even at the time, personnel in the
Marine Corps and in the State Department warned that the pur-
suit of such an objective was futile. In 1926, the then
American Minister, ttberhardt, wrote to Secretary of State
Kellogg "that the time has not yet come, if it ever will, when
a non-partisan constabulary or National Guard, organized under
American ideas and ideals, will oe a success in Nicaragua. It
9is not wanted." General Iceland echoed these sentiments in
Bernard i. to Kelloge, April 8, 192o, State Department
File No. 817.1051/99, General Records of the Department of State,
Record Group 59, National archives, Washington, quoted in
Millett, "Guardia Nacional," pp. 401-02.
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April, 1929. Two montns before, fresident r-loncada told
Eberhardt the same thing—a non-partisan Guardia was an impos-
sibility. As the intervention dragged on, it became more
and more apparent to tr.ose associated witn it that an apolitical
National Guard was not a viable objective . This realization,
expressed by the American Charge, jeaulac , in 1931 and more
strongly by Laurence Ju ran in the Jivision of Latin American
Affairs at the State Department in late 1931 and again in tne
sorins: of 1932, resulted in the State Jepartment's acceptance
12
of a bipartisan Guard.
The fact that a non-partisan constabulary was alien
to Nicaraeuan politics severely limited the ability of the
Guard's American leadership to provide the Guard ia with trained
senior officers. As Matthews said, no Nicaraguan presiaent
was willing to appoint men to high position in the Guard who
were not loyal to the president and to the president's party.
In other words, any person being groomed for a key position in
the Guard would have had to been acceptable t, the president
of Nicaragua and probably would have remained in office only
during that particular oresiuent's term. Thus, even if the
Marines in the Guard had been willing to have Nicaraguans
Kamman, Searcn for Stability , p. 173.
-^Eberhardt to Kellosrg, February 14, 1929, Foreign
Relations
, 1929, III, p. t>15.
12Millett, "Guardia Nacional," dp. 301-05.
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aopointed in a training statwj to senior positions in the
Guard i
a
earlier in the intervention—and the indications are
they would not have been--the likelihood of their continuance
in office would have been slight, and whatever expertise the
native officers may have acquired would have left with them. 13
-^The Marine opuosition to senior native officers was
based on the premise that no Nicaraguan was qualified to com-
mand American officers and men. To gain the expertise re-
quired, the Marines suggested that Nicara.euans selected by the
president as the future senior oificers of the Guard "accept
commissions as Second Lieutenants, or in other junior ranks,
in order to gain the experience necessary to enable them to
properly assume the duties and responsibilities of higher
command" (Smith, e_t al. , Organization and Operations of the
Guardia Nacional , o. 1^7. T~» Logically, tnis was correct. How-
ever, this attitude shows a lamentable lack of awareness of
the nature of the people and the nolitics of Nicaragua. The
men the president wouid have aopointed as trainees for important
and Dowerful positions in the Guard would have been men prom-
inent in Nicaraguan oolitics--ex-senators, deputies, caoinet
ministers, officials of the party, and colonels and generals in
the late revolutionary or government armies. The Marine Corps
may have equated these positions to tnat of a Marine second
lieutenant or less; but to a Nicaraguan general, he was a
general not a mere second lieutenant! It woula have been
virtually impossiole for prominent Nicaraguans to acceDt such
a demeaning rank, and none did ( loid . ) . It seems to this
writer that the problem of Nicaraguan "face" and the Marine
concern for qualified native officers could have been avoided
by the expedient of providing distinguished Nicaraguans with
the rank and privileges in the Guard commensurate with their
social status while at the same time, at least initially,
denying them any authority or responsibility. They could have
been appointed as "assistants" to the American commanders and
at first just observed tneir Marine tutors. Gradually, the
Marines could have given them administrative authority and then
operational authority with decisions initially subject to
American approval. When the Marines found that this approval
was no longer necessary, the tutelage would have been over; and
the Marines could have gone home. Whetner tne American leader-
ship of the Guard considered such a training program or not is
not known to this writer. Anyway, the above proposition is
rather academic since, as indicated in the text, native senior
officers would have been unlikely to remain in their posts
beyond the next presidential election.
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Even if the Nicaraguan oolitical parties and the State Jeoart-
ment had been able to arrange the bioartisan comuromise earlier
in the intervention (which seems unlikely since the iJepartment
would have had to admit much sooner than apparently it was
oreoared to do that a non-partisan Guard was an impossibility),
at the very least the two ranking officers in the Guardia , the
jefe director and the chief of staff, as orovided in bipartisan
agreement, would have had to been reolaced if the party in
power changed. Had the party remained the same, it seems
likely tnat the new president would have been sorely temoted
to surrolant his predecessor's aopointees to these two oositions
with his "own" men. In other words, continuity in the native
leadership of the Guardia , although possible, probably would
have been difficult even under the bipartisan agreement.
during the oeriod of the U.S. oresence in Nicaragua,
changes in native officer oersonnel, altnough wasteful, could
have been brought about oeacefully, or oerhaps even avoided;
but with the withdrawal of the Marines, it is doubtful that
the substitutions would have been tranquil. Certainly the
officers themselves would have objected as well as tne outgoing
administration (a continuance in office of the same Darty would
have reduced but orobably not eliminated discord) . Political
instability , which the St .te Jeoartmsnt was trying to prevent,
would have been the result of the replacement by one regime
of another's senior Guardia officers.
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The solution to the State Jepartment * s desire for
stability and the Marine's resDonsioility for training senior
native officers was to support the oeroetuation in office of
one party, or better yet in the context of Nicaraguan Dolitics,
one individual. A party or individual supported Dy xhe United
States, or at least treated in a manner resembling beneficent
neglect, would have been able to form a government assisted by
a Marine trained, loyal, and militarily competent national Guard
that could have Drovided Nicaragua with stability although not
democracy. This, of course, during the era of "making the
world safe for democracy" would have been contrary to American
ideals and policy. The United States, at the time, did not
support dictatorships in order to achieve political objectives.
However, it seems to this writer that such a course of action
would have been tne only one which would have enabled the
Marine Corps to effectively train Hicaraguans for senior
officers positions in the Guard. It didn't happen, and the
Marines didn't train the officers.
Despite tne inherent difficulties in providing the
Guardia with trained senior officers and despite the lack of
sufficient funds early in the tutelage to support a junior
officer training program, the Marines could have better pre-
pared the National Guard for its potential confrontation with
Sandino than it did. The Marines in the Guard, knowing as
of February, 1931» th t the U.S. withdrawal was definitely
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going to occur in January, 1933t did not expedite the
training of junior officers so that all of these officers
could have had adequate field exDerience by tne date of the
turnover. Since the Guardia Marines were aware of the with-
drawal date, it is difficult to exolain why they did not
adjust the training period of the fourth Academy class (May 1,
1932—December 1, 1932) so that the seventy-three graduates of
this class could have had more than a few weeKs of field duty
under exoerienced hicaraguan or Marine officers. One can
onlv assume that the Marines did not believe that an immediate
clash with Sandino would occur upon withdrawal, or they con-
sidered that the formal school training was more important to
the development of the young Nicaraguan officer than field
experience.
Another deficiency in the implementation of the program
for training the Guardia was the absence of any planned
preparation of the members of the Corps for the duties they
would assume upon joining the Nicaraguan national Guard
Detachment. Desoite the Marine Corps' severe Dudgetary
restraints and its heavy commitments and the Guard's urgent
need for officers in the field, if either organization had
considered that the benefits would have exceeded the cost
Fifty-five of the seventy-three graduates were
assigned to the Northern and Central Areas (Letter from the
Commanding Officer, nicaraguan National Guard Detachment,
to the Major General Commandant, USMC , Managua, 15 December
1932, Box 13 t File Folder ^, FRC . ) . The Marines turned over
these two areas to native officers on December 15» 1932.
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of a urogram of formal indoctrination in the various facets
of Nicarasuan society and in the oroblems the individual
Marine instructor was likely to encounter during his tour
with the Guard, the Corps or the Guard woula have found a way
to provide this training. That they did not make an attempt
to even provide a minimum indoctrination period of, say, a
month indicates that familiarization with Nicaragua, Wicaraguans,
and Dr obi ens unique to training an indigenous force had a very
low priority. Certainly, not all members of tne National Guard
Detachment needed such training, some having had experience as
instructors in other native constabularies; but for those who
had not had previous exDOSure to wording with native troops,
the Corps or the Guard should have made whatever sacrifice was
required to at least orovide some minimum training in this area.
The possible gains of better working relationships with native
members of the Guard, perhaps fewer mutinies and desertions,
better public relations, increased popular supoort, and the
better intelligence that might have resulted from even a small
amount of indoctrination in the Nicaraguan life-style warranted
some attemDt in providing the Guard i
a
Marine with familiarization
with the Nicarasruan ana his culture. The Marine assigned to
the Guard also needed Spanish lan-mage training. However,
this would have required the Marine Corps establishing an ex-
oensive school, orovidin^ the time for personnel to attend the
school, and detailing, sufficiently in advance, the Marines
who were to e;o to the Guard in order that these men could
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receive language training prior to their assignment as a
Guard i
a
officer. Certainly, the Marine Corps, if had chosen
to do so, could have overcome these organizational and finan-
cial problems, but it didn't. In retrospect, one can not but
feel that the training of the Guard ia iNacional de Nicaragua
was an ad hoc, secondary effort. It seems apparent that in its
list of considerations, headquarters, Marine Corps, placed
the Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment and the Guard ia
Nacional near the bottom. The Marines of the Guard succeeded,
for the most part, in training the Nicaraguans. .however, with
a greater expenditure of funds ana effort on the part of the
United States and the Corps, these Marines could have been
better prepared for their task and, perhaps, could have trained
more of the junior officers, at least, earlier in the tutelage.
The U.S. attempt to engender stability in Nicaragua
through the oractice of free elections failed. The very
organization that the State department intended to act as the
guardian of democracy by ensuring such elections, the National
Guard, became inevitably, a deciding, vice neutral, factor in
Nicaraguan politics. Non-oartisanship left with the Marines
in 1933* The Marines trained the Guardia and endowed it with
a technical competency. They did not alter the basic attitudes,






Tipitapa, May 4, 1927
General Jose Maria Moncada,
Tipitaoa.
Dear General Moncada:
Confirming our conversation of this
morning, I have the honor to inform you that I am authorized
to say that the President of the United States intends to
accept tne request of the Nicaraguan Government to supervise
the election of 1928; that the retention of President Diaz
during the remainder of his term is regarded as essential
to that plan and will be insisted upon; that a general dis-
armament of the country is also regarded as necessary for
the proper and successful conduct of such election; and that
the forces of the United States will be authorized to accept
the custody of the arms of those willing to lay them down,
including the government, and to disarm forcibly those who
will not do so.
Very respectfully
,
/s/ HENRY L. ST BISON
Sourcei Henry L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua
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Jul. 31. slations, !L927, *-.
Mar. 3i 1928 350 Nicaragua Microfilm Reel No. 14, HQ, USMC
June 16, 1928 3^0 H it H ii H ii •i
Sept. 22, 1928 200 M H n H it n H
Dec. 1, 1928 150 H •i H it H H •i
Mar. 9, 1929 220 it •i ii •i H ii ii
June 3» 1929 150 Nicaragua Microfilm Reel No. 18, HQ
,
USMC
SeDt.ll, 1929 175 ii H •i I •• •i H
Nov. 11, 1929 150 H H •i H ii it H
Mar. 31. 1930 250 ii H H H H H H
June 30
,
1930 300 H •i •i ii ii H •i
Sept. 30, 1930 200 Nicaragua Microfilm Reel No. 19, HQ, USMC
Nov. 30, 1930 200 Nicaragua Microfilm Reel No. 14, HQ, USMC
Mar. 1, 1931 500 Box 10, File Folder 1, FRC
June 1, 1931 500 •i H i • ii ii i i





Notesi When the Sandinistas demobilized in February and
March of 1933. approximately 1800 to 3000 men claiming
allegiance to Sandino turned themselves in to govern-









Str ensrth b Duty Station
COTID, Off Bnl a (Co. HQ)
Operationsa (City, Department)
1st. Co. Jul. 1, 1927 3 50 Ocotal, Nueva Segovia
2nd. Co. Aug. 4, 1927 No info. prov. Chinandega, Chinandega
3rd. Co. Aug. 22, 1927 4 87 Pueolo Nuevo, Esteli
4th. Co. Nov. 1, 1927 3 50 Nat'l Penitentiary,
Managua
5th. Co. Nov. 21, 1927 6 62 Leon, Leon
6th. Co. Apr. 13, 1928 3 23 Jinotega, Jinotega
7th. Co. Apr. 17, 1928 No info. orov. Jinotepe, Carazo
8th. Co. May 18, 1928 4 40 Matagalpa, Matagalpa
9th. Co. Jun. 6, 1928 4 21 Masaya, Kasaya
10th. Co. Jul. 18, 1928 4 40 Esteli, Esteli
11th. Co. Jul. 27, 1928 No info. prov. Juigalpa, Chontales
12th. Co. Aug. 20, 1928 No info. prov. Granada, Granada
13th. Co. Aug. 21, 1928 3 10 Rivas, Rivas
16th. Co. Mar. 15, 1929 3 75 Presidential Guard,
Managua
No info. prov. No information provided, Off. Officers,
Enl. Enlisted
Notes i a. Date is in some cases the date trie company departed
Manasrua and in others the date operations began at
the assigned duty station.
b. All officers are Marines (or i^avy medical personnel).
The first Nicaraguan officer was not apnointed until
July 30, 1929. All enlisted are Nicaraguans.
c. No information was provided on the 14 th and 15th
Companies or even if they were established or not.
d. The 1st and 3rd Companies were combined on uec. 31,
1927. The new combined company became the Managua
(city) Police Company on Mar. 16, 1928.
Sourcei Julian C. Smith, et al. , A Review of the Organization
and Operation s of trie Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua
(n.p.





TOTAL CASUALTIES, a 1927-1932
FRIENJLY CASUALTIES
Year USMC b USMC
in
GN C Total
1927d 3? e 2 13 52
1928 33 e 2 35
1929 5 2 11 18
1930 14 2 37 53
1931 2 5 41 48
1932 6 74 80

































Total 139 341 1246 1726
Notesi a. Casualties include killed in action, died of
wounds, and wounded in action.
b. USMC casualties do not include Marines serving
with the Guardia Nacional but do include the
2nd Brigade, Marine snip detachments, and Marine
aviation units.
c. GN casualties do not include Marines serving with





d. The year 1927 begins with the contact at
Ocotal on July 16.
e. Includes the only two Marine aviators killed in
action (1927) and the only t'.iarine aviator wounded
in action (1928) during the intervention.
f. Sandinista casualties are those inflicted solely
by ground forces—that is by USMC patrols, combined
USMC-GN oatrols, or by GN patrols.
g. Includes "estimated" Sanainista casualties.
h. Does not include "estimated" Sandinista casualties.
i. Includes casualties inflicted by two USMC—volunteer
contacts with the Sandinistas.
Sources i "PrinciDal Engagements the Marine Detachments have
had with bandits in Nicaragua since May 15 » 1927;"
"Casualties in Nicaragua from Jecember 23 i 1926, to
February 8, 1928;" monthly report on "bandit Contacts
in Nicaragua," from April, 1923, to November, 1932;
"Marine Corps Casualties in Nicaragua! January 1,
1927, to January 2, 1933 (corrected copy)," all
located in File "N," HQ, USMC ; "Annual Reoort of the
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua for the Period Com-
mencing October 1, 1931» and Ending SeDtember 30t
1932," Box 10, File Folder 1^, FRC ; and the "Official
List of Contacts of the Guardia Nacional de Nic-
aragua," printed in Smith, et al. , Organization and





Fig. 1.—Map of Nicaragua
Source » Bernard C. Nalty, The United St tes Marines in
Nicaragua (rev. ed., 2nd reprint; iVashingtoni Historical
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Fig. 2.—Political/Military Departments of Nicaragua
Source 1 Julian C. Smith, e_t al
.
, A Review of the Organization
and Operations of the Gumrdia Nacional de Nicaragua
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